

Reviewed by Zubair Qamar
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**Introduction and Outline of the Review**

This review will respond to key arguments and issues in *Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism*, edited by Katharine C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, with contributions from the editors and Stephen Ulph, John H. Moore, John Lenczowski, Robert R. Reilly, Thomas Joscelyn, and Sebastian L. Gorka. The review will be organized as follows:

**Part-1: Biographies of Authors and Institutions of Affiliation.** This section provides the biographies of the authors and editors, and institutions of affiliation, including The Westminster Institute, and publisher, Isaac Publishing. The aim of this section is to sufficiently familiarize readers with the authors to enable readers to better understand the authors’ perspectives more accurately and comprehensively.

**Part-2: Logic of book structure, organization, and related issues.** This section includes a general discussion of the relevance of certain chapters, as well as issues of grammar, spelling, and terminology.

**Part-3: Identification of the “enemy.”** This section discusses who is and is not the “enemy” in the perspective of the authors. This includes a discussion of the two general types of Islamists, how authors see the majority of Sunni Muslims as accomplices to Islamists, why the “Progressive Reformers” are the Muslims to support according to certain authors’ views, and clarity on what authors mean when they say they are not at war with Islam, and, by extension the wider Muslim community.

**Part-4: The Cold War approach of the authors, and the utility of applying any lessons to the battle against the Islamists.** This section includes a discussion of the unrealistic perceptions of the authors regarding the Cold War, and the prioritization and exaggeration of the role of “ideology.” The reviewer then questions the dubious utility of a selective understanding of the Cold War and its application to battling Islamists. Just as authors exaggerated the role of ideology in the Cold War, did they exaggerate the role of ideology in Islamism over other important factors? The exaggeration by authors of the role of ideology in Islamism is discussed in Part-6.

**Part-5: The authors’ views and arguments.** After knowing the biographies of authors/editors, their institutions of affiliation, the logic of book organization, a clear understanding of the “enemy,” and the Cold War approach of the authors to address the Islamist predicament, this section discusses the views and arguments of the authors in detail.

**Parts-6-11: Responding to the authors’ views and arguments.** These sections respond to the views and arguments of the authors/editors in detail:

**Part-6: Discusses the exaggeration of the role of Islamist ideology in Islamist and militant movements.** Islamism beyond ideology is discussed, including post-Islamism and the dilution of ideology. In addition, Al-Qa’eda beyond ideology is
discussed to illustrate that ideology is not necessarily the only, or even primary, cause of a militant’s outlook.

**Parts-7-8:** Comparing Islamists and militant movements today with classical Sunni Islam (political realm and combative jihad). The objective of Parts 7 and 8 is to demonstrate that, contrary to the authors’ claims, Islamism is a modern ideology *not* rooted in classical Sunni tradition, both in terms of political understandings, as well as in terms of combative *jihad*:

**Part-7: A comparison of the political realm in classical Sunni Islam with Islamism today.** This section compares the political realm of classical Sunni Islam, including the caliph-theologian arrangement, with the political realm of Islamist movements today. Islamism as an ideology today will be discussed and compared with classical Islam’s perspective, including a discussion of how the traditional caliph-theologian arrangement has been altered, and no longer represents the classical Sunni political arrangement.

**Part-8: A comparison of classical Sunni jihad and militant violence today.** This section discusses the violence of terrorists today and distinguishes their actions from classical Sunni combative *jihad* of the past. Discussions will be on the overview of the term *jihad*, the classical Sunni understanding of *jihad* in its various forms, war as the norm in early and classical Islam, non-Muslims under Muslim rule, the petering out of offensive *jihad*, the collaboration of Muslims and non-Muslims in *jihad*, and tolerance rather than active support of most caliphs by Muslims. Contrary to the authors’ views, terrorists today do not emulate classical Sunni warfare of the past, but ignore or selectively use tradition to mold their own “justification” for violence.

**Part-9: Discussion on ‘religion and terrorism,’ followed by a discussion of ‘Islam and terrorism,’ and foreign policy and terrorism.** This section discusses the “religion-terrorism” link, the Sunni perspective of terrorism, including a discussion of *hirabah, irhab, irjaf*, and related terms, to describe terrorism from a Sunni view, the al-qa’eda as today’s Khawarij, and a discussion of classical Sunni scholars who saw the Khawarij as heretics. A discussion of “Islam and Terrorism” will follow, including if the Qur’an (Islam’s holy book) teaches and condones terrorism, the lack of knowledge of Islam by al-Qa’eda recruits, and the “Verse of the Sword” (9:5) and the lack of reference to this verse by militants today. The next section discusses “foreign policy and terrorism,” including root-cause theory, exaggerating Islamist ideology over foreign policy, the effects of ignoring anti-Americanism while promoting democracy, and US foreign policy as the driving force behind anti-Americanism in the Arab world.

**Part-10: What do Muslims today really think?** This section aims to answer the question of what Muslims think today to separate the authors’ rhetoric from actual fact, as reflected in well-known and recent studies and polls. Contrary to the authors’ views, most Muslims do not support terrorism and share many of the
same aspirations as non-Muslims. Recent polls will be discussed to support this view, including the 2007 World Gallup Poll, “Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think,” which represents most Muslims worldwide and is the “largest, most comprehensive study of its kind,” and the Pew Research Center Poll of Muslims (The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society) conducted in 39 countries from 2008 to 2012. Other studies and polls will also be discussed. A discussion on what Americans think will follow. The next section will illustrate that the Muslim majority is not part of the problem, but the solution, and that overhyping the threat of “Islamic” terrorism is misleading in the fight against terrorists. This section explains that the book’s authors who seem unaware of these important polls have a skewed understanding of what Muslims think today. This distorted understanding of reality, when conveyed to security experts and policymakers, complicates and undermines the battle against terrorists and other extremists.

**Part-II: Addressing miscellaneous issues in the book.** This section discusses various issues in the book, including Katharine Gorka’s and Patrick Sookhdeo’s questionable approach to judging the effectiveness of important intelligence and national security reports. Moreover, Ulph’s chapter on Islamism’s comparison with twentieth century secular totalitarian movements will be discussed. The term “Islamofascism” is discussed, including the costs of usage of the term in counter-terrorism/extremism efforts. A discussion of the varieties of totalitarianism is discussed, as well as the differences between twentieth century secular totalitarian movements and Islamist movements, and the gap between rhetoric and practice of Islamists and their programs.

This is followed by a discussion of Thomas Joscelyn’s chapter on Jihadist States, and subsequently a discussion of how Reilly and Sebastian Gorka exaggerate the links between Syed Qutb and al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. The views of this link by scholars John Calvert, Fawaz Gerges, and William Shephard will be examined. Thereafter, a host of errors and dubious claims by Patrick Sookhdeo will be discussed, including giving readers the wrong year of a terrorism incident, as well as his misrepresentations of the following people: Islam scholar Olivier Roy, key “Progressive reformers” (including Khalid Abou El Fadl, Asghar Ali Engineer, and Farish Noor), Abdullah Azzam, and Bernard Lewis. This is followed by Ulph’s misrepresentation of the mujtahid Muslim scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

In addition, the reviewer questions Reilly’s moral argument to counter extremism, including a discussion of prioritizing foreign policy over values, and the immoral behavior of militants. Reilly’s call for a public diplomacy and communications institution and strategy to battle Islamists is then discussed, followed by a discussion of Sebastian Gorka’s misrepresentation of Pakistani General S.K. Malik. This is then followed by a discussion of the error of homogenizing the majority of Muslims as one group. The unrealistic warnings of a “global caliphate” will then be examined, followed by a discussion of Sookhdeo’s and Katharine Gorka’s unwarranted fears of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
Part-12: The conclusion. This section emphasizes the important conclusions, including recommendations on the way forward. It concludes that, contrary to Sun Tzu’s advice, the authors of the book do not understand the enemy because their blaming of terrorism on Islam is based on weak reasoning that contradicts the views of many scholars in the field, and blames the Muslim majority who are the most potent weapon against militancy. By doing so, the authors play into the hands of militants who struggle to promote war and a clash between Muslims and the rest of the world. The reviewer recommends being attentive to the effects of US foreign policy in the Arab world, as well as understanding and respecting Muslims and Islam, as per the results of recent polls. The authors’ own ideological infusion is then discussed, including a discussion of how their examination of matters of national security through such a lens can compromise sound understanding and advice to government and security professionals. The review then ends by recommending how the counter-ideology narrative should be refined, followed by the view that the authors’ recommendations should not be accepted by US policymakers and counter-terrorism professionals to ensure that terrorism does not become an even greater threat, to ensure continuing positive relations with the Arab and Muslim world, and to allow the strengthening of the security of the United States, its allies, and of the majority of peaceful Muslims globally.

Part-1: Biographies of Authors and Institutions of Affiliation

Before key arguments of the authors are discussed, it is essential to understand the biographies of the authors and institutes of affiliation to enable the authors’ main arguments to be understood and appreciated in a more informed manner by readers. In addition to providing the main elements of the authors’ biographies as stated in the book, the reviewer uses other sources for a more enriched and comprehensive understanding. One may refer to the “About the Authors” section of the book (p.235-238) to read how the authors chose to describe themselves, and compare their descriptions with the reviewer’s descriptions below.

Patrick Sookhdeo

Patrick Sookhdeo, an editor and contributor to the book, is described as a “leading expert on jihadi ideology and radical Islam.” Sookhdeo “received his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London” (p.237). The book notes that currently Sookhdeo is “Visiting Professor at the Defence Academy of the UK, Adjunct Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Guest Lecturer at the NATO school, Oberammergau, Germany, and lecturer at ARRC Germany on Islam and Islamic terrorism” (p.237), and has been involved in other related roles.[1]

Though curiously unstated in the book, Sookhdeo is described as an “ordained priest in the Church of England,”[2] International Director of the Christian charity group, Barnabas Aid, which sends “financial support to projects which help Christians where they suffer
discrimination, oppression and persecution as a consequence of their faith,” specifically “under Islam,” and, according to author Sebastian L. Gorka (husband of Katharine C. Gorka), is the “founder of Westminster Institute” (p.193). Sookhdeo has authored several books, including Global Jihad, which was reviewed by author and freelance journalist, Ben White. Two recent books by Sookhdeo are Islam in Our Midst: The Challenge to Our Christian Heritage (2011), and Is the Muslim Isa the Biblical Jesus? (2012). Sookhdeo in his personal website says he spent some time studying “theology at London Bible College.” After marrying one of his students, they “intended to go to South Asia as missionaries, but their hopes were dashed when they found that no mission society would accept either racially-mixed marriages or national (i.e. non-white) Christians as missionaries.” In 1970, Sookhdeo was “invited to work for the British Evangelical Alliance,” and was also appointed as the “secretary of one of the first race relations bodies in the British Church.” The book, “All One in Christ,” was authored by Sookhdeo and published in 1974. In 1975, the author and his wife, “started a ministry to British inner cities” and in the 1970s and 1980s “taught in various theological institutions including, in the UK, Oak Hill Theological College, Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, and Ridley Hall, Cambridge, as well as others overseas.” Sookhdeo’s website states his “main involvement was to train clergy and missionaries in culture and religion.”

Sookhdeo is affiliated with the mysterious International Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, that aims “to study contemporary Islamic movements and their impact on Christian minorities.” Sookhdeo was a guest speaker at the 2007 Counterjihad Conference in Brussels that also hosted Bat Ye’or and Andrew Bostom, well known for their anti-Islam views. Pamela Geller, another anti-Islam activist, described Sookhdeo’s presentation as the “most compelling presentation” and also interviewed Sookhdeo. Sookhdeo was also “quoted approvingly four times in the 1,500-page ‘manifesto’ of the Norwegian killer Anders Breivik,” and contributed a section to a book edited by Robert Spencer, another well-known anti-Islam author. Sookhdeo is controversial among leaders of the Church of England due to his views. Alex Murashko in an October 2011 article of the Christian Post said a “complaint…filed by a lay leader from the Church of England…challenged whether Barnabas Aid should be allowed to keep its charitable status when engaged in allegedly ‘divisive’ activity, according to a statement from Barnabas. The accusation included the charge that the material passed out by the group could incite racial hatred.” Barnabas Aid, however, was exonerated by the United Kingdom’s Charity Commission. Most of Sookhdeo’s life can be described as religious. His role in advising security and government staff came later and is superseded by his religious involvement.

Katharine C. Gorka – and The Westminster Institute

Katharine C. Gorka is described as the “Executive Director” of Westminster Institute on the book’s back cover and Westminster Institute website, which was established fairly recently in March, 2009. The Westminster Institute website states that she “received her M.Sc. in Economics from the London School of Economics (’87).” Gorka has “traveled extensively throughout Central and Eastern Europe conducting research on the post-communist transition and working for a number of organizations on democracy assistance projects in the region […].” Ms. Gorka also “co-founded with her husband, Dr.
Sebastian Gorka, the Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security (ITDIS), which focused on issues of economic reform and the problems associated with former communists and secret police in post-communist democracies.” She lived in Hungary for twelve years, returned to the US in 2008, and, as head of the Westminster Institute, is “responsible for helping to define the threat to liberty posed by Islamic terrorism and subversion in the United States.”[14] Gorka is also an “Executive Director” of Barnabas Aid.[15]

In addition to Sookhdeo and both Gorkas, all of the other authors are listed in the events page of the Institute.[16] Examples of other past events[17] listed in the Institute’s website include:

- The [Organisation of Islamic Cooperation] and the Islamist Agenda, by Stephen Coughlin,
- The West is Best: A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy, with Ibn Warraq, and
- Lord Or Many Gods? Can the God of the Bible and the God of the Koran be the Same?, with The Rt. Rev. Julian Dobbs, Convocation of Anglicans in North America

Discussing the above presenters in brief, Stephen Coughlin was allegedly removed from his post at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2008 due to his anti-Islam views. The lesson from Coughlin’s presentation by an attendee was that “Islam is out to take over the world and there is no such thing as a loyal American Muslim.”[18] Ibn Warraq is a well-known anti-Islam polemicist who does not require further elaboration. Retired Reverend Julian Dobbs is an Anglican preacher who served as an “Executive Director” of Barnabas Aid “where he developed awareness of persecuted Christians and the challenges of a resurgent Islam.”[19] It is interesting to note that the examples of events noted in the book (pg. 239, 240) do not list the above events. It appears that the Editors have attempted to conceal the anti-Islam and religious involvement of Westminster Institute in the book. Sookhdeo’s biography in the book also did not mention his ardent religious endeavors, in spite of his heavy involvement in Christian missionary activities, as illustrated earlier.

Isaac Publishing

The addresses of the Westminster Institute, Isaac Publishing, and Barnabas Aid are all located on the same street in McLean, Virginia.[20] Isaac Publishing mainly publishes books critical of Islam and for Christianity. The authors listed on the site (which seems to require updating) are Patrick Sookhdeo, Rosemary Sookhdeo (Patrick Sookhdeo’s wife), and Yusufu Taraki. Rosemary Sookhdeo is described as being “involved in pastoral/church planting ministry in the East End of London for 23 years” and “was responsible for training and coordinating the church planting and Muslim ministry and leading the outreach missions.” Yusufu Taraki is described as “a Professor of Theology and Social Ethics at the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS) and Director of the Centre for the Study of Religion, Church and Society (CRCS),” and other Christian affiliations.[21] Patrick Sookhdeo’s religious credentials and affiliations are already noted.
Stephen Ulph

Stephen Ulph is a “Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.” He is the “founder of Terrorism Focus and also the founder editor of the journals Terrorism Security Monitor and Islamic Affairs Analyst for Jane’s Information Group.” Ulph is described as a specialist in “analysis of jihadist and Islamist ideology[...]” (p.238). Ulph is the author of the three-part “Towards a Curriculum for Teaching Jihadist Ideology.”[22]

John H. Moore

In 1985, John H. Moore was appointed by President Ronald Reagan as “Deputy Director of the National Science Foundation,” later became an “administrator and faculty member at George Mason University” (p.236), and was the President of City Grove College. He also served as “Associate Director and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.” Moore received his doctorate in economics from the University of Virginia in 1966, is affiliated with the George Marshall Institute, which promotes climate change skepticism,[23] and is the author of several articles and books (p.236, 237).

Robert Reilly

Robert Reilly is currently a “Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Foundation.” He was a “special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and served as his liaison to the Catholic Church.”[24] He has taught at “the National Defense University,” “served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was a Senior Advisor for Information Strategy (2002-2006),” and was a former Director of Voice of America (VOA). He also served in the U.S. Information Agency. He describes himself as “a foot soldier in the Cold War” (p.151) and is listed as a member of the Board of Directors of MEMRI.[25] Reilly is the author of the book, The Closing of the Muslim Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern Islamist Crisis, in which he says that early Muslims opted mostly for revelation over reason, which led to a state of intellectual stagnancy and eventually terrorists like Osama bin Laden. Reilly believes, “The Middle East is poor because of a dysfunctional culture based upon a deformed theology [...].”[26]

Thomas Joscelyn

Thomas Joscelyn is a “Senior Fellow and Executive Director” of the “Center for Law and Counterterrorism at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies” – a neoconservative think tank and lobbying organization where author Sebastian Gorka also works. Eli Clifton in July 2011 said the, “FDD has a 10-year history of engaging in alarmist rhetoric and fear mongering,” including airing ads “conflating Osama bin Laden, Yasser Arafat and Saddam Hussein,” and also helping to “promote the ‘Bush doctrine’ which led to the invasion of Iraq.” Moreover, “[i]n recent years, FDD has become one of the…premier DC organizations promoting more aggressive actions against Iran.”[27] FDD’s Board of Advisers include Richard Perle,[28] former Chair of the Defense Policy Board and well-known neoconservative, syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer,[29] (quoted by Sebastian Gorka, p.191), and Gary Bauer,[30] President of the neoconservative non-profit, American Values, and Executive Board member of Christians United For Israel.[31]
Stephen M. Walt, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, says the FDD is a “fertile source of fear-mongering Islamophobia.”[32] Joscelyn has written for the Weekly Standard, is “Senior Editor of The Long War Journal,” and served as “senior terrorism adviser for Mayor Giuliani’s 2008 presidential campaign.” He was “named as one of Claremont Institute’s Lincoln Fellows” and has a BA degree in Economics from the University of Chicago. Joscelyn has written for the conservative Frontpagemag.com,[33] and has emphasized the Iran and Al-Qa’eda connection, though this has been challenged as an exaggeration since the disclosure of the Abbottabad Letters.[34]

**John Lenczowski**

John Lenczowski is the Founder and President of the The Institute of World Politics where, in Lenczowski’s words, “students study the GrecoRoman, Judeo-Christian moral tradition, and the ethics that derive from the philosophy of that tradition, and how those ethics should be applied to the use of power.”[35] He earlier served in the “State Department in the Bureau of European Affairs and as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.” He was also “Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council” where he “served as principal Soviet affairs adviser to President Reagan.” Lenczowski is the author of several articles and books, including the newly released “Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of US Foreign Policy” (p.236). In his article, “Leaving a Legacy for the Defense of Western and American Civilization,” Lenczowski lists examples of what he believes make civilization “fragile.” Among the examples he notes are “the traditional poor– with its unique and seemingly intractable pathologies” and the “growth of Islamic communities in Europe that threaten to erase the distinctiveness of individual European cultures.” These, along with other examples, like the rise of “Nazism,” “Communism,” and “Islamic fanaticism,” as well as “welfare states in the West” and “two world wars” were, or are, parts of the “problem” to Lenczowski.[36]

**Sebastian Gorka**

A December 2012 description of Sebastian Gorka says he “recently became a U.S. citizen,”[37] and Gorka describes himself as a “child of the Cold War.”[38] Gorka is the “Director of the Homeland Defense Fellowship Program of National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs, and Military Affairs Fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.” Gorka “teaches at Georgetown University, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and the FBI Academy” (p.235). Gorka has a PhD in Political Science and MA in Diplomacy and International Relations from Hungary, and a BA in Philosophy and Theology from London University. Gorka also gave a lecture at and is affiliated with the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET).[39] which “emphasizes Israel’s unique role as the eastern outpost of Western democratic values, holding down the fort against a rising tide of radical Islam” (italics added).[40]
Knowledge of the Authors’ Background

From the biographies and background of the authors, and their institutional affiliations, it is known that the authors have lived during and/or have largely been involved in US efforts related to the Cold War. Several authors served as political officials during the Cold War under President Reagan, all can be described as ‘conservative’ or ‘neoconservative,’ and most authors are sufficiently religious to express themselves religiously in their writings and religious positions. Several of the authors have associated with individuals openly critical of Islam, have worked with some of them, contributed to sections in the same books, participated in the same conferences, and, in at least one case (Sookhdeo), has been quoted by a Norwegian terrorist in his ‘Manifesto.’ While the Westminster Institute is outwardly described as an independent institute that examines the threat of extremism, it appears to substantially be a pro-Christian organization that primarily aims its attention at extremism that targets only Christians. Focus on, for example, the effects of “Islamic extremism” against Hindus and Jews, the extremism of minority radical groups in Christianity and other religions, and the effects on followers of other religions is absent. Whether or not the Institute and at least several of its propagators’ beliefs and involvement in a non-Muslim religion compromises the quality of their arguments and stated aims against “Islamic” radicalism is open to question, but one that the reviewer hopes to answer in the conclusion of the review.

Part-2: Book Structure, Organization, and Related Issues

The book consists of an Introduction, seven chapters, and three sections. Including Katharine C. Gorka, eight authors contributed to the sections (Introduction and seven chapters). The chapters are followed by Endnotes, author biographies, and ends with two pages on the Westminster Institute, including a list of recent events held by the Institute.

Initial Observations

There is no index, no chapter numbers in the main body of the book, but which are present in the Endnotes, thus making the book incongruous, and section titles have little relevance to the chapters that are supposed to describe them. For example, the two chapters under section-I (“Identifying the Enemy After the Death of Bin Laden”) are largely unrelated to what happened after Bin Laden. Chapter-1, “The West, Islam, and the Counter-Ideological War,” by Patrick Sookhdeo and Chapter-2, “Islam and Totalitarianism,” by Stephen Ulph are unrelated to any change following Bin Laden’s death.

Lessons from the Cold War to Defeat Islamism?

Section-II (“Learning From the Past”) has chapters by John Moore (“Ideology and Central Planning: Lessons from the Cold War”), John Lenczowski (“Political-Ideological Warfare in Integrated Strategy, and its Basis in an Assessment of Soviet Reality”), and
Robert Reilly ("Public Diplomacy in an Age of Global Terrorism: Lessons from the Past"). The problem, in the view of the reviewer, is that no meaningful lessons are actually learned beyond the claim that lessons could be learned by understanding the ideology of Islamism to defeat Islamism, just as the ideology of the (Communist) Soviet Union was learned to allegedly defeat the Soviet Union. The assumptions and weaknesses behind this argument will be explained in the sections below.

**Grammar, Spelling, and Terminology**

**Grammar and Phrases**

In addition to incongruence of section titles with chapters, the editors overlook grammatical and related issues. For example, the author says, “This is turn weakens their overall cause and justification” (p.12). It should read as “This in turn[…]”. Another example states, “Islamist reform includes the restoration of Islam’s universal mission to dominate and Islamic hegemony in both the domestic and global arenas” (p.20). The author probably means “to dominate and impose Islamic hegemony.” In another example, the author says, “In that sense they sound like to Islamists […]”(p.39). The word “to” should be deleted. Another statement reads, “Among other things, the Cold War experience shows how difficult is it to win ideological wars […]” (p.79). The author surely meant “how difficult it is […]”

**Incorrect Spelling**

There is also carelessness in spelling of some names. For example, Sookhdeo spells Delwar Hussain’s name as “Hussein” (p.18). Moreover, Sookhdeo says Umar “Faroul” (instead of Farouk) Abdulmuttalab (p.27). The book mentions “Samuel Huntingdon’s thesis” […] (p.238) instead of Samuel Huntington’s thesis. While these errors may be considered minor, the quality of editing could certainly have been improved.

**Dubious Terminology**

Sookhdeo and K. C. Gorka say that “The starting point for all these strategies is the correct use of terminology” […] (p.11).” While acknowledging the importance of correct terminology, the authors’ choice of words obscure more than help. For example, almost all Muslims except a minority of “Progressive reformers” are labeled as direct or indirect supporters of Islamism and terrorism. Homogenizing disparate strands of Muslims, past and present, with different and contradictory interpretations and goals into a single group glosses over many variables, nuances, and dynamics in the religious, political, social, and economic domains from both historical and contemporary perspectives, and simplifies a more complex and realistic description. The unsophisticated and distorted characterization of Muslims and the “enemy,” seen as fixed in time, requires urgent clarification. Similarly, the authors use the words terrorism and jihad, and jihadi and terrorist synonymously, blurring the boundaries between them, and using them loosely
and interchangeably. Contrary to the authors’ understanding, it will be explained below that the use of these words is counterproductive in the counter-terrorism narrative.

Other terms and phrases that are not very useful, are, for example, “the West” (p.12, 17, 80, 104, 107, 109, 144, 145, 152, 169, 172, 194), “Western liberal world order” (p.16), “Western governments” (p.17) “Western civilization” (p.79), “Western history” (p.79), “East and West” (p.95, 104), “Western leaders” (p.104), “Western silence and self-censorship” (p.104), “the Free World” (p.107), and “out-West” (p.194). The authors seem to use their bipolar understanding of the Cold War as a battle between “West” and “East,” and apply this to their understanding of Islam and Islamism, which, to them are not part of the “West.” Such terminology, while perhaps useful in only few respects, obscures more than clarifies if used excessively as it reinforces a “Clash of Civilizations” mentality that counter-terrorism experts are recommended to steer away from.

Irrelevant Chapters

John H. Moore’s chapter, “Ideology and Central Planning: Lessons From the Cold War” (p.79-94), mentions Islamists only on the first page: “The conflict with radical Islam is fundamentally a conflict of ideologies – the set of beliefs that underlie Western civilization on one side, the interpretation of Muslim beliefs that Islamists preach on the other” (p.79). Apart from saying that “ideological battles of the Cold War may shed light on our present conflict” and the difficulty of winning ideological wars, as understood by experience, Moore’s chapter is only about the Cold War with absolutely no mention of ‘how’ this knowledge could be used practically to counter ‘Muslim’ radicals today. In the view of the reviewer, it would have made no difference if this chapter was excluded from the book. Because it is in the book – under the heading “Learning From the Past” – it seems entirely irrelevant to the topic of the section, as the author does not explain how one should learn from the past. This further compromises the quality of the book.

Unfortunately, John Lenczowski’s chapter, “Political-Ideological Warfare In Integrated Strategy, and Its Basis in an Assessment of Soviet Reality” (p.95-147) – the longest chapter in the book (over 20% of the total pages of the book) – suffers from the same weakness. While explaining Reagan’s policy towards the USSR, which was understood through understanding the nature and ideology of the adversary, there is no mention of Islamism and terrorism, and how lessons could be learned and applied to combat radical Islamists, the central topic of the book. Therefore, this chapter could also have been removed. Because it was not, these fifty-two pages further compromise the quality of the section, as well as of the book.

The book’s third section, “Winning the Ideological War,” consists of chapters by Thomas Joscelyn (“The Jihadist States”) and Sebastian Gorka (“The Enemy Threat Doctrine of Al Qaeda: Taking the War to the Heart”). However, the chapter on “The Jihadist States” has nothing to do with the section that preceded it, and seems to be a chapter that belongs in a different section. The other chapter by Gorka discusses what the author believes is the “ideology” of Al-Qa’eda, but mainly repeats what other chapters – especially Chapter-1 by Sookhdeo – have already stated.
Before discussing the views of the authors in detail, it is important to first understand how the authors define and understand “Islamists” and the “enemy.” Understanding how the authors define “Islamists” will enable the reader to understand which Muslims are being referred to by the authors as the “enemy.”

**Part-3: Identification of the “Enemy”**

*Two General Kinds of “Islamists”*

Sookhdeo recognizes two basic types of Islamists: (1) “Radical Islamists,” like al-Qa’eda, and (2) “Gradualist Islamists,” (p.23) like the Muslim Brotherhood that temporarily use non-violent means to attain power through elections and other non-violent means, but are nevertheless allegedly supportive of violent insurgencies when they feel it is appropriate. (Sebastian Gorka calls the radical Islamists “kinetic terrorists” or “violent jihadists” – pg. 203 – and has the same general understanding of Islamists as Sookhdeo). Both groups are “jihadists” in their differing forms because they collectively exert a “global jihad” to ostensibly establish an Islamic caliphate that would subject populations to Shari’ah (Islamic Law). Sookhdeo says that the “border between mainline, gradualist Islamists and the violent radicals is thus not clear-cut and defined, but flexible and permeable in both directions.” He continues to say, “While there is agreement on ultimate goals, there is constant argument over how best to achieve those goals.” In spite of differences in means of achieving goals, “they do not differ on matters of core religious doctrine and ultimate goals.” Both, therefore, can be seen as “manifestations of single collective ideology, whose aim is the establishment of the global Islamic State, the Caliphate” (p.24). Similarly, Sebastian Gorka illustrates these two types of Islamists – “Violent” and “Non-Violent” – in an illustration (p.204) that shows both aiming to impose “Sharia Law” through a “Global Caliphate.” Gorka also says, “…today our enemy is not a European secular nation-state, as was the USSR, but a non-European, religiously-informed non-state terrorist group […]” (p.187).

*The Majority of Classical Sunni Muslims as Accomplices to “Islamists”*

Though not referred to as “Islamists” directly, the majority of peaceful Muslims worldwide, including the Sunnis who follow one of the four classical Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali), are, according to authors, also guilty of contributing to the cause of the extremists due to their acceptance of “violent” verses in the Qur’an, whether they act upon them or not. Sookhdeo says, “Most Muslims still accept the traditional doctrine of abrogation that justifies the radical interpretation of the Qur’an” (p.38). This incorrect assertion will be discussed later in the review. In regards to the 9/11 Commission Report, Sookhdeo and K.C. Gorka say, “The report also states, ‘Most Muslims prefer a peaceful and inclusive vision of their faith, not the violent sectarianism of Bin Laden.’ Is that based on researched and documented fact, or on
wishful thinking?” (pg. 5, italics added). This question will be answered later in the review.

The authors also say that Islamists use the same sources as the classical (or “traditional”) Sunni majority. Referring generally to Islamist movements, and al-Qa’eda as just one of many manifestations of such movements, Sookhdeo says,

“They view Islam as a political ideology and are linked to mainline, traditional Islam by their reliance on the Islamic source scriptures (Qur’an and Hadith), the model of Muhammad, and the history of the early Islamic state (the Caliphate), which is seen as paradigmatic by most Muslims. It is this link to traditional Islam that gives them legitimacy and serves to attract sympathy, resources and recruits to their cause” (p.16).

While not being described as “Islamists” directly, the authors nevertheless impugn the majority of Muslims who follow “traditional Islam” as being silent accomplices or, at least, having dubious or untrustworthy allegiances with both types of Islamists, as stated above, because they follow the same sources. The authors have therefore linked violent Islamists (terrorists), non-violent Islamists, and the Muslim majority as promoters, directly or indirectly, willingly or unwillingly, of extremism, including terrorism.

While the above views are stated explicitly by Sookhdeo and the Gorkas, Lenczowski and Moore are less clear about the “enemy” in the book since they focus primarily on the Cold War. However, as stated in the biographies section from other sources, Lenczowski is concerned about the “growth of Islamic communities in Europe that threaten to erase the distinctiveness of individual European cultures,” as well as Islamists, domestically and abroad. Therefore, Lenczowski also sees Islamists as the enemy, and likely does not hold Muslims in high regard due to his view that they are not part of Judeo-Christian civilization, and they threaten the “distinctiveness of individual European cultures.” Moore says, “The conflict with radical Islam is fundamentally a conflict of ideologies – the set of beliefs that underlie Western civilization on one side” and “the interpretation of Muslim beliefs that Islamists preach on the other” (p.79). Therefore, Islamists or those who follow “radical Islam” are the enemies to Moore. Joscelyn is critical of Islamists, but seems to understand the nuances among various Islamist groups, and appears to believe that violent Islamists are a greater threat. While Ulph clearly opposes Islamists and their movements, he is less explicit about his thoughts of Muslims and Islam. However, he does not take issue with the comparison of Islam (not Islamism) with political totalitarianism in his chapter by certain individuals, including Bertrand Russell, Carl Jung, and Karl Barth (pp.45,46). This silence by Ulph may be a sign of precaution by him, though he is content with associating with other authors who are openly critical of Islam. While openly against Islamists, Reilly is also critical of Muslims and Islam, in general, and blames Islam for the perceived current predicament of intellectual stagnancy in the Muslim world today. Overall, the authors are clearer about who they believe is the enemy – mainly Islamists – while, excluding Sookhdeo, they are less clear about which Muslims, if any, they support. A number of authors are critical of mainstream Muslims, and see them as accomplices to Islamists, while others are silent, but are likely critical of at least some aspects of mainstream Islam.
The “Progressive Reformers”

The only Muslims Sookhdeo seems to support is a minority who Sookhdeo describes as “Progressive Reformers” (p.39):

“Progressive reformers aim to liberalize Islamic teaching on jihad, shari’a and the relationship of religion and state. They reject a literal interpretation of the Islamic sources, especially the subjects of jihad, the Caliphate and non-Muslims. They weaken the authority of the Hadith, and interpret violent passages in the Qur’an and Hadith as normative only in their immediate historical contexts and therefore not applicable today. They view Muhammad as a fallible human who sinned in the violent episodes of his life, and they reject the classical view that his example is to be emulated in every detail by Muslims in every age. They spiritualize the Islamic teaching on jihad, seeing it as a moral battle against personal sin, and they explicitly deny the validity of military and violent aspects of jihad for today” (p.38).

While Sookhdeo lists examples of “Progressive Reformers” (p.39) who he claims to support, he nevertheless misrepresents at least a few of them, as will be explained in later in the review.

Is This a War on Islam?

In view of the above, when Sookhdeo claims that it is “important to clarify that this is not a ‘war on Islam[…]’” (p.17), or “Clearly extreme caution should be exercised in order not to give the impression that the West is at war with Islam” (p.29), he means he is not at war with Muslims who he describes as “progressive reformers,” a minority in the Islamic community. In other words, Sookhdeo targets the vast majority of Muslims, including mainstream moderate Muslims, terrorists, and political, non-violent Islamists and homogenizes all of them as a threat in some form. Any friendliness by him towards other Muslims should therefore be interpreted as a way of convincing them to become like the “Progressive Reformers” he claims to support. Sookhdeo is known to flip-flop on this matter in order to portray a semblance of legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim community, while he continues to promote the Islam-terrorism nexus to audiences in his writings and talks.

Part-4: The Cold War Approach of the Authors, and the Utility of Applying Any Purported Lessons to the Battle Against Islamists.

The Cold War as a Battle of “Ideologies”

Most authors directly state or allude to the “ideological” battle between the United States and Soviet Union. Sookhdeo says, “[T]he reality is that Islamism has replaced
communism as the most significant ideological opponent of the Western liberal order” (p.16). Sookhdeo acknowledges that, to him, communism was “the most significant ideological opponent” until Islamism came. Ulph compares twentieth century “totalitarian ideologies,” including Communism, with Islamism. A parallel he sees, for example, between such totalitarian systems and the ideology of Islamism is “the promotion of a single, supreme ideology as a universal explanation and filter, through which all phenomena are interpreted and processed” (p.54). Moore says, “The ideological battles of the Cold War may shed light on our present day conflict” with Islamists (p.79). Lenczowski says, “Ideological warfare was an essential part of Soviet foreign policy….In the international arena, this took the form of a ‘struggle between the two social systems’ – socialism and capitalism – and a consequent struggle between two worldviews […] (p.105).” Lenczowski, however, discusses more than just ideology as a cause of Soviet collapse (p.141-147), while still emphasizing the battle of ideas. Sebastian Gorka says, “[we have forgotten most of the lessons of the last ideological war we fought – the Cold War – including some of the cardinal rules of effective information and psychological operations]” (p.186). The authors attribute the US “victory” over the Soviet Union mainly to the “victory” of US ideology over Soviet ideology.

The Cold War: Exaggerating Ideology?

The authors appear to predominantly embrace one of many views without informing readers that the ideological dimension and role of superpowers in the Cold War, and its attribution to a US victory, is an issue of scholarly and diplomatic debate. Their pro-Reaganite leanings, taken to mythical proportions, gloss over the multifarious views of Soviet ideology and its role and use in the Cold War. Best-selling author, James Mann, describes this simplistic understanding: “Among Mr. Reagan’s most devoted followers, an entire mythology has developed. Theirs is what might be called the triumphal school of interpretation: the president spoke, the Soviets quaked, the wall came down.” These authors have constructed their own understanding of history and its application to current threats, which explains why they have a “preference for using a particular and self-serving configuration of cold war history to inform its arguments about the ‘present danger.’” The authors, typical of self-perceived Cold War warriors, “focus almost exclusively on the contours of American leadership – particularly its rhetorical intonations – giving little sense of the social, cultural and political nuances of the broader cold war era.” Their approach to Cold War history is “reductive and dramatic,” they “seek to portray a moral universe cleaved between the forces of light and dark,” and their "nostalgia for the cold war is messianic rather than despairing." This mindset and approach of the authors permeate the entire book, which appears to support the perceived struggle of a noble ideology over an evil ideology.

The issues to others, however, are more complex and transcend ideology. Mark Kramer says,

“Was the Cold War a contest of two ideologies – liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism – or was it driven mainly by considerations of power and material interests? No definitive answer to this question has yet emerged. Indeed, deep
Some scholars, like Kenneth Waltz, believe that conflicting ideologies had “little to no relevance” and that “rhetoric” was used to mask real intentions and interests. Rather, “structural features” or the “unequal distribution of capabilities” and “anarchic nature of the international system” were key. Lou Cannon portrays Reagan’s policies as “more pragmatic than ideological” and “not particularly driven by conservative dogma.” Realists with a “neoclassical persuasion” generally agree on structural aspects but emphasize “domestic level factors,” including “perceptions of external threats and relative power” to explain the behavior of superpowers. Other scholars, like John Gaddis, believe that structural factors in the absence of “clashing ideologies” would not have allowed the US-Soviet rivalry to continue. Similar to the authors of the book, they believe it was a “contest of ideas” in which ideological considerations took precedence over “balance of power” concerns between superpowers. This view, Kramer says, representing “simple binary opposition,” limits attempts to comprehend “historical complexity.”

Because the authors’ confident views of the role of ideology in the Cold War is only one, sanitized view in a spectrum of interpretations, this brings into question how close or far this view corresponds with reality. If their understanding of Cold War ideological conflict is exaggerated, then any claimed “lessons” they derive from this understanding may be of questionable value. Carrying the analogy to combating Islamists may then also lead to an exaggeration of Islamist ideology over other critical factors. Indeed, Part-6 confirms the exaggeration by authors of the role of ideology in Islamism.

Notwithstanding the lengthy discussions by authors of US-Soviet policy, there were hardly any specific, actionable lessons proposed to combat Islamists beyond vague mantras to oppose Islamist ideology just as Soviet ideology was opposed. This renders the analogy irrelevant and impractical to the battle against Islamists. Removing the specific chapters and sections on the Cold War from the book would have made the resulting critique against Islamism and its ideology more relevant, even if the critique is beset with its own set of flaws, as explained in Parts 6 to 11 below.

**Part-5: The Authors’/Editors’ Views and Arguments**

**General View of Authors/Editors**

The main message of the authors is that the “ideology” behind terrorism – in particular reference to Islamism – should be discussed openly and examined for a transparent, adequate understanding of the enemy which has, according to the authors, been missing due to reasons of political correctness. Both directly and indirectly, the authors believe that political ideology, as manifested today by Islamists who wish to attain global domination by violent or non-violent means, is rooted in classical Sunni Islam, and that Islamist/“jihadist” violence today is an extension and continuity of Islamic political-
religious propagation from previous centuries. The problem, in other words, is the religion of Islam itself. Overcoming political and Muslim sensitivities and being honest enables identification of the nemesis and its ideology, and allows for a more effective strategy and response against Islamists. While authors see the battle against Islamism – and by extension, Islam – from a Cold War lens, some authors (John H. Moore and John Lenczowski) elaborate on details of the Cold War while leaving the reader to extract lessons to apply to the battle against Islamists and Islam. The remaining authors elaborate less on Cold War details while discussing aspects that are relevant to them in their more explicit denunciation of Islamism and Islam, as discussed below.

Detailed Views of Authors/Editors

Introduction: Katharine C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo

In the “Introduction: In the Battlefield of Ideas,” (pp.1-12) co-authored by Katharine. C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, the authors explain that the approach used by the US Government against “Islamic” terrorists has undermined the battle against them. In particular, they question US policy in Afghanistan in which the mujahideen was supported against the Soviet Communists, and the resulting fall-out, including the radicalization of individuals like Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam. The other “Islamic resurgence,” the authors say, was taking place on the political front where Islamists, though generally non-violent, were establishing “Islamic” governments “in Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and Algeria” (p.3). Both forms of Islamists, according to authors, use different means to attain the goal of establishing a totalitarian, Shar’ia-run world to uphold Islam and subjugate non-Muslims. In other words, Islamists are launching a two-pronged attack through violent and non-violent means to achieve the goal of a global caliphate. This is with the understanding that the boundaries that separate the two are not entirely clear, with periodic exchanges of followers in both. For these reasons, the authors also criticize Bush Junior’s policies and sensitivities toward Muslims (pp. 4,5), inherited from the Clinton Administration, including The 9/11 Commission Report, which, according to the authors, makes “reference to the role of Islam in the attacks,” but “exercises great discretion in how it interprets that role” (p.5). Over the years, this “political correctness” about Islam became pronounced, especially since the “National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, released in July 2004,” did not use the word “Islam,” “Muslim”, or “jihad” even once (p.5). Likewise, the “FBI’s Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon” omits all reference to these words. This policy of cozying up with Muslims, say the authors, and refusing to be frank while prioritizing diplomacy over truth continues unabated by the Obama Administration. The authors also take issue with the National Strategy for Counterterrorism released in 2011, which describes al-Qa’eda’s doctrine as a “distortion of Islam” (p.6).

The authors zero in on what they assert is the problem and say that “much of the world’s terrorism today is carried out in the name of Islam, yet we cannot discuss Islam or analyze Islam or look closely at the way Islam inspires acts of violence or even authoritarianism and oppression” (p.9). The authors say that the “ideology” of al-Qa’eda must be understood to counter them effectively (p.9), which, to them, is rooted in Islam
as followed by mainstream Sunni Muslims. They say, “Islam inspires acts of violence or even authoritarianism and oppression” (p.9). They further say that, “Today it is the role of Islam that is downplayed as a motivator for acts of terrorism” (p.11). Both authors take issue with the counter-terrorism training that excludes “training that Muslims might find in any way offensive” (p.8). Therefore, they believe, “The White House has virtually shut down all domestic counter-terrorism training on Islam as a result […](pg.7,8). K.C. Gorka explains Sookhdeo’s belief that “Islamism is not a new ideology out to challenge the West” (p.11), implying that Islamism is a continuation of Islam from the past, which is made clear in Chapter-1 by Sookhdeo.

Chapter-1: Patrick Sookhdeo

In the first chapter, “The West, Islam, and the Counter-Ideological War,” (pp.15-44) Patrick Sookhdeo says that Islamists “view Islam as a political ideology and are linked to mainline, traditional Islam[…], (p.16) and radical Islamist movements are “grounded in the authority of religious texts” (p.17). He explains that “Islamism…adopted the expansionist drive of early Islam” (p.19), and “Islamism utilizes a strand of radicalism and violence inherent in much of traditional Muslim theology and history” (p.20). He asserts that “Islamists and Islamist terrorists are authentically Islamic […]” (p.21), and that “Islamists have revived the classical doctrine of jihad as a main plank of their ideology” (p.21). Sookhdeo briefly discusses other related matters, including the difference between “gradualist” and “radical” Islamists (p.23), the use of social media by terrorists (p.25), the impact of Islamism (p.27), the “Problem of ‘Root-Cause’ Theory” (saying it is “erroneous” to believe that “Islamist terrorism” is rooted in “Western responsibility” or even by “socio-economic and political factors” – p.30), “Denial of the Religious Dimension of Islamist Violence” (p.31) and the associated “confusion” (p.32-35), and how Islamists should be countered by understanding the ideology, counter- ing the Islamist threat directly, and “promoting reform within the Muslim world” (p.35-42), as discussed previously.

Chapter-2: Stephen Ulph

Stephen Ulph in the second chapter, “Islam and Totalitarianism: The Challenge of Comparison,” (pp.45-75) challenges the Islamists who believe their programs and movements to be “authentic, uniquely Islamic and divinely sanctioned” (p.50). To Ulph, by establishing the close resemblance of Islamist movements with some “mid-20th century European, “infidel” totalitarian collective ideologies, such as those represented by the Italian or German Fascisms or Marxism-Leninism,” the self-righteous claims of Islamists as God’s genuine followers is “severely, if not terminally, compromised” (p.50). Ulph, therefore, attempts to provide a counter-ideological response to the Islamists to undermine them. The chapter first illustrates influential individuals who compared Islam with Bolshevism (pp.45-46), with the aim of discrediting the twentieth century “totalitarian systems” and not “Islamism” (p.46). Ulph specifically targets the following claims by Islamists: (a) “The Uniqueness of the Islamists’ model for an Islamic society;” (b) “The divine origin of the doctrines underpinning the ideology;” and (c) “The uniqueness of the political applications of their ideology” (p.48). Ulph discusses what he believes is the “Propriety of the Comparison” of Islamist movements with secular,
totalitarian movements (pp.51-53), the “Generic Parallels Between Islamism and Totalitarianism” (pp.54-63), the “Specific Parallels Between Islamism and Fascism,” including (a) “the call for authenticity” and the “restoration of lost vigor;” (b) “the cult of tradition;” (c) “cultural purity and fear of diversity;” (d) “the conspiracy obsession;” and (e) “the hero and the permanence of the struggle” (pp.63-72). Lastly, Ulph discusses the “Implications of Comparative Totalitarianism For Counter-Ideology (pp.73-74), and provides a diagram of “The Enemies of the Muslims according to the Global Islamic Resistance” (p.75).

Chapter-3: John H. Moore

John H. Moore in the third chapter, “Ideology and Central Planning: Lessons from the Cold War,” (pp.79-94) discusses the ideological influences on academia by Sovietologists who formed a consensus that Soviet central planning was good for economic growth. He discusses former University of Virginia economic professor G. Warren Nutter’s “study that powerfully challenged the conventional wisdom about Soviet central planning. The author says that the conventional understanding of a matter may need to be opposed, in spite of political incorrectness, to better understand the enemy and the ideology. As stated earlier, Moore believes, “The conflict with radical Islam is fundamentally a conflict of ideologies – the set of beliefs that underlie Western civilization on one side” and “the interpretation of Muslim beliefs that Islamists preach on the other” (p.79). The author discusses the background of professor Nutter’s study (pp.80-81), “The Study and Its Controversial Results” (p.82), the “Responses to Nutter” (pp.82-84), and, under “Ideology and Response,” discusses the conclusions of the study that left the audience “gasping” (pp.85-91). The shock was the interpretation of evidence by professor Nutter that challenged conventional understandings of Soviet economic growth: “(a) Soviet industrial output was growing less rapidly than most public estimates held; (b) the rate of growth was slowing; and (c) it was unlikely that Soviet industrial output would catch up to America’s” (p.85). The final section, “Collapse of a System and Ideological Continuity,” discusses the shock of total Soviet collapse, the abandoning of socialist systems and adoption of “some form of market order” by “former communist bloc countries,” and that “advocates of socialism persist, and their ranks are, if anything, growing” (pp.91-92). Moore does not discuss how lessons from the chapter can be used to counter Islamist movements.

Chapter-4: John Lenczowski

John Lenczowski in the fourth chapter – the longest chapter in the book – “Political-Ideological Warfare in Integrated Strategy, and its Basis in an Assessment of Soviet Reality,” (pp.95-147) extends the analogy of understanding “Islamic” ideology as a driver of terrorism with the ideology of Soviet Communism, which was understood and used to counter the threat of the Soviet system effectively. If the ideology of “Muslim” terrorists is also understood, he says, they can also be countered more effectively. The chapter discusses details of the Cold War, including “The Assumptions Underlying Previous U.S. Policies” (pp.96-98), “The Assumptions Underlying the Reagan Policy” (pp.98-109), and “The Resultant Policy,” which demonstrates the “falsity” of Soviet ideology, the “illegitimacy of the regime,” the “possibility of successful resistance,” and
the “bankruptcy of the Soviet worldview (p.109). Lenczowski elaborates on “The Material Dimension” and “How It Had Strategic Effects in the Political-Ideological War” (pp.111-113), as well as the “The Non-Material Dimension” (pp.113-114). The author further discusses the “rhetorical dimension” of President Reagan (pp.114-116), the “Presidential Press Conference” (p.117), “Project Truth” (pp.117-121), “Counterpropaganda and Counter-Active Measures (pp.121-124), “The Modernization of the Freedom Radios and the President’s Direct Communication to the Peoples of the Soviet Empire (pp.124-130), “Support for Anti-Communist and Pro-Freedom Groups” (pp.130-131), President Reagan’s “Speech to the British Parliament” (pp.132-133), and the “Establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy” (p.133). Lenczowski further discusses the “Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals” (pp.134-135), “Promoting an Ideological Alternative” against the Soviet Union (pp.135-136), followed by a discussion of “Splitting the Peace Movement” (pp.136-137). The author then discusses the “The Covert Dimension,” including “Covert Assistance to Poland and Other Central European States” (pp.137-140), “Covert Action Inside the USSR” (pp.140-141), and lastly, “What Finally Precipitated the Soviet Collapse?” which the authors says was “a crisis of legitimacy” (pp.141-142), the crisis of the “Soviet military economy” (pp.142-144), and the crisis of the Communist Party (pp.144-147). The author ends by emphasizing “the courage” of President Reagan “who understood the critical moral dimension of the Cold War and his mobilization of the mechanisms of public diplomacy the substance of which touched the depths of the human heart” (p.147). Similar to Moore, the conclusion did not relate the lengthy discussion of US policy in the Cold War to how Islamists could be countered today.

Chapter-5: Robert Reilly

Extending the discussion of what the author sees as effective US government anti-Soviet strategy, Robert Reilly, in the fifth chapter, “Public Diplomacy in an Age of Global Terrorism: Lessons from the Past,” (pp.149-161) discusses the role of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and VOA which were used to promote the “American idea” (p.11) and “challenge the counter-narrative of Soviets.” Such a strategy has now been dismantled and replaced by broadcasting American music celebrities to the Arab world (p.11). In other words, American communication strategy requires attention as a tool to combat Islamists, just as a communications strategy during the Cold War was used to weaken the allure of Communism. Reilly believes, “The US Cold War strategy used religion to undermine the Soviet bloc” and “Reagan was the first political leader to use the moral vocabulary of ‘evil’ to describe the Soviet Union” (p.153). Reilly emphasizes the moral argument against Islamists as well, and believes that “The first thing the United States needs to do is address the moral critique of America as a godless, secular, sex-obsessed society immersed in materialism” (p.154). Most of the rest of the chapter, however, is a critique of President Obama and his softness towards the Arabs, discussing “gaffes” in Obama’s June 2009 speech in Egypt (p.154), and Obama’s May 2011 speech in which he “directly addressed the problem of Arab tyrannies and corruption” (p.157). Reilly thinks “President Obama…failed to notice” that the Arab Spring “uprisings have come close to achieving one of al Qaeda’s principal goals – the elimination of apostate authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa” (pp.157-158). He believes that Egyptians should be reminded “of some of their own history” and says that
“Egyptians were left with a constitutional monarchy in which basic human freedoms were enshrined, along with the rule of law, a functioning parliament, a relatively free press, and an independent judiciary,” (p.159) and that a series of events, including Gamal Nasser’s military coup in 1962, which ended the monarchy, changed the constitution, and enshrined “shari’a as the main source of legislation,” and was later amended by President Mubarak (p.159). The result, Reilly says, was a “one-party, authoritarian state,” and says, “Imperial powers did not do this to Egypt; Egyptians did it to themselves” (p.159). Reilly takes issue with the Obama administration’s “tortured rhetoric” that portrays “the current conflict…to avoid any mention” of the “nature” of Islam (p.159-160). He characterizes Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood as “an explicitly religious organization” (p.160) and urges the Obama administration to take stronger action against “the challenge of Islam” (p.161).

Chapter-6: Thomas Joscelyn

Thomas Joscelyn in the sixth chapter, “Jihadist States,” (pp.165-184) says, “[T]he assumption that al Qaeda and its affiliates are ‘stateless’ continues to be a dangerous one” (p.166). He believes, “This assumption has led to a crucial blind spot in America’s counterterrorism policy” (p.170), and “Even though the ‘stateless’ paradigm is transparently wrong, it remains the dominant construct used by the U.S. government” (p.172). Joscelyn says, “An explicit message of deterrence is necessary to dissuade the jihadist states from allowing or sponsoring further terrorist attacks against the West. Such a message should become a critical part of what has been coined the ‘new deterrence’” (p.166). He says, “Al Qaeda has sought and received assistance from several jihadist states, or at least the military and intelligence components of those states” (p. 165). Joscelyn makes reference to “The Soviet bloc’s sponsorship of terrorism” (p.169) in the Cold War, and says we should learn from it in the war against Islamists. He mentions, “Most of the significant terrorist plots in recent years can be traced to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan and Yemen” (p.170). He later says, “At a minimum, then, states provide jihadist terrorist groups the space to operate” (p.170). He continues, “States can do this either by explicitly granting terrorist organizations turf, or by refusing to take turf away from them” (p.170). He blames Pakistan for not launching a “sustained offensive” against “jihadists” along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but instead making peace deals with them (p. 170). He further notes that Pakistan provided a “safe haven” (p.171) for Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The author also highlights al-Qa’eda’s links with Iran and says bin Laden’s interim replacement, Saif al Adel, “spent nine years in Iran after the September 11 attacks” and was placed in a “loose form of house arrest” tantamount to a safe haven, and kept him alive (p.171). Likewise, Atiyah Abd al Rahman “spent years living in Iran” (p.171). The author notes Afghanistan as giving militants the space to operate and access recruits (p.172). He also mentions Sudan that, at one time, gave refuge to Bin Laden and was led by Hassan al Turabi, “a prominent member of the international Muslim Brotherhood” (p.172). He also discusses Iran’s and Hezbollah’s “help” to bin Laden (p.173).

Chapter-7: Sebastian Gorka
Sebastian Gorka in the seventh and last chapter, “The Enemy Threat Doctrine of Al Qaeda: Taking the War to the Heart of Our Foe,” (pp.185-204) claims that “America still does not fully understand the nature of the enemy that most threatens its citizens” (p.185). He says that “Bin Laden may be dead, but the narrative of religiously motivated global revolution that he embodied is very much alive and growing in popularity” (p.185). He believes that “many” reasons for the “paucity of our strategic approach” to Al-Qa’eda and associated movements is due to “so-called political correctness” (p.186). Referring to Sun Tzu, Gorka says, “in war it is not enough to know the enemy in order to win. One must first know oneself and why one fights” (p.186). He believes there is “confusion” in understanding the “enemy threat doctrine” because of the “misguided belief that the religious character of enemy’s ideology should not be discussed, and that we need not address it, but should instead use the phrase ‘Violent Extremism’ to describe our foe and thus avoid any unnecessary unpleasantness” (p.187). Moreover, according to Gorka, even if “clear-headedness” on the issue is achieved, “we still drastically lack the institutional ability to analyze and comprehend the worldview of this enemy and therefore its strategic mindset and ultimate objectives” (p.187). Gorka further believes that “it is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide the contextual knowledge to understand and defeat the enemy” if relying solely on “anthropologists and social scientists,” as Gorka claims the “Fort Leavenworth’s Human Terrain System (HTS)” does. Gorka believes we “can go back centuries and centuries, but the most important thing is to place al Qaeda in the last 100 years of Arab and Islamic history […] (p.193).” He thinks there were five “stepping stones in the last 100 years” that are of “core significance” to understand the “threat doctrine,” or the “ideology of Global Jihad” (p.193): The first links to the “consequences of World War I” (including the end of the Ottoman caliphate) (p.193), the second is the “consequence of World War II,” consisting of two “geopolitical factors” – the survivors of the Holocaust and where they would be relocated, and the loss of Palestine (p.194-195). The third are events that happened in 1979 and those connected to them: the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the siege of Mecca by a group of militants (pp. 195-196). The fourth and fifth milestones are the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and connected events of 1990 and 1991 (p. 197). Gorka considers the “strategic minds behind Global Jihad” to be Syed Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Brigadier S.K. Malik (pp. 198-200). Gorka says Osama bin Laden followed the strategy of “irregular warfare” that was developed by Che Guevara – a “top-down approach” (p.201) – and that he did not understand that to counter an extremely powerful enemy, he should have been a “Maoist” (p.202) who builds the movement “from the ground up” (p.201).

Next, Parts 6 to 11 will respond to the views of the editors/authors.
Part-6-11: Responding to the Authors’ Arguments

Part-6: Islamism - Exaggerating the Role of “Ideology”?

Islamism Beyond Ideology

The authors believe that Islamist ideology must be challenged to weaken and defeat the Islamists. For example, Sookhdeo says,

“Western discourse must discredit arguments that Islam is under attack from the West while delegitimizing Islamism by presenting it as a totalitarian political ideology detrimental to Muslims” (p.41).

Sookhdeo also says,

“As Arab countries throw off the yoke of authoritarian and dictatorial governments, so political Islam has begun to shape their societies with a new totalitarianism” (p.43).

Indeed, authors exaggerate the role of ideology in Islamist movements, just as they exaggerate the role of ideology in the Cold War. While ideology is undoubtedly important in the battle against Islamism, classifying the enemy as loyally and inflexibly ideological is not always realistic. Stefan Durand says, “Islamist movements make an instrument of religion and try to use it as an ideology, but they do not intend to create ‘a new man,’ as was the case in fascist Europe.” He further says, “They propound archaic religious and social precepts rather than an overall coherent ideology. The popular success of these movements is often due to factors unconnected with ideology” (italics added).\[48\]

Recent events have shown that the majority of Islamists today – those who wish to attain power through peaceful elections – are more flexible and pragmatic than Islamists of only a few decades ago. Time has demonstrated that inflexible adherence to ideology may be in retreat. Olivier Roy, commenting on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, says, “While the Muslim Brotherhood may finally have come to power, it is at the expense of its own ideology,” and says, “The ‘failure of political Islam’ is not the political failure of the Islamists; it is the collapse of Islamism as a political ideology” (italics added).\[49\]

Being overly focused on ideology may lead to neglecting other important characteristics of Islamist movements. Of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Brynjor Lia says, “While not denying the importance of ideology, it seems appropriate to look for characteristics and qualities other than just ideological particularities when searching for reasons behind the Society’s remarkable expansion in the 1930s” (p.14)\[50\]

Furthermore, Mark Fallon, head of the International Association of Police Chiefs, and former counterintelligence official, who “oversaw the prosecution of dozens of high-level terror suspects” and conducted a study of “hundreds of ex-terrorists,” says the most
common matter in the study’s findings “is that the trigger that turns someone to violence is a very personal one and is usually based on local conditions. The global environment is used to recruit these people, but it’s generally some local condition or individual event in that person’s life that turns them.” He then says, “It wasn’t about ideology; it wasn’t about theology; it was about identity.” [51]

Post-Islamism Dilutes Ideology

Some scholars describe Islamists today, especially after the Arab Spring, as going through a post-Islamist phase. Post-Islamism, [52] originally coined and described by Asef Bayat in reference to reforms in Iran, and later applied to Islamists by European and other scholars,

“…represents an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past. It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity (something post-Islamists stress), to achieve what some have termed an ‘alternative modernity.’”

Bayat further says, “Post-Islamism is expressed in terms of secular exigencies, in freedom from rigidity,” and “in breaking down the monopoly of religious truth.” If Islamists are going through a post-Islamist transformation, then Islamists are being influenced and molded by exigencies of the secular world, and not vice-versa, as the authors seem to suggest. This ‘softens’ the “totalitarian” element in their character as they tailor their views to the wants of a rights-demanding society.

Ghaffar Hussain says, “Post-Islamists are Islamists mugged by reality” and the “emergence of post-Islamism should be welcomed because it signals the failure of classical Islamism and teaches us that most people in the region are not motivated by ideology, instead preferring practical politics.” He continues, “In the long-term post-Islamism will also weaken the more extreme elements who are still dreaming of creating a totalitarian theocracy.” [53]

Responding to the Arab Spring, author Arshin Adib-Moghadam says, “What is slowly being engineered is an Islam that is geared to cultural emancipation, rather than ideological indoctrination.” [54]

Commenting on the lack of progress of the Islamist regimes since the Arab Spring began, former visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Khalil al-Anani, says, “…the most visible result of Islamists' failure is the "desacralization" of their ideology,” which means “Islamism, as a religious and political ideology, is increasingly losing its credibility and symbolic power.” Commenting on the Islamist experiment of governance, he says, “After two years in power, such a state has proven to be nothing but a mere "mirage” and “…while Islamist parties are ascending, their ideology, ‘Islamism,’ is surprisingly descending.” He concludes by saying, “If the Arab Spring would tell us something after two years of torturous transition, it is that Islamism is yet another ‘illusive’ ideology that
can't preserve its credibility and salvation power without fulfilling peoples' aspirations which may put Islamists' future at stake."[55]

Of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of the Arab Spring, Islam scholar Olivier Roy says the demonstrators, “…are operating in a secular political space, and they do not see in Islam an ideology capable of creating a better world.”[56]

Marc Sageman, former CIA psychologist and terrorism scholar who conducted studies on terrorists, concluded, “[T]errorists in Western Europe and North America were not intellectuals or ideologues, much less religious scholars. It is not about how they think, but how they feel.”[57]

As stated, the protestors are largely non-ideological as well. Fawaz Gerges says, “On the whole, the revolts are peaceful, non-ideological, post-Islamist, and led by the embattled middle class, including a coalition of men and women of all ages and political colors: liberal-leaning centrists, democrats, leftists, nationalists, and Islamists.” In addition, “Clerics and mullahs are not key drivers; there is no Ayatollah Khomeini waiting in the wings to hijack the revolution and to seize power.”[58] He also says that “the revolutions have reinforced what many of us have already known: al-Qaeda’s core ideology is incompatible with the universal aspirations of the Arabs.”[59] Recently in May 2013, Emad Abdel Ghafour, a Salafi adviser to Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, said he “had no problem” with Egypt’s peace with Israel.[60] Even Salafis are being molded by the new social-political realities of the day.

Al-Qaeda Beyond Ideology

Author and former FBI agent, Ali Soufan, who investigated the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, said, “…al-Qaeda's rhetoric is not an ideology; it's anti-American narrative” (italics added).[61]

In other examples, ideology does not always appear to be the motivator of actions of certain well-known militants. Gerges, who had interviewed some of Zawahiri’s former cohorts in Egypt, Yemen, and other places in the late 1990s, says, “The consensus was that pressing financial and operational circumstances forced his” – Zawahiri’s – “hand and caused him to join bin Laden’s front, a tactical move to rescue his sinking ship.”[62] Some cohorts said, “Zawahiri had no genuine interest in transnational jihad” and used the World Islamic Front to fight the “near enemy.”[63] Moreover, “at the end of the Afghan war in 1989, none of the leading figures – neither Azzam, Fadl, Zawahiri, nor bin Laden – called for targeting the United States,” and, “at this stage, none of the important voices advocated an armed confrontation with the West.”[64] Gerges further notes, “Although there is no single explanation for bin Laden’s antipathy to America, the Gulf War and its aftermath, particularly the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia, were primary.”[65] Had ideology been the primary cause of their animosity towards the United States and its allies, why did they not express their ideological opposition towards the “infidels” earlier?
Terrorism expert, Jessica Stern, says, “Terrorist movements often arise in reaction to a perceived injustice, as a means to right some terrible wrong, real or imagined. Yet ideology is not the only, or even the most important, factor in an individual’s decision to join a terrorist group.” Stern continues, “In interviewing terrorists, I have found that operatives are often more interested in the expression of a collective identity than they are in the group’s stated goals.” She concludes, “This understanding – that ideology is not the only, or even the principal, reason that individuals are drawn to terrorist groups – needs to be incorporated into our counter-terrorism efforts, especially when we consider counter-radicalization” (italics added). [66]

In the view of the reviewer, just as the authors overstress the role of ideology in the Cold War, they also overemphasize the role of ideology in Islamist and militant movements. This exaggeration has resulted in a myopic view of the terrorist threat by the authors who appear to see most issues through a religion-ideology lens. In the reviewer’s perspective, this view has caused the authors to create an unrealistic narrative that amalgamates everything “Islamic,” historically and contemporarily, as a single, fixed, and unchanging entity. Parts 7 and 8 describe how the authors homogenize classical Sunni Islam, as embraced by the Muslim majority today, with the ideology of Islamism, which, in the reviewer’s view, is a creation of modernity with no meaningful connection to Sunni Islam’s tradition.

**Part-7: Comparison of the Understanding of Politics and Ideology in Classical Sunni Islam with the Political Ideology of Islamist Movements Today**

*Is Classical Sunni Islam a Political Ideology?*

Sebastian Gorka says, “Islam is political” (p.188) so it does not have to be described as a political ideology. Other authors also view Islam as a political ideology.

However, while Gorka and other authors see mainstream Sunni Islam as a political ideology, their view of mainstream Sunni Islam is more similar to the minority of Islamists than to the majority of Muslims who do not share this view.

Religion and terrorism expert, Mark Juergensmyer, says, “The assumption of those who hold this ‘Islam is the problem’ position is that the Muslim relationship to politics is peculiar. But this is not true. Most traditional societies have had a close tie between political leadership and religious authority, and religion often plays a role in undergirding the moral authority of public life.”[67]

Furthermore, there is no equivalent word for “ideology” in classical Arabic, Persian, or other languages, which proves that classical Muslims never saw their religion as an ideology. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, scholar and professor at George Washington University, says,
“The case of ‘ideology’ is very telling as far as the adaptation of modern notions in the name of religion is concerned. Nearly every Muslim language now uses this term, and many Muslims in fact insist that Islam is an ideology. If this is so, then why was there no word to express it in classical Arabic, Persian, and other languages of the Islamic peoples?”[68]

“Traditional Islam,” Nasr says, “refuses ever to accept Islam as an ideology, and it is only when the traditional order succumbs to the modern world that the understanding of religion as ideology comes to the fore […].”[69] Describing Islam as an ideology, whether by the authors or by Islamists, is a modern notion – not a classical one. While Islam has a political dimension, Hamza Yusuf, author and Sunni scholar at Zaytuna College, says, “…the focus of Islam has never been on rectifying the state, but rather on rectifying the state of the souls that make up the state.” He then says, “We need an Islamic state of mind more than an Islamic state.”[70] Another author and Sunni scholar, Zaid Shakir, says, that “…doctrine issuing from a particular ideology is marshaled based on its efficacy in advancing the cause, not on the basis of any preexisting moral or ethical standard. Such a formulation is at complete odds with Islam and, thus, largely alien to its classical tradition.”[71]

Islamic knowledge of creed and jurisprudence in almost all of Islamic history had not been the prerogative of politicians, but of religious scholars who taught the masses, and distanced themselves from rulers while largely retaining their independent roles as spiritual guides. When examining the Islamic sources, reference to political authority is scarce, while references to spirituality and belief are abundant. That is why Muhammad is known as a religious prophet, and not a politician, and Islam is understood to be a religion and not a political movement by most people.

Furthermore, political ideology is not one of the five pillars of Islam or the six Sunni articles of faith. The uncertainty of Muslims on the issue of leadership following Prophet Muhammad’s death illustrates that political leadership was not a high priority to Islam’s Prophet. Otherwise, he would have made matters of political leadership clear to his followers as he did many matters before his demise.

While political leadership took on an important role, it was subservient to and confined within the limits of spirituality. That is why after the first four “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” caliphs that followed were not necessarily supported by the masses, but tolerated. Certain caliphs displayed unIslamic qualities and used religion for political expediency and domination. But anarchy was believed to be worse than poor leadership as it brought more harm than good to society. Therefore, all actions of caliphs over 1,000-plus years should not be seen as representative of Islam’s teachings, and Muslims who lived under their rule should not be described as their wholesale supporters. To do so is to misunderstand and mischaracterize social-power dynamics in those times. Even more important was the relationship and role of religious scholars in this milieu. The views of the authors that classical Islam is an ideology are unconvincing.
While it is correct that Islam includes the political dimension, Sebastian Gorka, Sookhdeo, and other authors fail to note that in practice there was a general separation between the roles of the politician and theologian.

“Islam advocates a limited government in which the individual enjoys considerable autonomy,” say Grote and Roder, “Islam does not advocate a totalitarian government,” they say, “as many aspects of civilian life remain outside the domain of law and government.” Moreover, the “political system in early Islam” did not “rest on absolutism as understood by the Greeks and Romans.” Caliphs did not teach religion while theologians did not rule and exert political power.

Rachel Scott says that in the “classical Sunni position, the caliph possessed neither God’s power to make law nor the Prophet’s function of proclaiming it. The caliph inherited only judicial and executive power.”

Asifa Quraishi differentiated siyāsah, “ruler-made law,” from fiqh, “scholar-crafted law.” The authors ignore this important distinction and appear to conflate both. Religious scholars did not mirror the views of the caliph, nor necessarily support him, but kept the executive authority in check as guardians of the religion.

Harvard professor and scholar, Noah Feldman, says, “[S]cholars had a substantial capacity to keep the ruler within the bounds of the law,” and served to deter unchecked autocracy by the executive.

Moreover, classical Islam does not advocate a theocracy. Grote and Roder explain, “If theocracy means government by religious leaders who exercise spiritual authority, such as that of the Pope in the Middle Ages…then the Islamic government does not qualify.” Quraishi says, “The classical fiqh-siyāsah division of legal and political authority was…not a theocratic distribution of power,” and “…Muslim rulers created their siyāsah laws not by analysis of divine texts (as the fiqh was), but from their own determinations of governing needs.” Renowned Islam scholar, Wael Hallaq, says, “…the Shari’a did not – because it was never designed to – serve the ruler or any form of political power. It served the people, the masses, the poor, the downtrodden, and the wayfarer without disadvantaging the merchant and others of his ilk.”

Contrary to what the book’s authors portray, religious scholars were not hand-in-glove with rulers, and rulers did not take the role of a religious scholar. Religious scholars kept their distance from caliphs, and maintained a delicate balance that could tilt one way or the other, for or against them. The cost and risk of being a religious scholar led some of them to punishment and death by caliphs for disobeying or challenging them. Scott says that the “…relationship of distance between the religious groups and the caliph…came to characterize normative classical Sunni Islam.” Scott further explains that religious scholars, “fearing proximity to power, were keen to remain at a distance from the caliph” and “were reluctant to attach shari’a to the authority of a specific ruler and to codify the shari’a, as this would invalidate the shari’a as God-given law.”
Had classical Sunni Islam primarily been an ideology, the caliph would have been both the religious jurist and political administrator, which was not the case. To say that classical Sunni Islam is mainly or solely a political ideology reflects an incorrect understanding of early Islam and its political arrangements.

*How Modern Islamism Differs from Classical Islam’s Tradition in the Political Realm*

While the previous sections explained classical Islam, this section explains how specific aspects of classical Islam have been altered by Islamist movements. Islamism is primarily a product of modernity, and not of classical Islam, which partially explains the similarities between Islamist movements and twentieth century European ideologies. While authors are quick to point to similarities between them, they seem less convinced of the *modernity-Islamism* connection. They somehow lend more credibility to the *classical Sunni Islam-and-Islamism* connection, which is incorrect.

Without modernity there would be no Islamism. Author and scholar, Bruce Lawrence, says, “Without modernity there are no fundamentalists, just as there are no modernists. The identity of fundamentalism, both as a psychological mindset and as a historical movement, is shaped by the modern world.” Ghazi ibn Muhammad says, “The rise of secularism has paradoxically contributed, by way of militant and ignorant reaction, to the rise of fundamentalism.” Sookhdeo’s assertion that “Islamism is not a new ideology” (p.11) is inaccurate and misleading.

How did modern Islamists arise? Though this review cannot discuss all factors, key factors led to the rise of Islamists, including the altering of the religious scholar-and-caliph arrangement that had existed for over 1,000 years in classical Sunni tradition, as explained; the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and desires for independence and autonomy by the Arabs; European colonial and imperial subjugation of the masses and its associated effects; imposition of rulers on the ‘independent’ Arab peoples by colonialists; domestic factors (tyrants, corruption, etc.); and US foreign policy.

Sovereign states originated in early modern Europe and were later adopted by Muslim countries following decolonization. Like other postcolonial societies, “Muslim” state elites also attempted to instill nationalism among their populations, which was often a mix of ethnic and religious identities.

In the modern milieu, Islamists opposed colonial subjugation while imitating their methods. While demonstrating their opposition, Islamists accepted the new political unit of the nation-state. They did not denounce democracy but eventually advocated it. They participated in elections, while certain Islamist groups were forbidden to participate until recently. In spite of their seeming rigidity, Islamists’ statements resemble the words of liberation and human rights groups, including *inter alia* their claimed support for women rights. Moreover, their attire is usually Western and they are willing to cooperate and collaborate with non-Muslim governments to promote themselves. Aid from the US and other countries, for example, supports this view, as well as their position on maintaining peace agreements with Israel.
Islamists do not adhere to Islamic tradition, but rather reformulate their understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah to justify their current efforts and forms of government rooted in modernity. Islamists, unlike the Muslim majority in the age of classical and contemporary Islam, have not propagated any of the four Sunni schools of law (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali). Islamists have prioritized politics over religion. Making religion subservient to politics is a priority that contradicts the views of the Muslim majority, and contradicts classical Sunni tradition. The section below elaborates on the matter.

The Altering of the Religious Scholar-and-Caliph Arrangement that had Existed for Over 1,000 Years in Classical Sunni Tradition

As discussed, for more than 1,000 years, classical Sunni Islam demonstrated a general separation of religion and state. Religious scholars guided the masses and served to keep the caliph in check, while the caliph was responsible for political and administrative functions, and ensuring the security of the territory. In other words, religion took precedence over politics. Islamists reversed classical Sunni priorities. To them, politics takes precedence over religion.

The upsetting of the religious scholar-and-ruler arrangement due to various internal and external factors occurred in the second half of the 1800s, which had profound and unprecedented effects on the political and religious landscapes. In particular, the Ottoman reform to codify the Shari’ah “sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book.”[^86] The codified law replaced the religious scholars and, according to Feldman, “took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law” and “transferred that power to the state.”[^87]

While in the classical arrangement religious scholars generally had full religious authority, codification of the law took their long-held authority away, and restricted them to “family-law matters.” The creation of a legislature in 1876 by the Ottoman Constitution – the “first democratic institution in the Muslim world” – that could have replaced the scholars as the “institutional balance to the executive,” was soon suspended (as was the Constitution later) by Sultan Abdulhamid II. With no scholars or legislature to keep the executive in check, “the sultan found himself in the position of near-absolute ruler,” which “set the pattern for government in the Muslim world after the Ottoman empire fell.” This paved the way for “dictatorship and other forms of executive dominance – the state of affairs confronted by the Islamists who seek to restore Shariah”[^88] (italics added).

However, seeking to restore the Shari’ah did not mean bringing the religious scholars back. Had Islamists wished to restore the classical Sunni arrangement, they would have done so, but did not. Religious scholars were marginalized or became coopted by governments, thus becoming “government scholars,” and, to a high degree, mouthpieces of the governments they worked in. The long-held role of religious scholars throughout classical Sunni tradition changed profoundly. They were no longer as powerful as they had been, and no longer in charge of Shari’ah. The call for Shari’ah without religious
scholars by Islamists took effect: An arrangement completely alien to classical Sunni tradition. The classical Sunni fabric of Shari‘ah was altered.

The geo-political situation of the time brought major changes to traditional Sunni society. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed and World War-I ended, the Muslim world was under European imperial control, which brought further changes to the traditional makeup of Arab-Islamic society. In the words of Graham Fuller,

“Imperial rule quickly distorted the natural development of the Muslim world, dismantling traditional structures of leadership and governance, destroying traditional institutions, and upsetting cultural patterns, while failing to encourage organic development of native alternatives. Imperialism represented the wholesale export of foreign cultural instruments and structures to be imposed upon the East.”[89]

Under the yoke of European colonialism and their puppet regimes, Arab populations continued to be controlled. Ethnic nationalism was at its peak in the Arab world under Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s as a reaction and resistance to European neo-imperialism. When Arab nationalism was seen as a failing effort, especially after the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, “Islamic identity” replaced Arab nationalism from the 1970s onward. Ethnicity and religion, the two most common characteristics of the Arabs, were therefore used by Arabs as means to attain freedom and human rights.

In the view of the reviewer, the shift from nationalistic to “Islamic” slogans did not represent a shift to a more religious, ideological society. Rather, religion was used as a means to achieve the same aims. That is why Islamist movements are better described as political rather than religious. Had religion been the primary interest of Islamists, as stated, they would have prioritized and re-established the power of the religious jurists. This did not happen. No Ayatollahs or Azharites are being called to run a government, and any role they may have is limited. Rather, independent theologians have continued to be marginalized, which is a trajectory away from Sunni Islam’s classical tradition, not towards it. The authors seem to be unaware of this.

Religion as a “Vehicle”

Islam was and is being used as a vehicle – or means – by Arabs in an attempt to achieve their long-awaited rights and other aspirations. As discussed, the classical Sunni makeup of Shari‘ah was not a priority to Islamists. They did not want classical Sunni Shari‘ah to return, but claimed to want Shari‘a under a modern arrangement. But how serious were Islamists about wanting Shari‘ah? It is difficult for the reviewer to believe they are serious because they have continued to marginalize the religious scholars whose job it is and always was to guide Muslims. When Islamist demands for justice, freedom, and human rights are examined, their use of religion as a vehicle seems to be a sensible alternative to Arab nationalism, which they had earlier lost hope in.
This is not an unrealistic assessment and is not the first time religion or ideology has been used as “vehicles” to express other frustrations, or serve as a rallying cry to unite the masses towards specific goals. The history of the United States is filled with examples. “Closer to home in the West,” says Fuller, “the entire Black Muslim movement in the US, beginning in the 1930s, reveals the deliberate use of religion to intensify existing social distinctions against the white oppressor.”[90] In the United States, “in times of war, most mainstream churches and clergy – Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish – are impressed into service to lend religious legitimacy to the national struggle.”[91] James Byrd, author of Sacred Scripture, Sacred War: The Bible and the American Revolution, says, “…the most productive year for preaching in colonial America was 1776. Sermons led the way in applying the Bible to the American Revolution.”[92] Even “martyrdom,” often attributed literally as part of “Islamic” ideology by militants and their detractors, was celebrated. “During the American Revolution, references to martyrdom were everywhere.”[93] This, however, does not mean that the American Revolution was a “religious” or “Christian ideological” effort. Religion was a vehicle for American patriotism and independence from British colonialism and domination. Likewise, the Arabs used and are using religion as vehicle to protest subjugation in their countries. And the vehicle is usually not as important as the goal the vehicle is intended to reach.

Indeed, the Palestinians used several vehicles, including religion, to express resistance: “[A]n Arab nationalist phase, a Marxist-Leninist phase, and, finally, an Islamist phase.”[94] The vehicle of Islam was also used by Saddam Hussein when he modified the Iraqi flag to include, apparently in his own writing, the Islamic “Allahu Akbar” (Allah is Great) in 1991 in an attempt to garner support by religious clerics and Muslims against the US and its allies. His “Islamic” rhetoric and symbols did not make him more of a Muslim, or any less of a secular, socialist Baathist.

Islamists likewise use Islam for modern, political aims, and, in the words of Mohamed Bechri, former President of the Tunisian Section of Amnesty International, “Islamism is nothing but politics draped in religious garb.”[95] Yet, the book’s authors appear to blame religion directly without a more sophisticated understanding of the role of religion as a vehicle in the socio-political landscape of the Arab region.

**Does Today’s “Islamic State” Mimic the Early Muslims?**

To further demonstrate that Islamism is not rooted in classical Sunni tradition, one can examine the nature of the “Islamic State” today in its various forms. These “Islamic States” are very much unlike the Islamic State in classical Islam. While the religious-scholar-and-caliph arrangement of classical Sunni Islam has been explained, how about the Muslims in the time of Prophet Muhammad? While Islamists today claim to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims of the *Salaf*, there was no Islamic State like the one Islamists envision today. Scholar and professor, Khalid Blankenship, says, “The state established by the Prophet Muhammad...in al-Madinah was extremely rudimentary and lacked any of the institutionalization connected with the modern state.” The Qur’an itself “never refers to the Muslim polity as a state, and the only complimentary reference to khalifah, the later title of caliph, is in one verse referring to
the Prophet Dawud.” The “Shari’ah-based state,” says Blankenship, “as usually envisioned by its modern supporters never really existed before, and especially not as an institutional state.”[96]

Similarly, Wael Hallaq says, “…to resort to such a usage as ‘Islamic state’ – as an entity having existed in history – is not only to indulge in anachronistic thinking but also to misunderstand the structural and qualitative differences between the modern state and its ‘predecessors’” […] Because Islamists imagine they have an Islamic State similar to early times does not make it so. The authors of the book would do well to reflect on this. The current “Islamic State” is modeled after the modern nation-state, a foreign “Western” import and product of colonialism alien to classical Islamic tradition.

The Adoption of Islamic Law Today

How about Shari’ah (Islamic Law)? While religious scholars are normally not as important in an Islamist movement, and have continued to be marginalized, do other aspects of Shari’ah still find expression in today’s nation-state? Is Islamic Law a threat to the Arab region and world as the authors suggest?

“Our of the forty-six countries where Muslims constitute the majority of the population,” Grote and Roder say, “only ten declare themselves to be Islamic states in their constitutions.”[98] This is only about 22 percent of the majority Muslim countries, which means that most of these countries (about 78 percent) do not declare themselves as Islamic States. Furthermore, “most countries have settled for a more moderate version of Islamic constitutionalism declaring Islam as the official religion of the state, but stopping short of proclaiming the country an Islamic state.”[99]

Similarly, author Jan Michiel Otto says, “[I]n the majority of Muslim countries over the last 150 years, most laws, legal institutions and processes have evolved independently of sharia. The governments of most Muslim countries have for decades” and that “classical sharia has had little noteworthy influence in most areas of law.”[100] Even when described as countries that have “Islamic Law,” secular jurists have outdone religious jurists in the new scheme of the unclassical “Muslim State”: “States have enacted their sharia as national law, outranking the religious scholars who were the traditional keepers of ‘the’ sharia. Jurists, trained at secular faculties became the new ‘masters of law.’”[101] Classical Sunni jurists did not train at secular facilities.

The book’s authors’ alarmism of Shari’ah taking over the world via a global caliphate is therefore unwarranted. Shari’ah is not creeping abroad, much less in the United States, and it certainly does not pose a threat. (Read more on the alarmism of a global caliphate below.)

Islamic Theocracy is Antithetical to Sunni Tradition

It has already been explained that classical Sunni Islam never had a theocracy, or rule by theologian. While most Islamists have marginalized the role of religious scholars, the
roles of religious scholar and ruler were combined in the person of Ayatollah Khomeini when he imposed the Vilayet-e-Faqih, or “Guardianship of the Jurist.” This gave the jurist executive authority analogous to a caliph or sultan of past who was responsible for political – not religious – matters. This is unprecedented in Islamic tradition and is yet another example of how modern manifestations of “Islamic” governance today deviate from the tradition of Muslim governments of the past.

Shari’ah’s Penal Code

The previously stated sections should dispel any fears of an Islamic takeover. But how about Shari’ah’s penal code? Most Muslim countries today that include the Islamic criminal code law within modern criminal codes have, in recent years, “become increasingly hesitant when it comes to actually carrying out the more serious hadd punishments.”[102] The hadd (sing. hadd) punishments are perhaps the most controversial aspects of Islamic Law and include punishment for theft (sariqa), brigandage (hirabah), illicit sexual intercourse (zina), false accusation of sexual intercourse (qadhf), and drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr). The few countries today that frequently implement the hadd, including Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, are exceptions to the rarity of its implementation by most Muslim countries today, and also by Muslims in the classical Sunni tradition.

Reformist Muslim scholar, Tariq Ramadan, who has called for a moratorium on corporal punishment, stoning, and death penalty, says, “The majority of the ulamâ‘ – or scholars – historically and today, are of the opinion that these penalties are on the whole Islamic but that the conditions under which they should be implemented are nearly impossible to reestablish. These penalties, therefore, are ‘almost never applicable.’”[103] The authors oddly and curiously seem to believe that somehow conditions are completely ripe for the full implementation of Shari’ah.

Even Egypt’s Islamists do not appear to take Shari’ah’s penal code seriously. The lack of rigidity and seriousness of applying such punishments was clear when Egypt’s general prosecutor in April 2013 had announced that he had canceled the order to lash Mohamed Ragab who was intoxicated by alcohol, and who had been sentenced to lashing by the village prosecutor. The village prosecutor was suspended and an investigation was launched. Mike Giglio says, “in Ragab’s case, the government acted swiftly to stop Sharia from being applied” and “analysts say that Ragab’s case helps to illustrate Morsi’s difficult balancing act on religion: while he and his allies may push Sharia in their politics, they are wary of seeing it put into practice now.” Giglio then quotes Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center: “The actual implementation of Islamic law is not on the [government’s] agenda right now,” and “They’re careful not to overreach.”[104]

This is a specific example that illustrates how the social and political contexts weaken Islamist ideology, including their purported interest in applying Shari’ah to the masses. Nathan Brown, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, says “Egypt is not following Iran’s path toward theocracy in spite of changes wrought by the infusion of religion into politics,” and “Clerics are not
gaining positions of political power. How seriously then is the Muslim Brotherhood about imposing Shari’ah through a supposedly rigid ideology? Not very serious, it seems. The authors’ warnings seem exaggerated.

Summary of Differences Between Classical Islam and Modern Islamism

As discussed, classical Islam, in practice, had a separation between the religious and political spheres. Overall, the religious jurists kept the caliphs in check in classical Islam, whereas the collapse of the scholar-caliph arrangement that transpired as a result of the Ottoman reforms in the late 1800s led to a marginalization of the role of religious scholars who were no longer able to keep the executive in check. This led to unchecked autocracy. Unlike in classical Islam, these and other changes explained above, led to religious scholars being coopted by governments, who were given minor roles related to family matters, or relegated to the periphery. “Political scholars” – Islamists – have taken over the pulpit. The supreme irony is that religious figures have little to no role in the formation of Islamist governments today. There is a general call away from classical Sunni tradition by Islamists, the blaming of Sunni tradition for the current weakness of Muslims by them, and a rejection or selective application of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence by Islamists. The Islamist adoption of ‘new’ and simplistic approaches to Islam, as well as in political matters, are now prioritized. Unlike in classical Islam, the modern world saw the example of “rule by mullah,” or theocracy, which did not exist in Islamic history and tradition.

The book’s authors are unaware of these crucial differences, which make classical Islam and Islamist movements today more different than similar, and definitely not the same as many of the authors convey.

Part-8: Jihad in Classical Sunni Islam Compared with “Jihad” as Understood by Militants Today

The authors believe that Islamist terrorism today by the likes of al-Qa’eda and similar groups is a loyal following of combative jihad in classical Sunni tradition. Sookhdeo, for example, says,

“Islamism utilizes a strand of radicalism and violence inherent in much of traditional Muslim theology and history” (p.20). “Islamists have revived the classical doctrine of jihad as a main plank of their ideology” (p.21).

Such views fill the book that homogenize and conflate violence by radicals today with violence in the classical Sunni tradition. This section explains the differences between the two, and opposes the distorted understanding of Sookhdeo and fellow authors.

While it may already be unconvincing to readers that classical Sunni Islam is an ideology, the expansionist wars of early and later Islam, some may ask, may shed light on Islam as an ideology. It is imperative, therefore, to understand combative jihad in some
detail before a meaningful comparison of terrorism today and combative *jihad* of past can be made.

**Jihad in Classical Sunni Islam – an Overview**

Muslims define *jihad* in Arabic as “holy struggle.” An often neglected matter is the plurality of meanings of *jihad* in early Islam, which includes both combative and non-combative *jihad*. *Jihad* takes many forms, including controlling one’s anger, studying at school, supporting one’s family financially, and any other efforts in a Muslim’s life that contributes to good. Almost all manifestations of *jihad* are non-combative and far more numerous than the combative form, which consists of defensive and offensive *jihad*.

**The Sunni View of Jihad**

Scholars from the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali) differ in their views of combative *jihad*. According to author Ahmad al-Dawoody, the majority of religious scholars in the four Sunni schools view *jihad* as a defense against aggression:

“Qur’anic *casus belli* are restricted to aggression against Muslims and *fitnah*, that is, persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief (Qur’an 2:190; 2:193; 4:75; 22:39-40). War and coercion are not means by which religion may be propagated because belief in a religion is only a matter of the conviction of the heart (Qur’an 2:256; 10:99; 16:93; 18:29). Fighting non-Muslims solely because they do not believe in Islam contradicts the Qur’anic injunction (Qur’an 2:256).”

While defensive *jihad* was a personal obligation, offensive *jihad* was a communal obligation proclaimed by the ruler. The latter did not always mean perpetual warfare, but also meant, in certain situations, to be in a prepared state of battle. *Jihad* was a battle between armies and followed specific limits, including the non-targeting of civilians. According to author and scholar, Asma Afsaruddin, the plurality of meanings of *jihad* in Islam’s earlier years gradually narrowed in meaning to the combative form due to geopolitical exigencies of the time:

“By the early Abassid period – roughly the mid-to-late eighth-century CE, second century of Islam – the military aspect of *jihad* began to receive greater emphasis in certain official and juridical circles.”

Religious jurists used the Islamic sources and resorted to abrogation, believing that Qur’anic verses calling for combat abrogated the peaceful verses. This view, however, was not shared by all scholars, and, contrary to Sookhdeo, does not represent the view of the Muslim majority today. (See below for a more detailed discussion of abrogation and the views of Muslims today).
**War as Part of the Norm**

Were only Muslims prone to war? Combative *jihad* was adopted through Islam’s history for various reasons, including spreading what Muslims believed was God’s word. War, however, was not unique to Islam and Muslims. The Muslim expansion in early Islam, as well as later wars, is to be understood in the context of the geo-political environment in those times. David Dakake says, “When Islam spread out of Arabia in the seventh century…warfare and conflict were the normal state of affairs between nations and peoples. The state of nearly constant warfare was simply the ‘way of the world’ and peace was the extraordinary and occasional exception to the rule.”[108] Justification for war found religious justification as *jihad* in Islam, just as “Just War” was formulated to justify war in Christianity.

**Non-Muslims Under Muslim Rule**

The promotion of combative *jihad* notwithstanding, this did not mean forced conversion. Mustafa Akyol says, “with the exception of a few cases – such as the fanatic Almohavids in North Africa – forced conversion remained anathema to Islamdom.”[109]

Historian Ira Lapidus says, “…the Arab-Muslims did not, contrary to reputation, attempt to convert people to Islam. Muhammad had set the precedent of permitting Jews and Christians in Arabia to keep their religions, if they paid tribute; the Caliphate extended the same privileges to Middle Eastern Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, whom they considered 'People of the Book,' the adherents of earlier written revelations […]”.[110]

Author Thomas Arnold says, “These stupendous conquests which laid the foundations of the Arab empire, were certainly not the outcome of a holy war […].”[111]

Similarly, historian Marshall Hodgson says, “There was no attempt at converting the peoples of the imperial territories, who practically adhered to some form of confessional religion already.”[112] Christians and Jews, and later followers of other religions, deemed “People of the Book” by Islam, were permitted to practice their religion in their places of worship while paying a tax to receive exemption from joining the army and full protection by the Muslim government in the event of an attack. “The poll-tax or *jizya*, Dakake says, was required to be paid by the People of the Book to the Islamic state” and “unlike feudal taxation in Europe, did not constitute an economic hardship for non-Muslims living under Muslim rule.” He continues, “The tax was seen as the legitimate right of the Islamic state, given that all peoples – Muslim and non-Muslim – benefited from the military protection of the state, the freedom of the roads, and trade, etc.” Muslims also had to contribute. “Although the jizya was paid by non-Muslims, Muslims were also taxed through the zakat, a required religious tax not levied on other communities.”[113]
The Petering Out of Offensive Jihad

Offensive jihad or perpetual warfare was also not the preferred choice for rulers after a certain period. Khalid Blankenship says that wars became unsustainable over time, which was partially responsible for the demise of the Umayyad state during the reign of Hisham ibn ’Abd al-Malik. This led to a “permanent restructuring of Muslim political praxis away from a scheme of permanent warfare against non-Muslims, to one which came, over time, to include protracted truces, formal diplomatic relations, and, in the modern world, membership in the international community of nation-states.”[114]

Non-Muslims Helped Muslims in Jihad

The authors portray a bipolar Muslim versus non-Muslim affair. However, Ian Almond, author of Two Faiths One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds, discusses the “under-reported phenomenon of Muslim-Christian military alliances,” including

“the thousands of Arabs who fought for medieval Christian emperors outside the walls of Milan and Bologna, the Castilians and Catalans who regularly allied themselves with Muslims to fight their Christian neighbors, the extraordinary level of Turkish co-operation in the last century of the Byzantine empire, the equally extraordinary number of Christian soldiers in the Ottoman armies which occupied the Balkans, and the tens of thousands of Hungarian Protestants, not to mention disaffected Hungarian peasants, who marched with the armies of the Turk on Vienna.”[115]

Similarly, Akyol says, “local Christians…actively helped the Muslim conquests. When Byzantine-ruled Damascus was besieged by the Arab army in 634, the city’s Monophysite bishop secretly informed the Muslim commander, Khalid, that the east gate of the city was weakly defended, and he supplied the Muslim troops with ladders for scaling the walls.”[116] “Christian Arabs from tribes such as the Banu Tayyi of Najd, the Banu al-Namir ibn Qasit of the upper Euphrates river valley, and the Banu Lakhm participated in the jihad with the Muslim armies.”[117] In addition, many wars did not necessarily count as jihad, while many wars waged by Muslims were against other Muslims.

Caliphs Were Tolerated More Than Supported

While reasons for offensive jihad are debated by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, it has been established earlier that most of the caliphs who undertook combative jihad were not necessarily supported by the masses, and more than a few were not in line with Islamic teachings. The collective actions of caliphs, therefore, should not be understood as the genuine expression of Islam. Moreover, the delicate relationship between the caliphs and religious scholars demonstrates more tension than collaboration. The religious scholars had the unenviable role of keeping the ruler in check and risking life and limb in the process. Religious scholars generally did not agree with the power-hungry goals of certain caliphs, but made decisions based on what they believed to be in the collective interests of the wider Muslim community.
Now that an overview of classical Sunni *jihad* has been provided, this section will compare the understanding and actions of militants today with combative *jihad* as understood and undertaken by classical Sunni Muslims of the past.

*Advocacy of Peace Over War Today as the Norm*

The geopolitical context in the past hundreds of years has evolved. It is not the same as the time of Prophet Muhammad, or the time of the Crusades. Unlike most of the past 1,000-plus years, peace, not war, is generally the normal state of affairs today.

Even if offensive *jihad* occurred in Islam’s history, this does not mean most Muslims wish to promote combat today. Contrary to the authors, the Muslim majority is not interested in waging combat on others, but living peacefully like most of the world’s people. “Gallup’s polling of Muslims worldwide determined that the vast majority of respondents (93 percent) belong to the mainstream who believe the 9/11 attacks were not justified.”\(^\text{[118]}\) This is not just the opinion of the Muslim masses, but also of prominent contemporary Sunni scholars. Several such scholars in a Peace Conference in Turkey in 2010 discussed how Ibn Taymiyah’s Fatwa of Mardin was misunderstood and misused by militants to wage violence. Among the conclusions of the New Mardin Declaration was a declaration of peace:

> The classification of abodes in Islamic jurisprudence was a classification based on *ijtihad* (juristic reasoning) that was necessitated by the circumstances of the Muslim world, then and the nature of the international relations prevalent at that time. However, circumstances have changed now: The existence of recognized international treaties, which consider as crimes wars that do not involve repelling aggression or resisting occupation; the emergence of civil states which guarantee, on the whole, religious, ethnic and national rights, have necessitated declaring, instead, the entire world as a place of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between all religions, groups and factions in the context of establishing common good and justice amongst people, and wherein they enjoy safety and security with respect to their wealth, habitations and integrity. This is what the Shari‘ah has been affirming and acknowledging, and to which it has been inviting humanity, ever since the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) migrated to Madina and concluded the first treaty/peace agreement that guaranteed mutual and harmonious co-existence between the factions and various ethnic/race groups in a framework of justice and common/shared interest. Shortcomings and breaches perpetrated by certain states that happen to scar and mar this process cannot and should not be used as a means for denying its validity and creating conflict between it and the Islamic Shari‘ah.”\(^\text{[119]}\)

These scholars did not advocate perpetual warfare against non-Muslims, but peace, in the current world of nation-states. Dakake reaffirms:
Today, in the modern world, the situation is somewhat reversed: we might say that ‘peace’ is generally the norm and warfare, although not exactly extraordinary, is somewhat less of a constant that it was in ancient times. This fact has led the vast majority of Muslim scholars today to declare that continual, offensive jihad is no longer applicable to the contemporary situation and that jihad today is primarily difa’i or defensive, because the world is itself in a different state from what it was in the seventh century.”[120]

Conflicts today involving “Muslims” are usually against other Muslims – not non-Muslims. The majority of al-Qa’eda’s victims have been Muslim, in spite of their rhetoric of attacking the “infidel.” A 2009 study, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against Muslims, by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, states:

“The results show that non-Westerners are much more likely to be killed in an al-Qa’ida attack. From 2004 to 2008, only 15% percent of the 3,010 victims were Western. During the most recent period studied the numbers skew even further. From 2006 to 2008, only 2% (12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remaining 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. During this period, a person of non-Western origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al-Qa’ida attack than an individual from the West. The overwhelming majority of al-Qa’ida victims are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are citizens of Iraq, which suffered more al-Qa’ida attacks than any other country courtesy of the al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) affiliate.”[121]

Therefore, most “Muslim” countries today live peacefully with non-Muslim countries, and most casualties by Muslim attacks today – including al-Qa’eda attacks if they are even considered Muslim – are other Muslims. This is contrary to the views of Sookhdeo and Sebastian Gorka who allege that classical Sunni Muslims today support violent “jihad” in some form against non-Muslims, which they strangely consider a continuation of centuries of jihad of the past. To do so is to mix geo-political contexts, fail to distinguish the nuances of both, and analogous to judging Christians today by the geo-political context of Christians in the time of the Crusades.

Muslims Today and “Abrogation” of Peaceful Qur’anic Verses

Sookhdeo says,

“Most Muslims still accept the traditional doctrine of abrogation that justifies the radical interpretation of the Qur’an” (p.38).

However, Sookhdeo provides no evidence to substantiate this claim, especially when most Muslims in the world today are peaceful and know little more than the basics of religion. The Islamic discipline of abrogation – ‘Ilm al-nasikh wa al-mansukh, or the Islamic discipline of abrogating and the abrogated – was understood differently by Sunni scholars.

Ahmed Al-Dawoody says, “Muslims disagree over the very existence of abrogation in the Qur’an”[122] and “Scholars give considerably different numbers for the occurrences of
abrogation in the Qur’an, ranging from 5 to 21, 66, 213, 214, 247, and even 500. Famous Qur’an exegetes are noted to have rejected abrogation of peaceful verses by violent ones. The following are two examples:

(a) Commenting on the Qur’anic verse,

“God does not forbid you, concerning those who have not fought you because of your religion or driven you from your homes that you treat them kindly and justly. God loves those who are just” (60:8),

contemporary Sunni scholar, Zaid Shakir, says, “Imam Qurtubi” – the famous classical Sunni exegete of the Qur’an – “mentions, while explaining this verse, that most of the exegetes consider it to be still operative and reject the idea, posited by some, that it is abrogated.” Shakir further says that “Imam Tabari, the Dean of Sunni exegetes, is much more emphatic than Qurtubi in his rejection of the idea that this verse is abrogated. He states, after mentioning the various interpretations of the verse in question, ‘The most accurate opinion concerning this issue is that of one who says, the people addressed by the verse, ‘God does not forbid you, concerning those who have not fought you because of your religion…’ are members of all ways of life and all religions, that you are kind to them, join relations with them and treat them justly. This is because God, Mighty and Majestic, makes a general statement that includes anyone who fits this description. He does not designate some people to the exclusion of others. The claim that the verse is abrogated is meaningless’” (italics added).

(b) Another example, as explained by Shakir, is the following verse:

“If they [your enemies] incline towards peace then you should likewise incline and place your trust in God. Surely, He hears and knows all.” (8:61)

Shakir says,

“This verse is particularly important because it undermines the arguments of those who claim there is no Islamic basis for peaceful relations between Muslims and other communities at a strategic level.”

He continues,

“Again, the vast majority of exegetes consider this latter verse to be operative. Imam Qurtubi, after mentioning the arguments of those who say that this verse is abrogated, engages in a lengthy discussion of his opinion that it is not. Amongst the reasons he gives as the basis for accepting or initiating a treaty of peace with other communities is that it secures benefit for the Muslims. He also mentions an opinion from Imam Malik that the period of any treaty of peace can be indefinite” (italics added).

Imams Qurtubi and al-Tabari are luminaries in the field of Sunni exegesis of the Qur’an. It is odd why Sookhdeo failed to mention such scholars and examples in the book,
especially when most Muslims today, as explained in recent polls below, are peaceful and mirror their understanding over the understanding of scholars who called for the abrogation of such verses.

_Jihad versus Terrorism_

Even if the political realm of classical Islam is understood as an ideology, does it necessarily mean that militants who wage violence today are following the same ideology? Contrary to the authors, to assume so is to have an erroneous understanding. The following examples illustrate key differences between both:

(a) *Jihad today is not proclaimed by rulers, but by “Muslim” vigilantes*

The minority of violent Islamists ("jihadists") do not follow the rules of combative jihad in classical Islam. A ruler is not necessary for them to declare jihad, and they are not members of armies. There is no leader of a nation-state in the world today calling for an offensive jihad against any government or follower of other religions.

(b) *Militants today do not protect places of worship*

Militants today do not spare places of worship, including churches, Buddha statues, mosques, and even graves and tombs (especially of Muslim saints) that they see as places of “worship” by millions of Muslims worldwide. The Boko Haram and other radicals in Pakistan’s tribal areas are examples. Barring a few exceptions, this is in contrast to how Muslims preserved and protected the places of worship of non-Muslims throughout Islam’s history. In this respect, militants are very unlike early Muslims and follow the historical aberration instead of the norm.

For example, when an Umayyad ruler, Walid Abd al-Malik, claimed property that belonged to a church in Damascus and turned it into a mosque, Umar bin Abd al-Aziz instructed that the portion of the mosque be destroyed and returned to Christians.[126]

Commenting on the following Qur’anic verse, “And had God not repelled one group of people from another, the cloisters, synagogues, churches, and mosques in which God’s name is mentioned in abundance would have been ruined” (Qur’an 22:40), Imam Abu Bakr al-Jassas quotes the famous Imam al-Hassan al-Basri: “God uses the believers as a means of preventing the destruction of the places of worship belonging to the non-Muslim citizens.”[127]

Regarding non-Muslim places of worship, even Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, the loyal student of Ibn Taymiyah, says, “God uses the believers to defend their places of worship….Moreover, it is obligatory for him [the believer] to defend their objects of worship, even though he detests them.”[128]
Militants today not only clash with classical Sunni tradition in this respect, but also oppose the words of controversial scholars whom they deceitfully claim to emulate.

(c) Militants today kill innocent civilians

Militants today target armies and civilians, have described all of their violence as “defensive,” have invented their own rules – for example, only combatants can speak on rules of combat – and discard or selectively and deceptively use Sunni tradition to achieve their aims. Therefore, expansion of Islam is not comparable to combat by al-Qa’eda and other terrorists groups today. Rather, in the absence of traditional Sunni rules of war, and an all-out war against the “enemy,” with most of the dead being Muslim, they are guilty of violating and perverting, and not following, classical Sunni Shari’ah.

(d) Militants demean and target religious scholars and knowledge

Scholar and author, Joas Wagemakers, says, “There seems to be a growing trend among jihadis to view fighters as being the most credible Muslims to comment on jihad, in spite of their lack of scholarly credentials.” The lack of respect of religious scholars has already been seen by their utmost marginalization by even peaceful Islamists, as explained above.

The opposition by militants to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, well-known for his religious knowledge among extremist circles, illustrates the point. Scoffing at religious scholars, a central part of the militant outlook, elevates combat over belief, and ridicules Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, including: “Scholars [of religious knowledge] are the inheritors of the Prophets.” He did not say that those who combat are the heirs of the prophets. Prophet Muhammad was also asked, “What is the best deed?” He responded, ‘Belief in Allah and His Messenger [...].” (Likewise, Islamists scoff at Sunni tradition by prioritizing politics over religion.)

Many militants understand combat experience as a prerequisite to speaking about creed and other religious knowledge – a complete reversal of Sunni Islam that requires correct creed as a first priority and prerequisite to other Islamic practices. Prophet Muhammad also forbade targeting religious figures in a legitimate jihad. Abd Allah ibn Abbas said, “When the Messenger of Allah…would dispatch his troops he would say [to them], “Do not act treacherously, do not steal the spoils of war, do not disfigure the dead bodies, and do not kill children and priests.” This partially explains why Pakistani scholars today find it difficult to speak against terrorism waged by the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa’eda. Their fate would be the same as Barelwi scholar, Sarfraz Na’eemi, and Deobandi scholar, Hassan Jan, who were killed by militants for speaking against terrorism, including suicide bombings.
(e) **Militants make combat a pillar of Islam**

The first pillar of Islam, the Testification of Faith (“There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah”) is replaced with so-called combative *jihad* as the first pillar, or is portrayed by militants as being a pillar of Islam. ‘Abd-al-Salam al-Faraj, for example, in “The Neglected Duty” appeared to see combative *jihad* as the sixth pillar of Islam. However, *jihad* is not a pillar of Sunni Islam and never has been. Asma Afsaruddin says that “the Medinan scholar ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Umar, son of the second caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, is on record as having challenged those who had wished to elevate combative jihad to the level of a religious obligation. An Iraqi man came to Ibn ‘Umar and reproached him thus: “What is the matter with you that you perform the hajj and ‘umra but have abandoned fighting in the path of God (al-ghazu fi sabil allah)?’ To which Ibn ‘Umar responded, ‘Fie on you! Faith is founded on five pillars: that you worship God, perform the prayer, give zakat, perform the pilgrimage, and fast during Ramadan[…].”[133]

(f) **Militants kill ambassadors**

Whereas militants target embassies, consulates, and foreign dignitaries, Abdallah bin Mas’ud said, “It is an established Sunna that ambassadors are not to be killed.”[134] It is also recorded in classical Sunni sources that when representatives of Musaylima, who claimed prophethood, visited the Prophet Muhammad as diplomats, Prophet Muhammad did not kill them or instruct others to kill them.[135] Militants today do the opposite of what Prophet Muhammad did.

As illustrated above, to conflate the *jihad* of classical Sunni Islam with the violent actions of terrorists today is to have an erroneous understanding.

*The Varieties of Offensive “Jihad” Today*

It is also interesting to note how the neo-conservatives, including many of the authors, supported an offensive – pre-emptive – war against Iraq under flawed pretexts, which killed more people than all of the offensive *jihad* in Islam’s history. The authors appear to be hypocritical in this regard, especially when their political ideology, like the militants they condemn, also bipolarize the world into good and evil.

*Division of the World into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr*

Though unstated in the book, Sookhdeo in his website says,

A basic precept of classical Islamic teaching divides the world into two kinds of territory, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Dar al-Islam or “the house of Islam” consists of those areas under Muslim control. The rest of the world, which is under infidel (non-Muslim) control, is significantly known as Dar al-Harb, “the
house of war.” This name is given to infidel-controlled areas because Muslims are obliged to subdue Dar al-Harb and turn it into Dar al-Islam.\[136\]

It is important to discuss this matter because authors have a bipolar, Muslim-versus-non-Muslim understanding of Islam, and portray Islam in this manner.

Sunni scholar Zaid Shakir explains this simplistic understanding. “[T]he often-cited division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb fits well with attempts to explain the inevitability of a clash between Islam and the West.” “However,” he says, “it does not really give us an idea of the nuances and complexities of those terms, nor the diverse ways in which Muslim thinkers, over an extended period of time, defined and actually applied them.” Shakir then provides examples of the various views of classical Sunni scholars. For example, “Abu Yusuf and Muhammad b. al-Hasan ash-Shaybani, the two companions of Imam Abu Hanifah “viewed a land governed by the laws of the nonbelievers as constituting a land of disbelief, even if populated by Muslims.” However, “Imam ash-Shafi’i viewed a land populated by nonbelievers who are not at war with the Muslims as not constituting Dar al-Harb.” Shakir then says, “Therefore, according to these definitions, most of today’s Muslim countries, which are governed by secular law codes, are not Dar al-Islam.”

Regarding most non-Muslim countries today that have peaceful relations with the Muslim world, they are not considered Dar al-Harb. Sookhdeo omits this from his understanding. Shakir says, “To reinforce this point, let us ask…‘[w]ould Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, two conservative nations that waged war against the Muslim nation of Iraq be considered Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Harb?’ Such questions reveal nuances that clearly weigh against the simplistic arguments being advanced by a growing wave of anti-Islamic polemicists and pundits and their Muslim ideological equivalents.”\[137\]

Moreover, Imam Shawkani believed that land not ruled by Muslims can still be called Dar al-Islam provided that Muslims can practice their faith safely.\[138\] Al-Dawoody also says, “Present-day non-Muslim countries would…be classified as dar al-Islam according to Abu Hanifah’s definition […]”.\[139\] Abu Hanifah’s ijtihad, or understanding of the Islamic sources, is followed by most Muslims today. There are also many other divisions that the authors neglect to mention. For example, Dar al-Sulh, Dar al-`Ahd, Dar al-Muwada’ah (house of peace, house of covenant, house of reconciliation).\[140\]

Of `Abd al-Rahman al-Haj, Al-Dawoody explains his view that “classical jurists coined thirty-four conceptual divisions related the word dar, including dar al-muhajirin, dar al-hijrah, dar al-baghy, dar al-da’wah, dar al-dhimmah, dar al-riddhah, dar al-shirk, and dar al-`Arab.”\[141\] Al-Dawoody concludes, “It is…unfortunate that all these juridical political concepts are ignored, so that the Islamic worldview is oversimplified as one of perpetual war between Muslims and so-called infidels.”\[142\] Sookhdeo and others who hold this simplistic understanding are guilty of omitting the details of Sunni jurisprudence and misleading readers.

In addition, most Muslims today do not divide the world into two polar opposites. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a “Progressive Reformer” who Sookhdeo claims to support (p.39), says,
“Many...books written by non-Muslim scholars in the West perpetuate the myth that Islamic law invariably dictates that the world should be divided into two abodes forever locked into conflict. Often the same books falsely assume that most Muslims today adhere to the same bipolar view of the world. This, of course, is not an accurate description of Islamic legal doctrine; moreover, it does not accurately describe the beliefs of the overwhelming majority of Muslims today.”[143]

As explained above, and as other examples will illustrate below, Abou El Fadl and at least a few other “Progressive reformers” contradict Sookhdeo’s understanding of Islam.

The Bipolar View of “Jihadists” and Neoconservatives

Terrorists – as well as the book’s authors – today do not have a sophisticated understanding of the Sunni categorization of the world and the political and related factors associated with it. Ironically and contrary to Sunni tradition, terrorists dichotomize the world simplistically just as neoconservatives do.

Indeed, the division of the world is not allegedly unique to Islam, or religion, in general. Price says, “…the division of the world into an in-group and an out-group…is not unique to religion, as it is also a characteristic of groups involved in ethnic conflict and secular conflicts.”[144] “Religion’s dichotomizing tendency,” he continues, “was certainly present in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, competing economic systems, capitalism, and communism, not faiths, were the ideological forces that stoked a 45-year global conflict that led to the brink of nuclear war with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the division of Europe into competing blocs, and wars by proxy throughout the developing world” (p.28).[145] The analogy of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb can be applied to both opposing sides in the Cold War.

Similarly, Fuller says, “Jihad in its more modern usage has been applied to many quite secular tasks, just as the term ‘crusade’ in English is casually applied to fighting crime or a campaign against drugs”[146]

The authors paradoxically counter Islamist ideology from an ideological perspective of their own that, some would argue, is just as extreme, and which has outlived its perceived usefulness. Their view of themselves as “good” and the Soviet Empire as “evil” (and now all Islamists as “evil”) illustrates the division of the world as two opposite extremes, similar to the views of the “jihadis” they claim to oppose.

Summary Overview of This Section

As discussed in this section, the authors are oblivious to the differences between classical jihad and today’s terrorism, which is incorrectly described as “jihad” by a minority of “Muslim” extremists. The authors failed to note the differences between the geo-political environments in classical Islam’s time and contemporary times, omitted the details of jihad and the differences with today’s so-called “jihad” by radicals, and conflated both. Sunni tradition is not upheld by radicals, but ridiculed, marginalized, and selectively used to deceptively portray loyalty to the tradition. Moreover, the authors are unable to
distinguish between the peaceful majority of Muslims and the violent minority that claims to act in Islam’s name. Their understanding also reflects a Muslim-versus-non-Muslim conflict, whereas Muslims have battled each other and allied with non-Muslims in past and present conflicts. The authors are also guilty of trusting the explanation of Islam by terrorists instead of Sunni Islam’s religious scholars who know classical Sunni tradition better than untrained extremists.

**Part-9: Religion and Terrorism**

If classical Sunni jihad is not terrorism, is there a direct link between religion and terrorism? The authors appear to believe that there is a direct link between terrorism and Islam, as explained in several previously stated quotes.

The matter is more complex than the authors believe. While scholars have differed in their views of the causes of terrorism, including links between religion and terrorism, David Gibson says, “In general, scholars have concluded that religion – be it Islam or any other faith – is neither the chicken nor the egg when it comes to creating terrorists,” and is but “one of many factors in the explosive brew of politics, culture and psychology that leads fanatics to target innocents […].”[147]

Identifying the causes of terrorism is a difficult undertaking because, as Tomas Prechta said in a 2007 study of terrorists in Europe, “No single factor can be considered ‘causal’ in the radicalisation process.”[148]

David Schanzer, Director of the Triangle Center of Terrorism and Homeland Security at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy, says, “There is not one pathway to radicalization and so every case has its unique attributes. Efforts to identify a ‘profile’ of a homegrown al Qaeda inspired terrorist have been unsuccessful.”[149]

Daniel Price asks, “Why, if religion is a significant cause of violence and terrorism, are the overwhelming majorities of Muslims, Christians, and Jews nonviolent?”[150]

Fuller Graham, author of *A World Without Islam*, believes that the extremism we see today from certain people in the Arab world would still have existed even if the religion of Islam did not. The reason is that the same types of grievances would have likely continued under different religions and identities.

Robert Pape, who examined nearly 2,200 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2009 concluded that “suicide terrorism such as that of 9/11 is particularly sensitive to foreign military occupation, and not Islamic fundamentalism or any ideology independent of this crucial circumstance.”[151] To Pape, mainstream Islam, ideological Islam (Islamism), or any religion is not the problem.

William Cavanaugh, author of *The Myth of Religious Violence*, believes that religion-and-violence arguments “are part of a broader Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between the religious and the secular and constructed the former as an
irrational and dangerous impulse that must give way in public to rational, secular forms of power.”[152]

Mark Juergensmeyer, while not divorcing religion from violence, nevertheless says that religion is not initially the problem:

“...In looking at the variety of cases, from the Palestinian Hamas movement to al Qaeda and the Christian militia, it was clear to me that in most cases there were real grievances – economic and social tensions that were experienced by large numbers of people. These grievances were not religious. They were not aimed at religious differences or issues of doctrine and belief. They were issues of social identity and meaningful participation in public life that in other contexts were expressed through Marxist and nationalist ideologies.”[153]

Juergensmeyer then says,

“But in this present moment of late modernity these secular concerns have been expressed through rebellious religious ideologies. The grievances – the sense of alienation, marginalization, and social frustration – are often articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images, and the protest against them is organized by religious leaders through the medium or religious institutions. Thus religion is not the initial problem; but the fact that religion is the medium through which these issues are expressed is problematic.”[154]

In other words, religion is not the problem, but becomes problematic after “real grievances” related to “social identity” and “meaningful participation in public life” have been expressed. Similar to Fuller’s views, Juergensmeyer sees religion as the “medium” – or vehicle – “through which these issues are expressed.” Religion as a “vehicle” has already been discussed.

Similarly, Peter Henne, referring to his recent study[155] on religion and suicide terrorism, says, “[R]eligion has a significant effect on political violence” in terms of “making attacks more intense and conflicts more intractable.” However, Henne says,

“[R]eligion itself is not the problem. Instead, when violent groups frame their struggles in religious terms they increase the severity of their violence, even if religious beliefs do not drive all of their activities. Scholars of religion and terrorism should thus focus less on religious beliefs themselves, e.g. “what does Islam say about suicide?” Rather, they should analyze the dynamic means through which social movements draw on religion as an ideology[…].”[156]

Contrary to the authors’ views, Henne’s findings suggest that there is a difference between religion and violent ideology. They are not the same, nor are their influences or effects on acts of terrorism.

Furthermore, the Suicide Terrorism Database at Flinders University (Australia), described as “the most comprehensive compendium of such information in the world,” which details suicide bombings in Iraq, Palestine-Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka, and collectively represents 90 percent of suicide attacks between 1981 and 2006, contradicts the claim that religion is a main promoter of suicide attacks:

“The evidence from the database largely discredits the common wisdom that the personality of suicide bombers and their religion are the principal cause of their actions. It shows that though religion can play a vital role in the recruitment and motivation of potential future suicide bombers, their real driving-force is a cocktail of motivations including politics, humiliation, revenge, retaliation and altruism. The configuration of these motivations is related to the specific circumstances of the political conflict behind the rise of suicide attacks in different countries.”[157]

The authors of the book do not cite any academic research or study to justify their view that terrorism’s link is directly related to a specific religious scripture.

Sunni Islam’s View of Terrorism

Contrary to authors, had classical Sunni Islam promoted terrorism, then classical religious jurists would not have labeled terrorist actions as violations of Islamic Law, would not have prescribed severe punishments for those crimes, and would have commanded rather than opposed the killing of innocent civilians. The following section discusses the equivalents of modern day terrorism to terms and acts describing such actions in classical and contemporary Sunni tradition.

*Hirabah, Muharib, and Muharibun/Hirabiyyun – Terrorism, Terrorist, and Terrorists*

The authors gloss over the crime of *hirabah* in classical Sunni tradition. *Hirabah* is broadly defined as the spreading of intimidation and terror in the Islamic community. Professor and author, Abdul Hakim Jackson, quotes some classical Sunni scholars to provide a more detailed understanding of *hirabah*:

“The Spanish Maliki jurist Ibn ’Abd al-Barr (d.463/1070) defines the agent of *hirabah* as ‘Anyone who disturbs free passage in the streets and renders them unsafe to travel, striving to spread corruption in the land by taking money, killing people or violating what God has made it unlawful to violate is guilty of *hirabah*…be he a Muslim or non-Muslim, free or slave, and whether he actually realizes his goal of taking money or killing or not.’”

“The Hanafi jurist, al-Kasani (d.587/1191) defines *hirabah* (or *qat al-tariq*) as ‘attacks upon pedestrians for the purpose of taking money by force and in such a way that people are rendered unable to pass freely through the streets…’”

“Imam Nawawi (d.676/1277) states that, ‘Whoever brandishes a weapon and terrorizes the streets (*akhafa al-sabil*) inside or outside a city must be pursued by the authorities (al-Imam), because if they are left unmolested their power will increase and through their killing and taking money and corruption will spread.’”
“Ibn Qudamah (d.620/1223) defines *hirabah* as ‘the act of openly holding people up in the desert with weapons in order to take their money.’ He notes, however, that many of his fellow Hanbalites held that such wanton brigandage constituted *hirabah* whenever it occurred, ‘because it is even more frightening and detrimental inside cities’[158] (names bolded by reviewer).

The Islamic punishment for people who commit the crime of *hirabah* – who spread disorder and corruption in the land – is severe, as stated in the Qur’an:

> “The punishments of those who wage war against Allah and His Prophet and strive to spread disorder in the land are to execute them in an exemplary way or to crucify them or to amputate their hands and feet from opposite sides or to banish them from the land. Such is their disgrace in this world, and in the Hereafter theirs will be an awful doom save those who repent before you overpower them; you should know that Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Ever Merciful.” (5:33-34)

Contrary to the authors’ claims, had Islam promoted terrorism, it would not have been seen as a crime and prohibited in Sunni tradition, and the Qur’an would not have imposed severe punishments against it.

**Irhab, Irhabi, and Irahabiyyun – Terrorism, Terrorist, and Terrorists**

While some scholars find *hirabah* to be the closest in meaning to how terrorism is generally understood today, other scholars recommend other possible terms. For example, analyst Douglas Streusand says, “[A] potentially useful word is *irhab*, the Arabic word for terrorism,” rendering *irhabi* “the literal translation of ‘terrorist.’” He says this in the context of rejecting the words *jihad*, *jihadi*, and *mujahidun* to describe terrorism and terrorists: “[D]escribing [our enemies]…as *jihadis* or *mujahidun* not only validates their claim to legitimacy, but also implies that we consider Islam itself our enemy.”[159]

**Irjaf, Irjafi, and Irajafiyyun/Murjifun – A Better Translation of Terrorism, Terrorist, and Terrorists**

However, according to Shaykh Ali Goma’a, the Mufti of Egypt, describing terrorism and terrorists as *irhab* and *irhabi* are “mistaken translations and a strategic error.”[160] The reason why, author Waleed El-Ansary explains, is because “[t]he classical usages and meanings of the root from which *irhabi* derives, *rahiba*, are overwhelmingly positive, for the Qur’an employs this root to refer to the fear of God (‘the beginning of wisdom’ in the Abrahamic traditions) or holding God in awe.” Osama bin Laden had used the word *irhab* himself, thus “exploiting the difference between classical and modern usages to argue for the possibility of commendable rather than reprehensible terrorism.”[161] To separate Bin Laden’s distorted usage of a term rooted in the Qur’an to justify his unIslamic actions, Mufti Goma’a suggests the term *irjaf*, “which denotes subversion and scaremongering to bring quaking and commotion to society, is derived from the root *rajafa*, which means to quake, tremble, be in violent motion, convulse, or shake.”[162]
Mufti Goma’a’s recommendation of using *irjaf* as a better translation of the word terrorism is, El-Ansary explains, because

“From a linguistic perspective, he points out that the term unambiguously connotes the cowardice, deceit, and betrayal associated with terrorism in striking from the back, unlike *hirabah*. The grand mufti’s discussion of the usage of *murjifun* not only deflates bin Laden’s pompous and grandiose ideology, but reduces him from monk to criminal. Moreover, *irjaf* is clearly distinguished from conventional warfare, *harb*, since the *murjifun* (or *irjafiyyun*) do not constitute a legal entity, whereas their target does.”[163]

El-Ansary continues,

“The legal sanction for *irjaf* is also much clearer than *hirabah*, for the punishment – execution – is unambiguous. Finally, from a practical point of view, it is far more difficult for bin Laden and al-Qaeda members to argue that they do not cause commotion within cities, and that their critics attempting to prevent such violence do. The term *irjaf* thereby effectively eliminates the possibility of extremists turning the tables on their critics.”[164]

*The Khawarij as Murjifun/Irjafiyyun and Today’s al-Qaeda*

It is interesting to note that Mufti Goma’a describes the early *Khawarij* in Islam who rebelled against the Companions of Prophet Muhammad as *murjifun/irjafiyyun*. [165]

Pakistani scholar Shaykh Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri also described the *Khawarij* as the first terrorists in Islam, saying that al-Qaeda and other militants carry the *Khawarij* banner today. According to Shaykh ul-Qadri in his comprehensive *Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings*,[166] classical Sunni scholars are divided into two groups in their verdict of the *Khawarij*. The first group of scholars impugns them with disbelief. The second group impugns them with sin, though not with disbelief. Both groups, however, are in general agreement that the *Khawarij* should be fought for their extreme actions. Of greater interest is the first group to illustrate that the *Khawarij*, like al-Qaeda and other militants today, were seen as disbelievers by prominent classical Sunni scholars.

(Note: Sookhdeo mentions Shaykh Tahir ul-Qadri’s name and *Fatwa* in the book through another source on p.34. However, Sookhdeo does not mention the *Fatwa*’s title, nor does he discuss the many examples of counter-terrorism material in it that is valuable to develop the counter-terrorist narrative from a Sunni perspective. This is a careless omission by Sookhdeo.)

*Classical Sunni Scholars Who Accused the Khawarij of Disbelief*

examples of the positions of Imam al-Bukhari and Imam al-Ghazali.

**Imam Bukhari**

Of the famous scholar of hadith, Imam al-Bukhari, well known Imam Ibn Hajar al-`Asqalani said,

“A large body of scholars said that the Kharijites are to be charged with disbelief, such as al-Bukhari, who compared them to apostates and heretics, and only singled out individuals [amongst them] who were subject to faulty interpretations, mentioning them in a separate chapter: ‘On the One Who Refrains from Fighting the Kharijites for the Sake of Drawing Hearts Near and so People Will Not Flee.’”[176]

**Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali**

*Of the famous Sunni scholar and Sufi, al-Ghazali, Ibn Hajar said:*“In al-Wasit, al-Ghazal said (following others): There are two opinions regarding the judgment on Kharijites: ‘They take the ruling of apostates or the ruling of rebels,’ and al-Rafi’i declared the first view preponderant.”[177]

Had those Muslim scholars been alive today, the reviewer believes they would certainly have opposed al-Qa’eda and similar militant groups and accused them of disbelief due to the similarity of their actions. This would contradict the authors’ claims that militants represent the continuation of the classical Islamic tradition. Rather, classical Sunni scholars repudiate terrorists in the strongest terms possible, with many accusing them of disbelief. Execution is also the punishment of terrorists according to Islamic Law.

The authors seem unaware of *hirabah*, *irhab*, and *irjaf*, and how they differ with classical Sunni *jihad*. Erroneously conflating all words as if they mean the same compromises an accurate understanding of today’s actions by militants. The ignorance and misrepresentation of Sunni tradition by the authors undermines any narrative they may have against terrorists.

**Does Islam Teach and Condone Terrorism?**

*Sookhdeo says,*

“[T]raditionalists…are not prepared to tackle the deeper theological legitimacy that terrorism derives from classical Islam” (p.40).

Sebastian Gorka says,

“We are not at war with communists, Fascists, nationalists, or eco-terrorists, but with religiously inspired mass-murderer who consistently cite the Qur’an to justify their actions” (p.202).
However, citing a scripture to “justify” any action does not necessarily mean the scripture supports the claimed action. The authors oddly seem to believe otherwise.

Scholar Fred Halliday says, “It is nonsense to seek the causes, as distinct from legitimation, of violence in the texts or traditions of any religion.”[178]

Similarly, Fuller says, “[T]o examine the vehicle – in this case, Islam – for flaws and problems, as if it were itself somehow the source of the resistance problem, is to utterly miss the point.”[179]

When Olivier Roy was asked if the Boston attacks, and other such attacks, were a product of the global spread of Islam, he replied, “The main motivation is not religious. Most of the guys, they were normal, they were not especially religious…. It is not the process of Islamization, through going to mosque, through studying the Koran.” Far from being part of the Muslim mainstream, the terrorists “are disconnected…from the Muslim community.”[180]

What does the Qur’an say? If one accepts the basic definition of terrorism to mean the threat or killing of innocent civilians to make a political point, then there is no verse in the Qur’an that permits this, whether it is threatening or killing civilians to make a political point, or any point. As stated earlier, killing civilians even in a legitimate combative jihad is prohibited according to Islamic Law. The verses that discuss violence do not command the killing of civilians, but are understood by religious scholars to mean violence within the parameters of a legitimate war, similar to Christian ‘Just War,’ with parallels to today’s laws of war.

People who selectively use such verses to wage terrorism are discarding the rich corpus of tradition that explains them, and extracting from scripture to justify what they already believe to be true. In this manner, any meaning can be extracted from the Qur’an, whether the Qur’an teaches it or not. Therefore, the reviewer believes that terrorism is not rooted in scripture, but in the mind of the individual who has already decided to use violence for his own reasons. Scriptural “justification” then becomes a veneer or vehicle for the expression of other concerns. Terrorists, in fact, know very little about Islam.

Al-Qaeda Recruits Know Little About Islam

Scholar and author, Abdal-Hakim Murad, says, “[N]either bin Laden nor his principal associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are graduates of Islamic universities or seminaries,” so “their proclamations ignore 14 centuries of Muslim scholarship […]”[181]

Explaining Current Myths about Al-Qaeda Recruits, Colonel John M. Matt Venhaus in a 2010 US Institute of Peace Report and study, in which 2,032 foreign fighters were interviewed and/or their personal histories were examined, noted the third myth that “[A]l-Qaeda recruits do not become terrorists because they are Muslim.” Contrary to the book’s authors, “They actually have an inadequate understanding of their own religion, which makes them vulnerable to misinterpretations of the religious doctrines.” Moreover, Venhaus continues, “In general, they do not come from strong religious backgrounds,” and, “Almost universally, they either had an incomplete religious education or were
raised in a household where the faith was routinely practiced but was not a dominating force.” Also, “Their teachers and religious leaders valued memorization of key phrases over rigorous analysis of the texts,” and “They were not exposed to the over 1,400 years of Quranic commentary and scholarship, nor were they invited to question their instructors on finer points.” Venhaus concludes by saying, “History is replete with examples of religious arguments being used to justify the violent redress of grievances. Regardless of the primary religion involved, small groups play up selected passages of religious texts into guiding principles to manipulate the uninformed and justify violent behavior. The same was true in these cases.”

David Schanzer, director of the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, concluded from a study of 188 cases of Muslim Americans connected to terrorism that none had a “traditional, intensive religious training” in their upbringing and that they “adopted fundamentalist views as they radicalized.”[182]

A 2008 study of Muslims by Britain’s MI5 concluded,

“Far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalization” (italics added).[183]

Instead of blaming the roots of terrorism on Islam, the “sophisticated analysis, based on hundreds of case studies by the security service, says there is no single pathway to violent extremism” (italics added by reviewer).[184]

Terrorism expert, Jessica Stern, says,

“Interestingly, terrorists who claim to be motivated by religious ideology are often ignorant about Islam. Our hosts in Riyadh told us the vast majority of ‘beneficiaries,’ as its administrators call participants, did not have much formal education or proper religious instruction and had only a limited and incomplete understanding of Islam.”[185]

Contrary to the authors’ claims, ignorance – not proper knowledge – of Sunni religious tradition appears to be a hallmark of terrorists. Contrary to the results of studies and views of terrorism experts, the book’s authors’ contrary conclusions are devoid of evidence, data, and sophisticated analysis. The authors make simplistic assumptions of a supposed Islam-terrorism connection while ignoring the complexity of the subject.

The “Verse of the Sword”

How about the “Verse of the Sword?” It is interesting to note the verses of the Qur’an most cited or quoted by extremists. A July 2012 study that examined the most frequently cited or quoted verses in the Qur’an from over 2,000 extremist texts from 1998 to 2011 in the Center for Strategic Communication’s database found that the “analysis revealed only
3 citations of the ‘Verse of the Sword’” – verse 9:5 – “among the over 2,000 coded extremist texts reviewed [...].” The authors further say,

“The most frequently cited Qur’anic verses identified in this study suggest that Islamist extremists favor content that falls within three core thematic categories: exhortations (e.g. 12:21, 63:8, 3:102), battle imperatives (9:14, 4:75, 22:39), and affirmations of faith (e.g. 8:17, 4:104, 3:139). These thematic categories correspond with our observation regarding the surprising verse selection from Surat at-Tawbah. Extremists do not favor the “Verse of the Sword,” which encourages all-out war against unbelievers. Instead they appear to invoke specific verses of the Qur’an that support a promise of deliverance”\(^{[186]}\) (italics added).

In an interview, Sebastian Gorka incorrectly claims that verse “9:4” in the Qur’an is one of the “violent passages.”\(^{[187]}\) Rather, the specific verse mentioned discusses peace, not war. If Gorka is referring to verse 9:5, then this verse is in reference to a war between armies in early Islam. Today, as stated in the conclusions of the study above, “Extremists do not favor the ‘Verse of the Sword,’ which encourages all-out war against unbelievers.” Therefore, Gorka and other authors need not worry.

Robert Crane, appointed US Ambassador by President Reagan to the United Arab Emirates in 1981, made the distinction well when he said, “There is no such thing as Islamic terrorism, but there have always been Muslim terrorists.”\(^{[188]}\) The distinction is important, which the authors of the book need to be cognizant of.

**Foreign Policy and Terrorism**

**The Problem of ‘Root-Cause Theory’**

Sookhdeo in his chapter under the “The Problem of ‘Root-Cause’ Theory” section, says,

“One of the key reasons for the failure of the West adequately to understand and address Islamist ideology is the continuing focus by many Western media and analysts on the erroneous ‘root-cause analysis’ of Islamist terrorism. They assume the primacy of Western responsibility for causing Islamist radicalism, and…ignore the self-definition of radical Islamists. The root causes are explained in terms of socio-economic and political factors such as unemployment, poverty, discrimination, cultural displacement or US and Western foreign policy towards Muslim states” (p.30).

Similar arguments echoing Sookhdeo’s are made by Ulph in his writings.\(^{[189]}\) Reilly, in another book, says,

“Terrorists are produced by a totalitarian ideology justifying terrorism. That is its ‘root cause.’”\(^{[190]}\)
Exaggerating Islamist Ideology Over Foreign Policy

While pin-pointing root causes of terrorism is difficult, zeroing in on ideology (or religion) as the root cause, as the authors seem to suggest, appears reductive and hypocritical. The authors’ views omit important factors that may be strongly associated with terrorism. Ignoring the studies and polls that highlight those aspects and relying on ideology or religion alone is to have an incomplete understanding of the matter. This is especially true when the link between religion and violence is more complex and less straightforward to reputable scholars of terrorism, as explained earlier.

In particular, to distance the behavior of extremists and perceptions of the Muslim – and especially Arab – world from the effects of “US and Western foreign policy towards Muslim states” is to ignore a vital piece of the puzzle.

Marginalizing the Effects of US Foreign Policy

Contrary to the authors’ claims, the effects of US foreign policy on terrorism should not be marginalized, but examined carefully. Again, when Robert Pape was asked about what his research illustrated regarding the “conventional wisdom” that “suicide terrorism is motivated by “religious fanaticism” or “religious hatred combined with the promise of a martyr’s paradise in the hereafter,” Pape responded, “The conventional wisdom is mostly wrong” because what “more than 95 percent of all suicide terrorist attacks since 1980 have in common is not religion, but a specific secular goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.”

Why did the authors not discuss Pape’s important study?

Osama bin Laden’s 1996 “Fatwa,” or the Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, focused mainly on concerns related to US foreign policy. A British Foreign Ministry memo from 2004 stated that the involvement of the UK in the Iraq war “seems to be a key driver behind recruitment by extremist organisations.” Likewise, regarding America’s troop presence in Saudi Arabia, then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, said, “It's been a huge recruiting device for al-Qaeda. In fact if you look at bin Laden, one of his principle grievances was the presence of so-called crusader forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina.” Daniel Benjamin, the State Department's counter-terrorism coordinator, said “[T]he invasion of Iraq gave the jihadists an unmistakable boost. Terrorism is about advancing a narrative and persuading a targeted audience to believe it.” Moreover, Iraq “gave a boost to the al-Qaeda network's propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition, provided an ideal targeting and training area for al-Qaeda-linked terrorists" (London's Chatham House), and, according to a study of the July 2005 London attacks, Britain's Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that "Iraq continues to act as a motivation and focus for terrorist activity." Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to set a car bomb off in Times Square, New York, said, “[U]ntil the hour the U.S. pulls its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, and stops the drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen and in Pakistan, and stops the occupation of Muslim lands, and stops killing the Muslims, and stops reporting the Muslims to its government, we will be attacking U.S.” If true,
Shahzad’s deplorable actions are a response to his perception of the negative effects of US foreign policy in Muslim countries. One of the terrorists who attacked a British soldier in Woolwich, England on May 22, 2013, said, “The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers.”[193] The blowback from drone attacks in Pakistan is also being increasingly felt.

The book’s authors not only do not provide empirical evidence to support their view that foreign policy has no impact on the level of terrorism, but directly contradict major research findings and views of influential individuals that support contrary conclusions. The statements of terrorists and politicians are also being ignored. While improving foreign policy in the Arab world will not stop terrorism, in the view of the reviewer it will likely decrease terrorism.

**Ignoring Anti-Americanism While Promoting Democracy**

Ignoring the effects of US foreign policy in the Arab world may cause one to ignore important repercussions on the Arab psyche. The promotion of democracy worldwide by the US, says author Amaney Jamal, while ignoring the reasons for widespread anti-Americanism in the Arab world, invites autocratic regimes and complicates the relationship between the US and those countries. Jamal, author of *Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All?* explains that in regions where anti-Americanism is rampant, “greater democratization could…bring groups unsympathetic to the United States into power, thus jeopardizing the interests of both the United States and the citizens of the region.”[194] It is therefore imperative for national security experts and policymakers to understand the reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arab world, and what anti-Americanism means, especially when it is linked to US foreign policy priorities like democracy promotion.

**US foreign Policy Drives Anti-Americanism in the Arab World**

Shibley Telhami, an Arab Israeli scholar and author of “The World Through Arab Eyes,” undertook a poll in six Arab countries from 2004 to 2008 in which respondents were asked:

> “Would you say that your attitudes toward the United States are based more on American values or on American policy in the Middle East?”

Telhami explains the results: “They” – the Arabs – “reject American policies and therefore question American values and whether America stands for what it professes.” Telhami says, “It should not be surprising that every time I asked a question about the primary source of anger and disappointment with the United States, an overwhelming majority of Arab respondents specified U.S. policies, not U.S. values.” He continues, “On average, roughly 75 percent chose ‘policy’ while only 10 percent opted for values.”[195]

What do Arabs dislike about US foreign policy? Discussing findings from a six-country Arab poll from 2009 to 2011, Telhami says, the “two key forces driving American policy in the Middle East” according to most Arabs are “[protecting] Israel and [controlling] oil,” – 44 percent (2011) and 55 percent, respectively – and “only single-digit...
percentages for peace and democracy promotion” – 8 percent (2011) and 5 percent (2011), respectively.\[106\]

These views were similar to an earlier March 4\textsuperscript{th} to April 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2002 poll conducted by Zogby International that conducted face-to-face interviews in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Explaining the results, James Zogby says, “America’s overall ranking sank because of the incredibly low marks Arabs gave to U.S. policy toward Arab nations generally and Palestinians specifically.” When asked to summarize the poll’s results, Zogby says,

“I boiled down our polling to four words: ‘It’s the policy, stupid.’ And it still is. Which suggests that instead of asking, ‘Why do they hate us?’ we should be asking, ‘How can we create a broader base of support across the Middle East to ensure that those who would do us harm are permanently isolated and defeated?’ That way we starve the resentments on which terrorists feed.”\[107\]

If the authors’ views that foreign policy has nothing to do with terrorism is accepted, “resentments” will continue to be ignored, and terrorists will continue to feed on these resentments.

**US Foreign Policy as a Trigger for Revenge**

The effects of foreign policy may also trigger strong feelings of revenge, which may continue even after US troops, for example, withdraw from Muslim lands. There need not be a religious connection to such hate and revenge, or even the original reason this hate and revenge was initiated for in the first place. James Payne, in his article, “What Do Terrorists Want?” says,

“This is not to say that if the United States pulled out of Iraq and other Middle East involvements, the terrorists would lay down their arms. Their perceptions of ‘oppression’ are somewhat subjective, and once their hatred has been kindled, it may not be amenable to rational adjustment. It is significant to note, for example, that bin Laden makes no comment about the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia in 2003, an event that logically ought to have reduced his antipathy toward the United States and Saudi leadership. It may well be that the man is now so lost in hunger for revenge that he no longer cares about an issue that originally stoked his hostility.”\[108\]

Ignoring foreign policy is detrimental to Arab-Muslim relations with the United States, and the national security of the country. Therefore, contrary to the authors’ claims, it is important to be attentive to foreign policy and its effects on the Arab population.
**Part-10: What do Muslims Today Really Think?**

Assumptions of violent interpretations of Islam are different from what Muslims today actually believe and think. While blaming Islam’s scriptures for terrorism, Sookhdeo and Katharine Gorka cast doubt and suspicion on the intentions of the Muslim majority.

Commenting on The 9/11 Commission Report’s statement, “Most Muslims prefer a peaceful and inclusive vision of their faith, not the violent extremism of Bin Laden,” Sookhdeo and K. Gorka say,

“Is that based on researched and documented fact, or on wishful thinking?” (p.5).

If most Muslims follow “the violent extremism of Bin Laden,” as the authors insinuate, then why is the overwhelming majority of the 1.6-billion Muslims today behaving non-violently? This question will be answered by well-known polls below that Sookhdeo, Katharine Gorka, and the other authors appear to be unaware of.

*Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think.* Published in 2007, *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, is a study “based on six years of research and more than 50,000 interviews representing 1.3 billion Muslims who reside in more than 35 nations that are predominantly Muslim or have sizable Muslim populations. Representing more than 90% of the world's Muslim community, it makes this poll the largest, most comprehensive study of its kind.”[199]

The following are key findings of the poll that answer Sookhdeo’s and Katharine Gorka’s question:

a) **Do most Muslims support the 9/11 attacks?**

Most Muslims **condemn** the 9/11 attacks.

b) **What is least liked by Muslims in their own societies?**

Most Muslims least like extremism and terrorism. Esposito and Mugahid say, “Far from being glorified by Muslims, the ‘terrorist fringe’ is rejected by citizens of Muslim majority countries.” This majority is separated from the “7% who are ‘politically radicalized.’” In other words, most Muslims worldwide are not politically radicalized. While 7% of politically radicalized Muslims is a large number, the authors note the comparison that “In America, 6% of the public think that attacks in which civilians are targets are ‘completely justified.’”[200]

c) **Are the 7% of “politically radicalized” Muslims motivated by religion?**

Authors of the study say that “radicals use politics, not piety, to justify 9/11, while moderates argue against 9/11 using religious justifications.” In other words, religion is used by the majority of Muslims to **condemn – not support** – the 9/11 attacks. Religion is not unique to the politically radicalized. “While most radicals
- 90% – cite Islam as an important part of their daily lives (90%), most moderates
- 94% – do as well.”[201]

(In another poll of Arab countries from 2004 to 2010 by Shibley Telhami, the
question was asked, “What aspect of Al Qaeda do you admire the most, if any?”
Explaining the results, Tehlami says, “Those who embraced Al Qaeda because of
its aims to establish a Taliban-like Islamic state or because they liked the group’s
methods of operation were a small minority.” He continues, “…only 7 percent in
2004 and 3 percent in 2010 identified its methods; and 7 percent in both years
identified its objective of an Islamic state. About one-quarter in both years said
they did not admire any aspect of the group.”[202] Therefore, only a minority of
Muslims today support the radicalism of militants. The vast majority of Muslims
reject them.)

d) *What do moderate Muslims resent about the West?*

The authors of the study say, “Muslims resent what they perceive as a War on
Islam in the West that equates their religion with terrorism and extremism.”[203]
This means that the recommendations of Sookhdeo and other authors of the book
who blame Islam for terrorism will make matters worse between the US and the
Muslim world. This cannot be good for US national security or for America’s
relations with the Muslim world.

e) *Do most Muslims support Shari’ah and theocracy?*

The study’s authors say, “The majority of Muslims admire the West’s political
freedoms and value self-determination. However, Muslims do not appear to want
secularism or to imitate Western democracies; instead, many Muslims, both male
and female, state they want Sharia as at least one source of legislation” and that
“many Muslims see no contradiction between democratic and Islamic principles.”
They say, Muslims “wanting Sharia involved in politics does not translate into
Muslims wanting theocracy. Majorities in many countries remarked that they do
not want religious leaders to hold direct legislative or political power.” Moreover,
“[M]any Muslims desire neither a democracy or theocracy, but instead a unique
model incorporating both democratic and religious principles.”[204]

f) *Do Muslims dream of doing combative jihad?*

The authors of the study say, “When asked to describe their dreams for the future,
Muslims don't mention fighting in a jihad, but rather getting a better job.”[205]


This Report[206] is based on public surveys by the Pew Research Center between 2008 and
2012 in 39 countries and territories in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The surveys “involved
more than 38,000 face-to-face interviews in 80-plus languages and dialects, covering every country that has more than 10 million Muslims except for a handful (including China, India, Saudi Arabia and Syria) where political sensitivities or security concerns prevented opinion research among Muslims.\[^{[207]}\] The following are key findings of the poll:

a) *Shariah and its application*

The authors of the study say, “Although many Muslims around the world say sharia should be the law of the land in their country, the survey reveals divergent opinions about the precise application of Islamic law. Generally, supporters of sharia are most comfortable with its application in cases of family or property disputes. In most regions, fewer favor other specific aspects of sharia, such as cutting off the hands of thieves and executing people who convert from Islam to another faith.”\[^{[208]}\]

b) *Do most Muslims think Shari’ah should apply to non-Muslims?*

The authors of the study say, “Among Muslims who support making sharia the law of the land, most do not believe that it should be applied to non-Muslims. Only in five of 21 countries where this follow-up question was asked do at least half say all citizens should be subject to Islamic law.”\[^{[209]}\]

c) *Do most Muslims support the death penalty for those who leave Islam?*

The authors of the study say, “Compared with attitudes toward applying sharia in the domestic or criminal spheres, Muslims in the countries surveyed are significantly less supportive of the death penalty for converts.”\[^{[210]}\]

d) *Do most Muslims oppose democracy and do they stop non-Muslims from freely practicing their religion?*

The authors of the study say, “Muslims around the world express broad support for democracy and for people of other faiths being able to practice their religion freely.” Regarding non-Muslims practicing their religion freely, “…among those who view non-Muslims as very free to practice their faith, the prevailing opinion is that this is a good thing.” Specifically, “[i]n 33 of the 38 countries where the question was asked at least half say people of other faiths are very free to practice their religion.” That is, “… three-quarters or more in each country say this is a good thing.”\[^{[211]}\]

e) *Do most Muslims support Islamic militant groups?*

The authors of the study say, “Many Muslims express concern about religious extremist groups operating in their country. On balance, more Muslims are concerned about Islamic than Christian extremist groups.”\[^{[212]}\]
f) **Do most Muslims support suicide bombings?**

The authors of the study say, “[T]he vast majority of Muslims in most countries say suicide bombing is rarely or never justified […]”[^213] Also, “In most of the 21 countries where the question was asked few Muslims endorse suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets as a means of defending Islam against its enemies.”[^214]

g) **Do most Muslims think religious leaders should have a large influence in politics?**

The authors of the study say, “With the notable exception of Afghanistan, fewer than half of Muslims in any country surveyed say religious leaders should have a large influence in politics.”[^215]

h) **Do most Muslims support honor killings and are they driven by religion?**

The authors of the study say, “Across the countries surveyed, attitudes toward honor killings of women and men are not consistently linked to religious observance. In most countries, Muslims who pray several times a day are just as likely as those who pray less often to say that honor killings are never justified. There also are no consistent differences by age or gender.”[^216]

i) **Do most Muslims oppose interfaith relations?**

The authors of the study say, “Few Muslims see conflict between religious groups as a very big national problem. In fact, most consider unemployment, crime and corruption as bigger national problems than religious conflict. Asked specifically about Christian-Muslim hostilities, few Muslims say hostilities are widespread.”[^217]

**What do American Muslims Think?**

In the Pew study above, the authors say, “In their attitudes toward modern society and their relations with people of other faiths, U.S. Muslims sometimes more closely resemble other Americans than they do Muslims around the world.”[^218] The same study found that “[a] majority of U.S. Muslims (56%) believe that many religions can lead to eternal life.” “Most Americans (65%), including nearly two-thirds of American Christians (64%), share this view.” In addition,

“Most U.S. Muslims (63%) say there is no inherent tension between being devout and living in a modern society. A nearly identical proportion of American Christians (64%) agree.” In other findings, “More than eight-in-ten American Muslims say suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets
are never justified (81%) or rarely justified (5%) to defend Islam from its enemies.”

In another study by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding that was undertaken between 2006 and 2010, “212 imams, social workers, therapists, lawyers, and divorced men and women were interviewed about their experiences of marriage and divorce” and “information was also collected on how they understood the influence of shari’a on their beliefs and lifestyle choices, the relationship between shari’a and the formal legal system, their recourse to the legal system in the event of marital conflict and divorce, and their use of private conflict resolution drawing on shari’a principles.” In addition, “Further data was acquired during larger group conversations held in mosques and Islamic community centers.” The findings state that

“[m]isconceptions over the real meaning and effect of shari’a on the everyday lives of American Muslims are compounded by the often-repeated claim that Muslims want to impose and enforce “shari’a law” in America via the courts. None of this study’s 212 participants agreed with this claim. Respondents consistently distinguished between God’s law (a matter of personal conscience rather than public adjudication) and the law of the land or “human law.” While many described the importance of being able to appeal to the formal legal system when necessary (particularly to enforce private agreements), respondents wanted continued access to their Islamic traditions in an informal family setting.”

Furthermore,

“All understood their private family law-related choices as separate from the formal legal system. Even among imams, who sometimes complain that their advice can be easily disregarded since it cannot be enforced in courts, there is almost no support for a parallel Islamic tribunal system. The community appears content with a private informal system that offers spiritual, emotional, and social comfort for some of its members. Respondents also rejected the assumption that any Muslim support for shari’a-compliant behaviors represents an aggressive antagonism toward local laws and norms. Rather, they spoke about their strong attachment to their right to access formal legal institutions and their belief that identifying as Muslim does not diminish their identification as American citizens. In addition, almost all of them had obtained a civil marriage license when they signed their nikah, as well as a civil decree at or around the time of their quest for a religious divorce. These findings challenge the assertion that such practices somehow make them ‘disloyal’ citizens.”

In January 2010, a study of Muslim communities in the United States by researchers at Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill concluded, “Muslim-American communities strongly reject radical jihadi ideology, are eager to contribute to the national counterterrorism effort, and are fiercely committed to integration within the mainstream of American social and economic life.”

In view of the above, Sebastian Gorka’s claim that “shari’a-compliant mortgages in Northern Virginia” are examples of “counter-state” enemy efforts (p.202) is an example
of conspiratorial thinking with no supporting evidence to substantiate his claim. Contrary to the view of alarmists, American Muslims are not imposing *Shari’a* law on America and Americans, and there is no active Islamic extremist takeover over of the country or the world.

Knowing from the polls above that most Muslims worldwide desire peace and are against the minority fanatical fringe, a “thoroughgoing reform of Islam,” (p.38) as Sookhdeo recommends, is irrelevant to reducing extremism, including terrorism. Olivier Roy echoes this agreement in his views of the Arab Spring:

> “But the outside world wrongly assumed that Islam would first have to experience a religious reformation before its followers could embark on political democratization – replicating the Christian experience when the Reformation gave birth to the Enlightenment and then to modern democracy.”[221]

This belies Sookhdeo’s purported solution of supporting “Progressive Reformers” (p.38) who he believes “represent the best hope for a liberal, tolerant and terrorist-free Islam” (p.39). As discussed in the results of the polls above, most Muslims residing today who follow classical Sunni Islam are peaceful and do not support terrorism. Clearly, then, it is not necessary for them to become “Progressive Reformers.” Sookhdeo’s proposition aims to resolve a “problem” that does not exist in the larger Sunni community.

Furthermore, because other peaceful expressions of Islam (as expressed by the majority of Sunnis today) other than the form advocated by “Progressive Reformers” exists, Sookhdeo attempts to reduce various expressions of peace to a single form according to his personal preference and incorrect assumptions. This homogenization of Muslim groups robs the diversity of multiple, peaceful interpretations promoted by Muslims, and increases the probability of tension to increase amongst them. Sookhdeo’s recommendation is therefore misleading. Expecting an already peaceful majority of Sunnis to “weaken the authority of the Hadith,” to “view Muhammad as a fallible human who sinned,” and to “reject the classical view” that Prophet Muhammad is to be emulated is not only unnecessary, but more a recipe for disaster than of peace.

*The Muslim Majority Is Part of the Solution – Not the Problem*

Rather than participate in terrorism, or provide tacit support as the authors allege, many Muslims help to stop it, as key studies have demonstrated. “…Muslim-American communities are taking a variety of positive steps that help prevent radicalization within their communities: 1) they consistently denounce terrorism directed at the United States; 2) they engage in self-policing by prohibiting radical sermons in their mosques and taking action against radical views expressed by outsiders or community members; 3) they are building strong institutions within their communities to direct their youth in a positive direction; 4) they are addressing their grievances through political mobilization; and 5) they are emphasizing their identity as Muslim Americans. In addition, Muslim-Americans have developed strong working relationships with federal and local law enforcement agencies.”[222]
David Schanzer, one of the authors of the study discussed earlier, said, "Our research suggests that initiatives that treat Muslim-Americans as part of the solution to this problem are far more likely to be successful."[223] In an interview, he also says, “Al Qaeda’s ideology has been rejected by almost all Muslim Americans. Every major Muslim American organization in the United States has consistently and vociferously denounced acts of terrorism, by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.”[224]

The authors also seem oblivious to the statements against terrorism and for peace by Muslims. For example, A Common Word Between Us and You,[225] The Amman Message,[226] the Fatwa Against al-Qa’eda by the Islamic Commission of Spain,[227] the Fatwa against terrorism by Shaykh Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti,[228] the Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings by Shaykh Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri,[229] and many other denunciations of terrorism by influential Muslims.[230]

Overhyping the Threat of “Islamic” Terrorism

Just as the authors exaggerated the role of ideology in the Cold War and of Islamists today, the authors also exaggerate the threat of “Islamic” terrorism in America. In an April 2013 article, David Gilson says,

“While America has been fixated on the threat of Islamic terrorism for more than a decade, all but a few domestic terror plots have failed. Between September 11, 2001, and the end of 2012, there were no successful bomb plots by jihadist terrorists in the United States. Jihadists killed 17 people in the United States in four separate incidents during this time, according to data collected by journalist Peter Bergen and the New America Foundation. All four of these incidents involved guns, including Nidal Hassan's shooting rampage at Fort Hood, which killed 13 people. In contrast, right-wing extremists killed 29 people during those 11 years.”[231]

Of the Boston Marathon attackers, Gilson says they are “not evidence of the power of Islamist terrorism in post-9/11 America so much as a painful exception to its ineffectiveness.”[232] The authors seem to overhype the threat of terrorism by “Muslims” and represent the “painful exception” as the norm.

In another report published in 2010, Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND Institute said,

“There are more than 3 million Muslims in the United States, and few more than 100 have joined jihad – about one out of every 30,000 – suggesting an American Muslim population that remains hostile to jihadist ideology and its exhortations to violence. A mistrust of American Muslims by other Americans seems misplaced.”[233]

Part-11: Addressing Miscellaneous Issues in the Book
Dubious Approach and Logic on Intelligence and National Security Reports

Sookhdeo and Katharine Gorka in the Introduction illustrate dubious logic in their analysis of national security documents. They say, “The 9/11 Commission Report, released in July 2004, used the word Islam 322 times, Muslim 145 times, jihad 126 times, and jihadist 32 times,” while the “National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, issued in August 2009, used the term Islam 0 times, Muslim 0 times, jihad 0 times.” They say the same of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon, which “makes no reference to Islam, Muslims, or jihad” (p.5).

However, is the number of times a word is stated in a strategy or relevant report necessarily a function of the effectiveness and usefulness of that strategy or report? Also, does the absence of words in such reports necessarily indicate poor quality of the meaning, strategy, or approach the document conveys? Absolutely not to both questions. When the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism did state Islam several times, Sookhdeo and Gorka still took issue with the Strategy and said it “states that the preeminent security threat to the United States is ‘al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents,’ not Islamism, radical Islam, or global jihad” (pp.5,6). Actually, al-Qa’eda and its “affiliates and adherents” do represent violent “Islamism,” “radical Islam,” and “global jihad,” as they understand it. It appears that Sookhdeo and Gorka need to read such reports more carefully before commenting on them.

Stephen Ulph and the Questionable Utility of the Comparison of Totalitarian Movements with Islamist Movements

In his chapter, “Islamism and Totalitarianism: The Challenge of Comparison,” Ulph suggests a counter-ideological approach by exposing Islamists as essentially modern-day movements similar to non-Muslim ideological movements in the twentieth century. However, contrary to Ulph’s view, elaborating on similarities of Islamists with Communists, Nazis, and, Fascists does not provide a sufficiently strong rebuttal to Islamist claims to authority. This is because Islamists can cherry-pick from Islamic sources and formulate their own justification for doing what they do, in spite of rhetoric similar to modern-day totalitarian movements. Twentieth century ideological movements, in spite of their parallels with Islamist movements, still have significant differences recognized by Islamists that would not convince them that their ideological program is like an “infidel” program. Even with parallels, they are not the same, and this fact alone render’s Ulph’s approach questionable. Even if Islamists are or appear totalitarian, they would likely still be accepted by their populations if they give them what previous autocrats could not: Rights, dignity, and economic prosperity. As previously stated, there is a difference between rhetoric and practice. If, as Bayat says, Arabs are in a post-Islamist phase, then much of what we hear and see that resembles non-Muslim twentieth century ideologies may not be of much significance or concern as Ulph would believe. Secular and other wants, in other words, may be molding the Islamist project and diluting
totalitarian practice, in spite of Islamist rhetoric. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how such comparisons can be effective if certain Islamists themselves have chosen to imitate Marxism and Fascism and are aware of the resemblance. Two examples are stated by Ulph himself. Mawdudi, for example, said that an aspect of the “Islamic state bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communist States” (p.61), and Syed Qutb said it was “necessary that there should be a vanguard […]” (p.62).

Even if such comparisons had value, Ulph’s quotations from individuals who compared Islam (not Islamism) with modern totalitarian ideologies (p.45,46) undermined any purported benefit gained from the comparisons. As stated previously, comparing the religion of Islam with political, secular non-Muslim ideologies, as well as ideological Islamist movements that prioritize politics over religion, does little to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world. Indeed, comparisons of Islamists with twentieth century, non-Muslim political ideologies may, to Islamists, be a reason to make them proud and bold instead of humiliated. After all, Islamists, by and large, are products of modernity rather than of Islamic tradition, which they largely criticize for their current state of weakness. Also, Islamists, in general, can hardly be described as expansionist or violent, but more nationalistic and peaceful, and therefore differ in this respect with other non-Muslim totalitarian movements. Countering Islamists who have attained power through democratic means complicates the counter-ideological approach even more. It appears that Ulph was overly focused on comparisons at the expense of the strategic value such an approach had in countering political Islamist ideology.

Any attempt by Islamists to resist change risks societal opposition, and worse, political power. As discussed, these dynamics were seen in the Arab Spring, the democratic response against totalitarianism. While the book’s authors fear that the Arab Spring will invite “totalitarian” Islamist rule, the reviewer believes that Arabs, whose protests were generally non-ideological, would not wish to replace one “totalitarian” government with another. If Islamists do not address democratic aspirations adequately, they will likely suffer the same fate as the autocrats before them. Therefore, the authors’ fears of an all-powerful, Islamist government controlling society, much less the world, through an austere form of Shari’ah, is unrealistic. The reviewer also believes that incorporating Islamists in the democratic process will likely make them less ideological and extreme, and more pragmatic.

Throughout the book, and in their other works, several authors compare Islamist movements to twentieth century secular, totalitarian movements. While there may be some benefit in doing so, the reviewer believes the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits from a practical standpoint.

The Varieties of “Totalitarianism”

Because “totalitarianism” comes in many forms, including the “neo-conservative” anti-Islamist form that many authors seem to espouse, it may be prudent to refrain from using such terms. Totalitarianism is a word that can be used to describe more than just Islamism, as understood by the authors, which weakens its utility. While the Islamist understanding of Islam can be called totalitarian, so can religion in general, and not only
Islam, but also Christianity, Judaism, and other religions. Moreover, William Cavanaugh says that “[t]he case for nationalism as a religion…has been made repeatedly, from Carlton Hayes’s 1960 classic, Nationalism: A Religion, to more recent works by Peter van der Veer, Talal Asad, Carolyn Marvin, and others.”[234] He continues, “There is no reason to suppose that so-called secular ideologies such as nationalism, patriotism, capitalism, Marxism, and liberalism are any less prone to absolutist, divisive, and irrational than belief in, for example, the biblical God.”[235] There are conservative and neoconservative ideologies, the latter of which can be argued to be even more totalitarian than the Islamist groups the authors condemn. How can the authors who many see as following an extreme ideology be taken seriously when countering other extreme ideologies?

“Islamofascism” and Negative Fallout

The worst effect of using the term “Islamofascism” is to close one’s mind before allowing an objective analysis and understanding of what is being described. The problem with using the term “Islamofascism,” historian Michael Burleigh says, is that “it suggests to many people that Islam itself is fascist.”[236] Bernard Lewis takes the sensitivities of Muslims into account and dislikes using the term “Islamofascism” because, he says, “it’s insulting to Muslims. They see it as insulting to link the name of their religion with the most detestable of all the European movements” and prefers to use the term “radical Islam” instead.[237] If Muslims feel insulted by such terms, then these terms could be more damaging than useful in the counter-extremism narrative. Moreover, relating any movement to fascism triggers a combat mentality. Stefan Duran says the term ‘Islamofascism’ “…is not only inaccurate, it is deliberately intended to promote the idea of preventive wars.”[238] Author and scholar, Reza Aslan, says, “To talk about Jihadism as Islamofascism is to misunderstand both Jihadism and fascism. Fascism is an ideology of ultranationalism; Jihadism rejects the very concept of the nation-state as anathema to Islam. In that regard, Jihadism is the opposite of Islamism.”[239]

Totalitarianism – More Differences Than Similarities?

The reviewer agrees with the authors that Islamist movements, revolutionary and peaceful, have attempted to model themselves, at least verbally and in terms of certain features, after political ideologies of the twentieth century. However, the authors fail to note that there is a difference between rhetoric and its application, and, unlike Fascism, Nazism, and Communism, Islamism (with only rare exceptions) has been unable to support its rhetoric with practice. Any success represents the aberration and not the norm. This makes Islamism very unlike other compared political ideologies that were relatively comprehensive in their organization, action, and effects, and had a high degree of sophistication. Stefan Duran states, “[T]he expansionist nationalism, corporatism, bureaucracy and the cult of the body…are generally lacking in Islamism.”[240]
Similarly, the Taliban in Afghanistan was more like a “medieval obscurantist” theocracy than a fascist regime. Moreover, “jihadism” should be differentiated from Islamofascism.

*Where is the “Totalitarian” Program? Matching Rhetoric with Action*

In spite of their rhetoric, Islamists have generally been oblivious to how society ought to be governed according to Islamic Law. While a range of Islamists are now experimenting with governance after the Arab Spring, no planned program of governance has materialized that incorporates the full spectrum of Islamic Law, including its controversial aspects. Rather, Islamists are learning that Islamic Law can only expand within the confines of the current social-political milieu. Ideology in this sense, Roy describes, is “more an emotional and vague narrative than a blueprint for ruling.” To Roy, it is yet another reason why the continued “failure of political Islam” persists. Likewise, Bayat says that “Al-Qaeda intrinsically lacks any sort of social and political program and thus is unlikely to succeed in mobilizing a concerted national dissent against a concrete national state.” The seriousness with which Islamists claim to want an “Islamic State” seems to be lacking, in spite their rhetoric, slogans, and symbols.

When Fawaz Gerges asked Kamal al-Said Habib, a top former leader of the al-Jihad terrorist organization in Egypt, if al-Jihad was “truly prepared to establish a viable Islamic government,” Habib replied,

> “Thank God, we did not win, because we would have constructed a state along the same authoritarian lines as the ones existing in the Muslim world. We had no vision or an intellectual framework of what a state is or how it functions and how it should be administered, except that it should express and approximate the Islamic ideal. While I cannot predict that our state would have been totalitarian, we had little awareness of the challenges that needed to be overcome.”

Indeed the Islamists’ rhetoric of creating an “Islamic state” has always been louder than action. They would need to adapt to the needs of society in a more sophisticated and informed manner for any possibility of surviving. Harvard scholar, Noah Feldman, attributes the ignorance of a blueprint for society by Islamists partly because Islamists are usually not religious scholars:

> “The Islamists would…like to acknowledge what they refer to as God’s ‘sovereignty.’ But without the scholars to fulfill the role of authorized interpreters of God’s law, the Islamists find themselves in difficulties when they try to explain how and why Islamic law should govern.

Feldman continues, “For most of the last century, Islamist literature has basically avoided dealing with the issue. It presents Islamic law as a promising source for social salvation, with no serious attempt made to explain, constitutionally or theologically, what would justify its adoption and implementation.” The marginalization of religious scholars by Islamists is a relatively modern phenomenon that reflects discontinuity and change from
classical Sunni tradition. It is an important distinction between Islamic governance of pre-modern times and modern or post-modern governance of Islamists today. The authors of the book fail to acknowledge this difference.

“Jihadist States”

Josceyln seems to assume that all that happens within a state is the fault of the state. For example, he does not elaborate on the fact and possibilities that countries could sponsor groups in other countries without their knowledge to achieve geo-political goals/interests, as was the case, for example, during the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s. While blaming Pakistan, and even if Pakistan is double dealing, the author neglects to account for geo-strategic benefits that may be gained by allowing Pakistan to deal with militants in its own style and terms. Even if they support militants for what they see as their national and regional security, they nevertheless generally do not support them sufficiently to pose a threat to their own or other States apart from, perhaps, India. The author also does not account for the possibility that the US Government may stand to gain far less if Pakistan directly confronts militants, which could lead to an even more unstable region. Such matters are to be dealt with tactfully to prevent the situation from changing from bad to worse. The Afghan Taliban, for example, while extreme, did not wish to expand their occupation of land beyond Afghanistan. There was no “global jihad” and they did not support or plan terrorist attacks against the United States from their soil. Even when Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan, there is evidence to explain that the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’eda did not see eye to eye on many matters, with the Afghan Taliban demanding that no action should be taken by Bin Laden or his group pending approval of the “Amir al-Mu’mineen” (Mullah Omar). Evidence illustrates that al-Qa’eda’s attack on the US in September 11th was not planned by the Afghan Taliban, but by al-Qa’eda in violation of the agreement the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’eda had. Regarding Sudan, Josceelyn discusses the country when it was a safe haven for Bin laden more than 15 years ago. Accusing Sudan of playing the same role today is irrelevant and outdated.

The overall problem with the author’s analysis is that al-Qa’eda is still mainly stateless, even if they reside within States – they have to reside somewhere. Even if States may know of al-Qa’eda’s presence on their territory, they may not have the wherewithal to act successfully against them, to inform others due to unstated political reasons, and/or may not know of their presence. While militants may be used as proxies by various countries to achieve national or regional interests, they are nonetheless not in bed with them in the full sense of the phrase because country leaders themselves are targets of the “kaﬁr” nation-state system by militants.

Furthermore, the view of the author cannot be taken seriously in view of the fact that the United States and other countries have, at one time or another, supported militants for what the US saw as its geo-political interests. Supporting militants in the Soviet-Afghan war, and Israel’s support of Hamas against PLO’s nationalism are examples that Josceelyn
completely ignores. Ignoring these facts can potentially lead to even less trust among the masses, and portray the US as a “do as I say, not as I do” country that stops countries from working towards what they believe are their interests, while allowing the US to do what it desires.

Also missing in Joscelyn’s discussion are the reasons why militants exist in many of the regions mentioned and why they commit terrorism. Abundant literature has been neglected by the author, including Robert Pape’s explanation of why suicide bombers attack and respond to occupation, why attacks increase as occupation continues, and decreases as the occupation wanes. Without identifying and addressing the possible reasons that contribute to terrorism, targeting “Jihadist States” may not resolve the problem of terrorism, even if they have a role in supporting terrorism.

**Reilly and Sebastian Gorka Misrepresent Syed Qutb**

Robert Reilly says Syed Qutb is the “chief Egyptian ideologue of the radical Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks our destruction….The entire Islamist world revolves around the thinking of this man […]” (p.153). Of Qutb, he also says, “You can be sure to find his writings at the foundation of any radical Muslim group today, including al Qaeda” (p.154). Sebastian Gorka says that Qutb’s “only way” of cleansing society from alleged jahiliyya “is through jihad, through holy war” (p.198), and then quotes Qutb as saying, “Islam is not a religion, it is a revolutionary party” (p.198).

However, Gorka seems unaware of the fact that there is debate on whether Qutb was calling for revolutionary violence or not. Extending linkages from Syed Qutb to the “entire Islamist world” is an exaggeration that has been addressed by scholars John Calvert, Fawaz Gerges, and William Shephard. Reilly, it seems, follows the same strange logic in his explanation of Islamic history when he somehow links his understanding of the classical Sunni Ash’ari school of creed with the rise of Osama bin Laden.

**John Calvert’s View of Syed Qutb and Links to al-Qa’eda**

John Calvert, author of “Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam,” says that present-day Islamists read Qutb differently: moderates (such as mainstream Muslim Brothers) downplay his revolutionary religio-political message, and radicals (such as al Qaeda members) exaggerate it:

“Yet, if the Al Qaeda threat has made Qutb a household name, it has also monopolized and distorted our understanding of his real contribution to contemporary Islamism. In the search for Al Qaeda’s origins, even well intentioned observers tend to focus on points of similarity between Qutb’s thought and that of Al Qaeda at the expense of significant anomalies between the two. Some have even suggested that the global jihad has remote origins in the Qutb’s uncomfortable experience at a church social in the conservative town of Greeley, Colorado in the late 1940s. Read backwards from the event of 9/11, these
accounts enfold Qutb in the Al Qaeda mantle in an attempt to make the variegated history of the Islamic movement into a cohesive narrative. If some students of the jihad are careful to situate Qutb correctly in relation to Al Qaeda, still they often consign him to the position of opening act. Rarely do observers of the scene address Qutb’s singularity.”[^245]

Calvert continues:

“Yet in resorting to short cuts, we pass over a history that is as nuanced as any other. We run the danger of succumbing to a ‘neo-Orientalist’ trop that subordinates particulars to an essential and enduring identity, and ignores complexity in favor of simplicity. Just as it makes no sense to confuse the outlook of Hamas, an organization focused on redeeming land lost to Israel, with the plan-Islamism of Al Qaeda, so too is it unwise to assume a direct link between Sayyid Qutb and Usama bin Laden. Researchers need to study each on its own terms with reference to its distinctive environment and concerns.”[^246] (italics added by reviewer).

**Fawaz Gerges’s View of Syed Qutb and Links to al-Qa’eda**

Fawaz Gerges, best-selling author and al-Qa’eda scholar, says,

“After September 11, Western commentators and analysts suddenly discovered Qutb, and portrayed him as the ‘philosopher of terror,’ the spiritual and operational godfather to bin Laden and Zawahiri; they have drawn a direct, unbroken line between Qutb and al-Qaeda.”[^247]

Gerges continues, “This connection fits perfectly with al-Qaeda’s own designs. The organization has engaged in a systematic effort to claim the Qutbian legacy.” He says, “Despite their claim of kinship, bin Laden and Zawahiri twisted Qutb’s idea to suit their purposes. According to Qutb’s contemporary followers, some of whom spent years with him in prison and underground, Qutb never called for a confrontation with the West and instead exhorted them to strike at Arab rulers who conspired with Islam’s external enemies and allowed them to infiltrate Muslim lands.” Gerges continues, “Contemporary followers maintain that he showed no interest in either the internationalization of jihad or the targeting of Western powers. Nonetheless Qutb essentially called on Muslims to defend dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) against crusading intrusion and cultural invasion. Yet both bin Laden and his detractors have claimed that Qutb supplied the fuel that powered al-Qaeda’s transnational jihad.”[^248] “This could not be further from the truth,” Gerges says. “None of the surviving chiefs of the Secret Apparatus” – Qutb’s organization – “whom I interviewed ever mentioned that Qutb had instructed them to attack the United States and its Western allies or had theorized the need to confront the enemy without.” Quoting a close confidant of Qutb inside and outside prison, Sayyid Eid, who calls Qutb al-shahid, said, “I do not ever recall al-shahid saying that we should wage war against America or Britain; rather he wanted us to be vigilant against the West’s cultural penetration of our societies.”[^249]
Gerges says, “While Qutb’s diatribe against America has widely resonated among Islamists, al-Qaeda’s actions cannot be traced to his rhetoric. Indeed, transnational jihad took Qutb’s strategic priorities and turned them on their head” (italics added by reviewer).[250]

William Shepard’s view of Syed Qutb and Links to al-Qa‘eda

Author and scholar William Shepard says,

“the ‘terrorism’ and the ‘martyrdom operations,’ which are seen as the particular trademarks of al-Qaeda and, to some extent, Hamas, have the least grounding in Qutb’s writings. We can say, however, that his dichotomous ‘Manichaeism’ and his theological absolutism do provide fertile ground for the seeds of ‘terrorism’ and ‘martyrdom operations,” even if they are initially alien to him. Any ideologue who feels certain about ultimate truth and perceives a clear and absolute distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, is capable of justifying even the most horrendous of actions. History illustrates this all too well. This far, but no further in my view, can we call Qutb an ideological father of Islamist violence[251]” (italics added by reviewer).

Reilly’s and Sebastian Gorka’s understanding of Qutb and links to al-Qa‘eda lack the sophistication and scholarship needed for a more informed understanding.

Sookhdeo Gives the Wrong Year of a Terrorism Incident

Sookhdeo says that the young Nigerian, Umar Abdulmutallab, “attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detroit in December 2010” (p.27). This is incorrect. The attempt was made in December 2009 – not 2010.

Sookhdeo Misrepresents Olivier Roy

Sookhdeo says,

“As Olivier Roy argues, the traditional concepts of the umma, the sovereignty of Islam in the state, and the supremacy of shari’a as revived by Islamists have become a major driving force in contemporary Islam, both in Muslim states and among Muslim minorities elsewhere” (p.27).

Sookhdeo misrepresents Roy who actually said, “And as I tried to show in Globalized Islam (2004), what is perceived in the West as a return to a traditional and nostalgic Islam is, on the contrary, a profound alteration of traditional Islam, which is now giving way to a more open and diverse religious field.”[252] In the first page of the Preface of the book, Roy says,

“Globalised Islam refers to the way in which the relationship of Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalisation, westernisation and the impact of living as a minority.
The issue is not the theological content of the Islamic religion, but the way believers refer to this corpus to adapt and explain their behaviors in a context where religion has lost its social authority”[253] (italics added).

Contrary to Sookhdeo’s portrayal of contemporary currents as reflections of Sunni tradition, including “the supremacy of shari’a as revived by Islamists,” Roy says these expressions are “a profound alteration of traditional Islam,” and, in his book, says, “The issue is not the theological content of the Islamic religion […].” Sookhdeo says the opposite of what Roy discusses in his book.

**Sookhdeo Misrepresents “Progressive Reformers”**

When examining the “Progressive Reformers” listed by Sookhdeo (p.39), he misrepresents some of them. A few examples are explained below:

**Sookhdeo Misrepresents Khalid Abou El Fadl**

Contrary to Sookhdeo, Khalid Abou El Fadl in his commentary, “Terrorism Is at Odds With Islamic Tradition”, does not believe that classical Islamic tradition teaches or promotes terrorism. El Fadl, says,

> “Ignoring for the time being that Muslims themselves often have been victims of terrorism, I am sure that there are a number of Muslims who do believe that terrorism, at some level, is justified. It is worth noting, however, that, at a minimum, this belief is at odds with Islamic law. The Islamic juristic tradition, which is similar to the Jewish rabbinical tradition, has exhibited unmitigated hostility toward terror as a means of political resistance.”[254]

It is curious why Sookhdeo, who has a completely opposite view from Abou El Fadl’s on classical Islam and terrorism, claims to support Abou El Fadl.

**Sookhdeo Misrepresents Asghar Ali Engineer**

Asghar Ali Engineer is also misrepresented by Sookhdeo. While Sookhdeo claims that the understanding of Islam by terrorists like Osama bin Laden is rooted in classical Islamic tradition, Ali Engineer, in his article, “The Jihad Most Needed,” defines jihad as “to strive for anything good, including striving for peace and the welfare of humanity”, and says,

> “For the likes of Osama bin Laden jihad means a very different thing. They use it for retaliation against the US, and have given rise to what is the totally unacceptable phenomenon of terrorism.”

Ali Engineer further explains Osama bin Laden’s distorted understanding of *jihad*:
It is neither an acceptable approach in the contemporary world nor does he belong to the political or the ruling class. No head of an Islamic state has approved of what bin Laden does, nor has any army of a Muslim country invaded a non-Muslim country at his behest. Bin Laden is neither the head of a country nor does he have the backing of any Muslim state’s army. His misguided jihad has neither scriptural nor political backing (or that of the ulema)” (italics added).[255]

While Sookhdeo roots “Islamic” terrorism in classical Islamic tradition, Ali Engineer states that Osama bin Laden’s actions do not have scriptural support at all.

**Sookhdeo Misrepresents Farish Noor**

Farish Noor is also listed by Sookhdeo as a “Progressive Reformer,” but Noor’s view of *jihad* is quite different from Sookhdeo’s. Noor says,

> Muslims…cannot engage in acts of terror and indiscriminate violence where civilians are targeted. (In fact, numerous Muslim leaders like the early Caliphs even warned their troops not to burn the fields of their enemies or kill their livestock). A proper Jihad for the sake of self-defence was therefore a complicated and highly regulated matter – and the rulers had to consult the jurists as well as their own populations before such an enterprise was undertaken. [256]

Noor is clear that Muslims “cannot engage in acts of terror and indiscriminate violence” and that such discretion was followed by “numerous Muslim leaders like the early Caliphs.” Sookhdeo, however, claims that “terrorism derives from classical Islam” (p.40).

The above demonstrates that not all “Progressive Reformers” support Sookhdeo’s views of Islam as Sookhdeo incorrectly portrays in the book. Therefore, the views of the other listed scholars by Sookhdeo should be investigated further before assuming that they represent Sookhdeo’s views. It seems that Sookhdeo will not find many supporters among “Progressive Reformers” – the “best hope” (p.41) according to Sookhdeo – to counter radicalism. As discussed, “Progressive Reformers” are not needed in the first place because the majority of Muslims are already peaceful and oppose terrorism, as illustrated in key findings of polls mentioned earlier.

**Sookhdeo Misrepresents Abdullah Azzam**

Sookhdeo misrepresents Abdullah Azzam, a father figure of Osama bin Laden. For example, he quotes Azzam’s words,

> “We are terrorists. Every Muslim must be a terrorist. Terrorism is an obligation as demonstrated in the Koran and Sunna. Allah Most High said: “Muster against them [infidels] all the men and cavalry at your command, so that you may strike terror into the heart of your enemy and Allah’s enemy” [Q. 8:60] Thus terrorism is a [religious] obligation. And the Messenger of Allah is the first terrorist and the first menace” (p.24).
Sookhdeo isolates Azzam’s quote and portrays him as a supporter of terrorism. He also seems to insinuate that Azzam’s words rightly represent Islam’s teachings. However, of Azzam’s “Introduction to Emigration and Preparation (muqaddima fi ’l-hijra wa ’l-i’dad),” a “collection of Azzam’s lectures, speeches, and sermons,” Brynjar Lia says, “Judging from their contents, these lectures were held in one of the training camps for Arab volunteers; the audience seems to have been mostly newly arrived volunteers.”[257] This means that Azzam was preaching to a group of fighters primarily in reference to defensive jihad against the Soviet Union, a strictly military encounter. In any war, fighters instill fear in the hearts of the opposing army to weaken their morale. Because armies, in general, do this, it does not make them de facto supporters of “terrorism,” as the term is commonly defined. Because the targets of Azzam’s battle were not civilians, but Soviet soldiers, and because he did not share al-Qa’eda’s later views on targeting civilians, Azzam cannot be described as a “terrorist” as Sookhdeo would like readers to believe.

Of Azzam, Gerges says, “At the height of the Afghan war, Azzam opposed attacking civilians, including Russians, though between 1979 and 1989 Soviet troops nearly destroyed Afghanistan and killed and injured millions of its inhabitants. He opposed terrorism as a tool of war as well as aggression against noncombatants.”[258] Gerges also says, “…Azzam opposed taking arms against fellow Muslims, including nationalist rulers like Nasser and Mubarak.”[259] He continues, “From 1987 until his assassination in 1989, Azzam doggedly opposed initiatives by the Egyptian and Algerian contingents led by Zawahiri to deploy the Afghan Arabs...against pro-Western secular regimes and to spread the Islamic revolution throughout Muslim lands, starting with Egypt and Algeria.”[260] Gerges says, “Azzam attempted to restrain what he saw as reckless adventurers, such as Fadl and Zawahiri and their cohorts, and to prevent them from hijacking the Afghan jihad. Before his assassination in 1989, and to the chagrin of Zawahiri, Azzam also tried to extract Bin Laden from the clutches of the Egyptian contingent.”[261] Gerges also clarifies that, contrary to what the book’s authors portray, Azzam never supported a ‘transnational jihad’ as Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri later did: “Azzam did not call for the internationalization of jihad and never envisioned a transnational organization along al-Qaeda ideology, structure, and tactics.”[262] In fact, according to Fadl, an emir of Tanzim al-Jihad and senior associate of Zawahiri, al-Qa’eda’s rise was a reaction away from Abdullah Azzam and a rejection of his views.[263]

This does not absolve Azzam’s own extremism, but explains that Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other extremists cannot be described homogenously as the authors do. Azzam never shared Zawahiri’s and Osama bin Laden’s (later) views on targeting American civilians, even if he inspired fighters of many colors, whether they fully agreed with him or not, or whether they were in line with his views or not. Had Azzam been alive today, he would likely have condemned al-Qa’eda’s call for ‘jihad’ against the “Far Enemy” and targeting of American civilians.

Sookhdeo Misrepresents Bernard Lewis
While using statements of Bernard Lewis in an attempt to support his view that classical Islam promotes violence, including terrorism, Sookhdeo fails to note that Bernard Lewis says exactly the opposite. Commenting on terrorism and the 9/11 attacks, Lewis says,

“What the classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered is the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations that we saw in New York two weeks ago. For this there is no precedent and no authority in Islam. Indeed it is difficult to find precedents even in the rich annals of human wickedness” (italics included by reviewer).\[264\]

In another article, Lewis comments on suicide bombing:

“Well, a lot of what is being done is certainly a perversion of Islam, simply in the light of their own texts. Take, for example, the suicide bomber. Now, the classical Islamic legal and religious texts are quite clear on the subject of suicide….Even if a man or a woman had lived a life of unremitting virtue, by committing suicide they forfeit paradise and go straight to hell, where, according to the sacred texts, the eternal punishment of the suicide consists of the eternal repetition of the act of suicide. So, if you poison yourself, an eternity of bellyache; if you strangle yourself, an eternity of strangling; and presumably for these people, an eternity of exploding fragments.”

“We ask, well, why do they do it? How does it happen? This is a very recent development.”\[265\]

Contrary to Sookhdeo’s misrepresentation, Lewis is clear in his view that terrorism, including suicide bombing, is not rooted in classical Sunni tradition. Sookhdeo’s method is similar to al-Qa’eda’s: Just as al-Qa’eda cherry-picks from Islamic sources and tradition to support its own non-traditional, militant views, Sookhdeo cherry-picks from scholars selectively and misrepresents them to support his views.

**Ulph Misrepresents Ahmad ibn Hanbal**

In explaining the literalist understanding of the Qur’an and hadith by radicals where speculation and metaphor have no place, Ulph says, “Radicals of all stamps seek authority to this priority in the person of Ibn Hanbal who championed the cause of the Text with his claim that

“whoever involves themselves in any theological rhetoric is not to be counted amongst the Ahl us-Sunnah, even if by that he arrives at the Sunnah, until he abandons debating and surrenders to the texts” (p.66).

This is an inaccurate understanding of the literalist approach of radicals, and an incorrect representation of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali school of Sunni jurisprudence. Not being involved in “theological rhetoric” does not translate to accepting the text literally, as Ulph erroneously understands. Ironically, this is the same incorrect understanding of Ibn Hanbal’s words that Wahhabis and other Salafis have. Ibn Hanbal
Ibn Hanbal spoke on theology – or creed (‘aqida) – the correct understanding of the attributes of God as stated in the Qur’an and Sunnah. Ibn Hanbal said that God’s attributes should be accepted without attributing meaning to them, metaphorically or literally. Contemporary Sunni scholar, Nuh Keller, explains:

“The real (‘aqida) of Imam Ahmad was very simple, and consisted, in the main, of accepting the words of the mutashabihat or ‘unapparent meanings’ of the Qur’an and hadith as they have come without saying how they are meant.”[266]

Keller continues,

“It should be appreciated how far this position is from understanding the mutashabihat or ‘unapparent in meaning,’ scriptural expressions about Allah as though they were meant literally (‘ala al-dhahir).”[267]

Ibn Hanbal’s understanding of Islamic creed is called the Athari school of creed in Sunni Islam, and is followed by most Hanbalis. The Athari approach, grounded in Sunni tradition, should be differentiated from and not be conflated with the neo-Athari understanding of creed that demonstrated and still demonstrates, the “tendency…towards excessive literalism in beliefs and even towards anthropomorphism (affirmation of human attributes to Allah).”[268] Wahhabis and Salafis follow a neo-Athari understanding of creed that cannot be called Hanbali. The neo-Hanbali understanding of creed, which is not part of mainstream Sunni tradition, was followed by Ibn Taymiyah, Muhammad ibn Abdal-Wahhab, and other figures who were, and still are, opposed by the majority of Sunnis.

This example illustrates the importance of counter-terrorism analysts and commentators to learn classical Sunni creed and differentiate it from the understanding of creed by minority groups who claim the “Sunni” mantle. Serious mistakes like Ulph’s could unintentionally demonize non-radical Muslims, mainly of the Hanbali school, and compromise mainstream Sunni arguments against radicals.

**Challenging Reilly’s “Moral” Argument to Counter Extremism**

Robert Reilly seems to agree with the moral critique of America by some Islamists:

“Those who insist that America’s public diplomacy nightmare in the Middle East is due only to its policies mistake the fundamentally moral nature of the attack” (p.154).

“The first thing the United States needs to do is address the moral critique of America as a godless, secular, sex-obsessed society immersed in materialism. Just when the moral basis of American life may be eroding, it is precisely this basis that it most needs to present to the Muslim world if it is to defuse the contempt
and anger American popular culture provokes” (p.154, 155).

*Policies – Not Morality – Are the Bigger Problem*

However, the moral critique of America by some Islamists does not translate to a demand for moral rectification by the Arab population at large. The world’s biggest Gallup poll of Muslims ever conducted and released in 2007 states, “Though Muslims resent the cultural saturation and immorality they perceive in the West, they do not feel the West needs to ‘stop being immoral and corrupt.’” Moreover, “To improve relations, they feel the West simply needs to make concrete changes to its policies, not its principles.”

Therefore, if Arabs and Muslims dislike certain cultural and moral aspects of America, this does not necessarily translate to terrorism or extremism against America or its citizens by them.

Because morals are derived from values, it is important to highlight the 2004 to 2008 poll held in six Arab countries by Shibley Telhami that was explained earlier. Telhami, explaining the results, says, “They” – the Arabs – “reject American policies and therefore question American values and whether America stands for what it professes.” Telhami says, “On average, roughly 75 percent” of the Arabs said their attitudes toward the US are based more on American policy in the Middle East. The primary attitudes by Arabs toward the US are not based on morals or values.

In addition, “Western products and brands” are widely accepted in the Arab world. In a 2009 Arab poll of six countries, the following question was asked: “When you watch television, how often do you watch American or European movies, shows, or music videos?” Telhami explains,

> “On average…61 percent said they watch such programs at least five to six days every week (and another 12 percent said three to four times per week). While Moroccans were most likely to watch Western programs almost daily (79 percent), 46 percent of Saudis said they watch at least five to six days a week, while another 17 percent said they watch three to four times per week.”

American television and pop culture are not sources of tension for most Arabs, but are examples of “What Arabs Still Like About the United States.”

These views were similar to an earlier March 4th to April 3rd 2002 poll conducted by Zogby International using face-to-face interviews in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. James Zogby explains, “…we found that those polled expressed a high regard for many aspects of America’s broader cultural contributions” and “American movies and television as well as education and products were also well received by majorities in all countries.”

*Militants and “American” Values*
Disliking American morals and values also does not appear to be the case with the minority of terrorists, who, in spite of their rhetoric, have been known to indulge in moral decay. For example, when terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) was in the Philippines, “he was a frequent visitor to Manila’s red light district, including its karaoke bars and mirrored go-go clubs, where he introduced himself to women as a wealthy businessman from Qatar.” Muhammad Atta, the “leader of the September 11 terrorists and four other hijackers made several trips to Las Vegas over the summer to hold meetings, gamble and be entertained by topless dancers.” Pornography was also reportedly found in Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abottabad. Pornography was also found by security forces in Taliban hideouts in Pakistan, and militants also embedded coded material in child pornography according to Scotland Yard. Nidal Malik Hassan is also reported to have had a lap-dance at a strip joint just six days before the Fort Hood massacre. Terrorists do not appear from their behavior to genuinely be against “American” culture, in spite of their rhetoric against America. Therefore, Reilly’s moral critique will likely not make America and its citizens any safer, especially if the United States does not change its foreign policy that Arabs generally resent.

Reilly and a Public Diplomacy and Communications Institution and Strategy

Such an institution and strategy that represents Reilly’s views would be ineffective due to his understanding that morality – and not policy – is the chief concern in the Arab region that would cause positive change. While neglecting the bigger concern, little success would be expected in changing hearts and minds in the Arab region. Moreover, such a strategy would be further undermined by Reilly’s remarks that would be construed as offensive by many Arabs. For example, as stated, Reilly claims, “The Middle East is poor because of a dysfunctional culture based upon a deformed theology […].” (Sebastian Gorka also says Prophet Muhammad is “not a man of peace” – p.188.) Reilly says that “Al-Azhar,” – the famous religious university in Egypt – is an “intellectual backwater retarding Muslims’ ability to enter the modern world […].” (p.154) He also takes issue with John Brennan’s description of jihad as “holy struggle,” and says, “Conceding legitimacy to your enemy in a war of ideas is not a good move” (p.160). Reilly is to be reminded that because most Muslims define jihad as a “holy struggle,” defining the acts of the “enemy” as jihad, as Reilly does, undermines the Arab majority while legitimizing the minority of extremists who claim to represent genuine Islam. What is needed is a counter-narrative that distinguishes acts of terrorism (preferably described as irjaf) from the classical Sunni view of jihad. Reilly’s – and the other authors’ – pejorative words and condescending views about Islam and Arab culture would result in a communications catastrophe, would embolden the extremists, and worsen relations between the United States and the wider Muslim world.

Sebastian Gorka and his Misrepresentation of Pakistani General S.K. Malik

Sebastian Gorka says, “If you read only one person to understand the enemy, read S.K.
Malik’s book, The Quranic Concept of Power” (p.200). Curiously, Gorka makes this recommendation in spite of the fact that Malik was an army man, and not a religious scholar. While also recognizing that General Zia ul-Haq wrote the forward of the book, and that the book is clearly a work of political propaganda used to rally the Muslims and Afghan combatants to fight against the Soviets, Gorka nevertheless imagines (without evidence) that Malik’s interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah are “a theological strategy of war for Islam.” Gorka is unable to differentiate theology and Islam from a political propaganda piece relevant to a specific conflict. Seeing Malik as a legitimate interpreter of the Qur’an and Sunnah to explain war is like using a Crusader’s interpretation of the Bible on waging war on Muslims and other ‘infidel’ Christians.

Gorka’s non-sequitur is even more glaring. Gorka says that because Malik believed that “the best weapon in war is terror,” Malik, as well Zia ul-Haq who endorsed the book, “thus told the world back in 1979 that 9/11 is the kind of attack one should execute if you want to win a war” (p.201). It is strange that Gorka concludes that two individuals who lived more than 20 years prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks endorsed the attacks. While Malik is not a religious scholar, his own words clearly state that he meant instilling “terror” in the enemy in times of war. Terror in war is different from terrorism perpetrated by al-Qa’eda. Yet, Gorka seems to believe they are synonymous, and curiously agrees with the 9/11 militants he condemns by describing their terrorism as terror in war. Illogical extrapolations do not help, but misinform and confuse, and embolden the extremists who government and military professionals are trying hard to defeat.

*Homogenizing Muslims*

The authors absurdly homogenize almost all Muslims as one group, expect the “Progressive Reformers” who Sookhdeo claims to support. This means that traditional Sunni Muslims of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence (the Muslim majority), various non-political Salafis (most Wahhabis), violent radicals (like al-Qa’eda and Boko Haram members), non-violent Islamists (like the Muslim Brotherhood), and other kinds of Muslims are seen as guilty of promoting extremism in one form or another, directly or indirectly, unintentionally or knowingly, internally or externally. However, most Muslims worldwide want what most Americans want. Also, most Islamists are non-violent and do not wish to wage “jihad” on any enemy, “near” or “far.” Rather, they have embraced the nation-state model of governance and democracy, and, as a result are accused by the militant minority of being heathens. Their goals are not the same and should not be explained as such (see Sookhdeo, pg. 24; Sebastian Gorka, p.204, for example). David Fisher and Brian Wicker say, “[al]-Qa’ida’s ideology is not shared…by…terrorist organization…Hamas.” They also say that when Hamas was “prepared to participate in elections for the Palestinian legislative council in January 2006”, they were “fiercely condemned by Al-Qa’ida and accused of following the ‘infidel religion of democracy.’”[282] The authors’ superficial understanding and description of the “enemy” leaves much clarification to be desired.
A Global Caliphate?

The authors claim there is a “global jihad” (p.12). Sookhdeo says that both “gradual Islamists” and “violent radicals” “can… be viewed as manifestations of a single collective ideology, whose common aim is the establishment of the global Islamist State, the Caliphate” (p.24). Stephen Ulph says, “Indeed the formation of the Islamic state is a prerequisite for fulfilling the goals of a supra-state designed to embody the supremacy of the Islamic faith” (p.47).

However, a July 2012 study that examined the most frequently cited or quoted verses in the Qur’an from over 2,000 extremist texts from 1998 to 2011 in the Center for Strategic Communication’s database had a different conclusion. The authors concluded that

“…verses extremists cite from the Qur’an do not suggest an aggressive offensive foe seeking domination and conquest of unbelievers, as is commonly assumed. Instead they deal with themes of victimization, dishonor, and retribution. This shows close integration with the rhetorical vision of Islamist extremists.”[283]

The study further says,

“Based on this analysis we recommend that the West abandon claims that Islamist extremists seek world domination, focus on counteracting or addressing claims of victimage, emphasize alternative means of deliverance, and work to undermine the “champion” image sought by extremists”[284] (italics added by reviewer).

Kamal El Helbawy, a former steering committee member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood who left the Brotherhood in 2012, “insists that it is wrong to say that the absolute goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is to bring about any sort of caliphate.”[285] Even if they did establish a caliphate, it would not be one that unites the Muslims, because the Muslim Brotherhood is not united at the regional or global levels. Juan Cole says,

“The Brotherhood is a decentralized organization even in Egypt. It is not organized internationally. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan…is essentially a different organization from its Egyptian counterpart. Hamas has its distant origins in Brotherhood proselytizing in the 1930s, but it takes no orders from Cairo. Other political groups with a Muslim Brotherhood genealogy include the Iraqi Islamic Party, which cooperated with George W. Bush’s invasion of and administration of Iraq.”[286]

Furthermore, taking into consideration the post-Islamist period, and Islamists being more flexible and softer on ideology over time due to secular exigencies, Islamists who claim to work towards a global caliphate may have to be taken less seriously.
While a 2007 poll in four countries (Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia) showed majority support “to unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or caliphate,” this does not mean a Taliban-like state. The same poll showed that the majority favored “a democratic political system” to govern their country, as well as “freedom to practice any religion.”[287] As stated previously, the poll of Arab countries from 2004 to 2010 by Telhami concluded that only 7 percent of Arabs polled in both years “embraced Al Qaeda because of its aims to establish a Taliban-like Islamic state.”[288] Also, as explained, the world’s biggest Gallup Poll of Muslims worldwide concluded that Muslims “wanting Sharia involved in politics does not translate into Muslims wanting theocracy. Majorities in many countries remarked that they do not want religious leaders to hold direct legislative or political power.” Moreover, “[M]any Muslims desire neither a democracy or theocracy, but instead a unique model incorporating both democratic and religious principles.”[289]

The type of caliphate, therefore, would be a moderate one that does not represent the kind of caliphate that a minority of extremists would like, nor what classical Islam represents, but more similar to what the United States is. Mohammed Habib, a former deputy general guide of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, “underscores that the real goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is to bring about either a structure that resembles that of the US government or one that is looser but nevertheless a confederation, with a constitution and a leader.”[290] The authors’ warnings of an extremist global caliphate that reigns supreme and subjugates non-Muslims are therefore more imaginary and doom-laden than realistic.

**Sookhdeo’s and Katharine Gorka’s Exaggerated Views of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)**

Sookhdeo and Katharine Gorka say,

“Rather, the Islamists have the force of the OIC…and its 57 member states behind them, pushing for ever greater recognition of Islam and its demands, and, in its own words, promoting and coordinating Muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political affairs” (p.9).

Sookhdeo also says of the OIC,

“By pooling all the available resources of its constituent parts, it might begin a new civilizational cycle in which the umma is at the forefront of human power” (p.28).

Sookhdeo then says,

“We have already seen that the Islamist emphasis on the global umma tends to lead to a jihad mentality” (p.28).

It is naïve to assert that “Islamists have the force of the OIC,” as if the OIC was an Islamist organization similar to or controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamists were
known to be against the leaders of many of the OIC countries, and is why the Arab Spring took place. Moreover, OIC countries, in spite of their rhetoric of unity, chart their own political and national interests, and the impact of the OIC on Muslims has been negligible. Author Toni Johnson from the Council on Foreign Relations explains,

“Overall, says Hady Amr, a director of the Brookings Doha Center, along with other experts, the OIC hasn't made much of an impact on the daily lives of Muslims or on issues such as Palestinian self-determination and statehood and control over Muslim holy sites within Israel. Efforts to isolate Israel have largely fallen flat. For instance, Egypt was excluded from the OIC in 1979 for establishing a peace agreement with Israel (Egypt was reinstated in 1984), and several other countries continue to maintain diplomatic and economic ties despite a 1981 OIC resolution for an economic boycott. There also can be significant enmity between some OIC states, such as Iran and Iraq.”[291]

Sookhdeo and Gorka repeat the same flawed approach of homogenizing all Muslims, and ignoring the differences and priorities among them. Harun Moghal, Executive Director of the Maydan Institute, says, “Identifying the OIC as an expression of a collective Muslim will means attempting to forge, out of a messy mix of states, an international partner for America.” He also says, “But the OIC's fifty-seven member-states are by no means united by their modes of government or foreign policies.”

Just as the authors draw an unconvincing link from classical Sunni Islam to modern terrorism, they also create a dubious link from the OIC to the possibility of a “jihad mentality.” It is also unrealistic to think that OIC countries will pool “all available resources” that “might begin a civilizational cycle.” Sookhdeo’s and Gorka’s Westminster Institute has held events to promote conspiratorial views about the OIC as an Islamist front that is out to dominate the world. It is better to distance oneself from such imaginary thinking and be more realistic and practical, especially if the authors wish to rectify the allegedly ineffective counter-terrorism policies of the US government. Contrary to the authors, the reviewer believes that continuing active cooperation and bridge-building with the Arab and larger Muslim world is imperative for any counter-terrorism policy to be effective.

Other Selected Errors and Odd Statements by the Authors

• Reilly describes Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood as an “explicitly religious organization” (p.160) that “seeks our destruction” (p.153). Rather, the Muslim Brotherhood is better described as a political organization, and it is not seeking the destruction of the United States. Reilly makes claims without any evidence.

• Reilly says, “President Obama…failed to notice that these uprisings have come close to achieving one of al Qaeda’s principal goals – the elimination of…apostate authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa” (pp.157-
Rather, it was the democratic aspirations and struggle of largely non-ideological masses that led to newly elected leaders. The outcomes are not close to al-Qa’eda’s principle goals because anti-al-Qa’eda Islamists have taken over.

- Sebastian Gorka says that individuals involved in Global Jihad “are not primarily politically motivated; they are primarily religiously motivated, with political goals as important, but secondary” (p.193). This contradicts Gorka’s claim that “Islam is political” (p.188). If Islam is allegedly political, how can political goals be secondary?

- Sebastian Gorka says, “Bin Laden may be dead, but the narrative of religiously motivated global revolution that he embodied is very much alive and growing in popularity” (p.185). Gorka provides no evidence to substantiate this claim.

- Sebastian Gorka says, “We can go back centuries and centuries, but the most important thing is to place al Qaeda in the last 100 years of Arab and Islamic history […]” (p.193). While Gorka claims that those who wage global jihad “are primarily religiously motivated” (p.193), his five “stepping stones in the last 100 years” that are of “core significance” to understand what he believes is the “threat doctrine,” or the “ideology of Global Jihad,” are all mainly related to political – not religious – matters.

The first links to the “consequences of World War I” (including the end of the Ottoman caliphate) (p.193), the second is the “consequence of World War II,” consisting of two “geopolitical factors” – the survivors of the Holocaust and where they would be relocated, and the loss of Palestine (p.194-195). The third are events that happened in 1979 and those connected to them: the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the siege of Mecca by a group of militants (pp.195-196). The fourth and fifth milestones are the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and associated events of 1990 and 1991 (p.197).

Furthermore, Gorka did not mention that Osama bin Laden and other fighters supported US interests when they fought the Soviet Union. Bin Laden’s animosity towards the US occurred after the Soviet-Afghan War was over, specifically when US troops were invited by the Saudi regime for protection from a possible attack by Saddam Hussein. In other words, political events initiated Bin Laden’s animosity towards the US, not any particular ideology. Gorka believes political goals to be “important, but secondary,” yet fails to provide a convincing argument why he believes militants like Bin Laden are “primarily religiously motivated” (p.193) – especially when Bin Laden’s “ideology” did not make him oppose the US before and during the Soviet-Afghan War.

- Sookhdeo, according to Katharine Gorka, asserts that “Islamism is not a new ideology” (p.11). However, Sookhdeo contradicts himself when he says, “Islamism first appeared in the first half of the 20th century” (p.19).
**Part-12: Conclusion**

*The Authors do Not Understand the Enemy*

Sun Tzu says, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

It seems that the authors have not only misunderstood the enemy, but also the history of the Cold War, as well as President Reagan’s perspectives and actions. The authors have not only failed to identify the enemy, but have labeled the majority of Muslims who are the most useful allies against terrorism as guilty accomplices due to their belief in the Qur’an and Sunnah, and the classical Sunni tradition that explains them.

The authors have not presented convincing arguments that ideology is the main cause of terrorism today, and have ignored the research findings and interviews of many scholars who stated that ideology had little to no influence in many cases. The authors have homogenized a variety of Muslims, naively lumped past with present events with different social-political environments, and glossed over nuances of the political-religious domains and dynamics in classical Islam, as well as of contemporary Islamist movements and militant groups today.

*Playing into the Hands of Militants*

The authors propose a simplistic explanation that terrorism is rooted in religion (Islam), and ignore the vast, sophisticated corpus of scholarship that addresses other influences and variables. The authors ignore major findings of studies that illustrate foreign policy as a leading factor and contributor to animosity and terrorism, and marginalize all factors except ideology to sustain their own ideologically-driven views. To blame Islam and Muslims is to play into the narrative of al-Qa’eda and other militants who wish to wage a cosmic war, with each side representing itself as “good” fighting against “evil.” The neoconservative ideology and their political-religious perspectives are just as extreme as the ideology they claim to battle. Listening to the authors would sustain a “Clash of Civilizations” mentality on both sides, and make the battle against militancy very difficult to win. As Kenneth Ballen rightly says, “Indeed, the far-too-frequent stereotyping of Muslims serves only to reinforce the radical appeal of the small minority of Muslims who peddle hatred of the West and others as authentic religious practice.”

[292]
Blaming mainsteam Sunni Islam for the faults of extremists who distort Sunni scripture, theology, and history is not an intelligent strategy to counter terrorists. It will only isolate Muslims and increase the probability of hatred, misunderstanding, division, and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Regarding the authors’ representation of Islam’s expression today as a continuation of centuries of Islam from the past is historically inaccurate and reflects a lack of understanding of the evolution of Islamism in a time of modernity. Olivier Roy says, “It is intellectually imprudent and historically misguided to discuss the relationships between Islam and politics as if there were one Islam, timeless and eternal.”[293] Similarly, Esposito says that “a reductionist approach that sees the religion of Islam as the primary driver of Muslim-West relations and as a necessary source of conflict and a clash of civilizations is a dead end and dangerous. It obscures or downplays historical, political, and economic causes for conflict, posits a monolithic Islam and Muslim world as well as a monolithic Europe and America.”[294]

Because the current US Administration does not blame Islam for terrorism, the authors incorrectly believe that the administration has “shut down” all training on Islam. Therefore, the authors’ concerns and criticisms of previous US Administrations that divorced Islam from terrorism in their statements, reports, and policies are not only unwarranted, but inaccurate, misleading, and dangerous to the security of the United States and the peaceful Muslim majority worldwide.

The authors fail to consult reputable and large polls that explain what Muslims today really think, and superimpose their unverified understandings, assumptions, and biases on Muslims instead. Ignoring such polls is highly irresponsible, especially for a group of authors who would like to improve counter-terrorism policy in the United States and protect Americans from terrorism. What the authors ignore is exactly what policymakers and intelligence officials should be attentive to.

Not Ignoring the Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy

It is just as, if not more, important for Americans to know how Arabs perceive America and what they admire and resent the most. Contrary to the authors’ views, US foreign policy and its effects on the Arab psyche are the most important to focus on and address.

In a 2009 to 2011 poll of six Arab countries, the question was asked, “What two steps by the United States would improve your views of America?” The first two reasons pertained to Israel/Palestine. Telhami, the author of the study, says, “The top four answers all pertained to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the presence of American forces in the Gulf region.” The 2011 poll showed the following results in order of priority:[295]:

a) Israel-Palestine peace agreement: 55%

b) Stopping aid to Israel: 42%

c) Withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula: 29%
US policymakers and security experts should reconsider and adjust their foreign policy to win hearts and minds in the Arab world. Furthermore, the polls illustrate that political solutions are needed for political problems to improve the image of the United States in eyes of the Arabs.

Respecting Muslims and Islam

The World Gallup Poll states, “Muslims resent what they perceive as a War on Islam in the West that equates their religion with terrorism and extremism.”[296]

Contrary to the authors’ views, blaming Islam for terrorism is not only incorrect from a logical and academic standpoint, but it also worsens Muslim-Arab relations with the United States and European countries, and makes it more difficult to use the moderate majority as the best tool to counter radicals of all colors. Rather, the differences between the views of the peaceful Muslim majority and the minority of terrorists/extremists should be differentiated, and both should not be lumped as one group with identical views. Agreeing with the authors is detrimental to the national security of the United States, Europe, and the wider Arab and Muslim world.

Authors’ Ideological Infusion Compromises National Security

It is probable that the ideology of Patrick Sookhdeo and other authors have altered a realistic understanding of the world and their views of the Muslim majority. Asking the authors to comment on recommendations to combat radical Islam may be just as absurd as consulting extremist Muslim groups to combat radical Christian groups. The Westminster Institute appears to be less of a counter-terrorism/radicalization institute, and more of a religious institute that uses politics to attain their religious, ideological aims. It is difficult to accept the advice of these individuals seriously, especially when the element of religious bias is likely to be there, and when policy recommendations are made through such an ideological prism. The authors seem to care more about the purity of “Western Civilization” than protecting our borders from “Muslim” militants. As illustrated, the authors demonstrate, contrary to Sun Tzu’s advice, that they do not know their enemy.

Refining the Counter-ideology Narrative

Contrary to the views of the authors, the main threat is not the majority of peaceful Islamists who participate in democratic elections, and who are willing to be molded by the political-social contours and exigencies of today’s nation-states and its peoples’ aspirations. This democratic participation by Islamists should be seen as a moderating force on more extremist groups who, like other militant groups, have relinquished
violence and rebellion and opted for more productive and peaceful means to attain rights and respect.

At the same time, al-Qaeda and others of this minority who oppose the majority of Islamists, non-ideological masses, as well as non-Muslims, should be actively opposed through counter-ideological measures and other means. Such efforts should be undertaken while recognizing that ideology is only one of many factors that contribute to terrorism. Ideology in many, or maybe even most, circumstances may have less of a contribution to terrorism than perceived by the authors compared to other factors, including the effects and perceptions of the Arab and wider Muslim world of US foreign policy. Counter-ideology alone will therefore not improve perceptions and relations with the Arab and Muslim world, or necessarily be as effective to weaken terrorists. While US foreign policy concerns are identified and addressed, the counter-narrative against militant ideology can be best formulated by knowledgeable, mainstream, Sunni Muslims, and non-Muslims. This counter-narrative should utilize Sunni Islamic history and jurisprudence to demonstrate that the actions of terrorists are contrary to the “early pious Muslims” who they claim to emulate. All Islamic terminology, including jihad, mujahid, and other terms frequently used by terrorists and their uninformed describers, should be distanced and differentiated from the acts of terrorists by repudiating their self-claimed “jihad” as hirabah or, preferably, irjaf.

Unfortunately, the authors of the book mistake most Muslims as one homogenous group, do not use or advocate the participation of the majority of peaceful Muslims against militancy, and, similar to the terrorists they denounce, describe the acts of terrorists using terminology derived from Islamic Sacred Law. The authors’ authoritarian and condescending tone towards the Arabs and the religion of the Arab majority serves to damage more than improve relations. Such an approach undermines the bulwark against the militants who deceptively speak in Islam’s name, while alienating the Muslims who are most capable of denouncing and defeating them.

It is recommended that US policymakers and counter-terrorism professionals continue to marginalize the views held by the authors to ensure that terrorism does not become an even greater threat, to ensure continuing positive relations with the Arab and Muslim world, and to allow the strengthening of security of the United States, its allies, and of the majority of peaceful Muslims globally.

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Works Cited


[14] Ibid.


[17] Ibid.


[20] The Westminster Institute and Isaac Publishing are located at 6729 Curran St McLean, Virginia, 22101


[43] Ibid., pp. 76-77.
Extremism After the Arab Spring


Asef Bayat says, “The categories “Islamism” and “post-Islamism” serve primarily as theoretical constructs to signify change, difference, and the root of change. In practice, however, Muslims may adhere simultaneously to aspects of both discourses. The advent of post-Islamism does not necessarily mean the historical end of Islamism. What it means is the birth, out of the Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different discourse and politics. In reality we may witness for some time the simultaneous process of both Islamization and post-Islamization.” (Asef Bayat, “What is Post-Islamism?” *ISIM Review* 16 (Autumn 2005): 518–542, accessed May 22, 2013, doi: 10.1080/09546550802257226, [https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17030/ISIM_16_What_is_Post-Islamism.pdf?sequence=1](https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17030/ISIM_16_What_is_Post-Islamism.pdf?sequence=1))


Ibid., p.5.


F. Gerges, op. cit.,p.36.

Ibid., p.37.

Ibid., p.46.
Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Muslims are also the majority in the Palestinian Territories and Western Sahara."

The ten countries that declare themselves Islamic States are Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brunei, Maldives, Mauritania, Oman, and Yemen.

[R. Grote and R. Tilmann, op. cit., p. 10. These countries include Algeria, Bangladesh, Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia.]


[Ibid.]

[102] Ibid.


[113] J. Lumbard. op. cit., p. 33


[Ibid.]


[120] J. Lumbard. op. cit., p. 34.

A. Al-Dawoody, op. cit., p.52.

[122] Ibid., p.53.
[124] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid., p.163.
[128] Ibid., p.164.
[133] Q. Huda, op. cit.,p. 47.
[135] Ibid., p.100.


[139] Ibid., p.95.
[140] Ibid., p.93.
[141] Ibid., p.96.
[142] Ibid., p.96.
[145] Ibid., p.28.


101


Ibid.


Q. Huda, op. cit., p. 64.

Ibid., p. 65.

Ibid., p. 65.

Ibid., p. 67.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 68.


M. ul-Qadri, op. cit., p. 358.

Ibid., p. 360.

Ibid., p. 358.

Ibid., p. 361.

Ibid., p. 363.

Ibid., p. 366.

Ibid., p. 367.

Ibid., p. 370.

Ibid., p. 371.

Ibid., p. 358.

Ibid., p. 360.


G. Fuller, op. cit., p. 270


Ibid.


R. Reilly, op. cit.p.198.


Ibid., pp.119-121.


Ibid., pg.6.

S. Telhami, op. cit.,p.117.

J. Esposito and D. Mogahed, op. cit., pg.6.

Ibid., pg.5.


Ibid.
See, for example, the list of denunciations of terrorism by influential Muslims and organizations at Charles Kurzman, “Islamic Statements Against Terrorism,” accessed June 2, 2013,


[239] Ibid.


[284] Ibid.


